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Abstract
H�w can theology survive the acute challenges it has encountered in the modem era? Stanley
Hauerwas suggests that theology constructed (or, better, deconstructed) on the terms set by
modernity is bound to result in a theology that loses its voice-a theology emptied of any
conception of God substantial enough to challenge a contemporary secular, scientific- view of reality.
· Yet he maintains that theology is misguided to the extent that it submits to the principles which lead
to this impasse. History has made us quite cognizant of the contingent, traditioned, and complex
nature of human interpretations of the world. In light of the multiplicity of constructions of reality
and the conflicting assumptions that lead to different ways of settling claims· about truth, it becomes
unclear how we might adjudicate between divergent conceptions of the world. Thus, according to
Hauerwas, it no longer is obvious why the Christian tradition must work from within the
assumptions of modernity-assumptions which lead to its demise. This work seeks to investigate
both sides of this position. Can the Christian tradition, in particular, resist the attacks it has
sustained in the modem era by insulating its claims in this sort of rhetoric? And, if not, does
theology indeed, as Hauerwas suggests, start down a slippery slope which leads straight to its
dissolution?· Put broadly, these are the questions this project attempts to answer.
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Chapter 1: Sheer Assertion
Introduction
The theological/ethical witness Stanley Hauerwas unfolds in With the Grain of the Universe and
a prodigious output of other works serves as a fitting example of the peculiar variety of discourse
taking place (especially around the subjects of ethics, theology, and religion) in this postmodern age.
Hauerwas insists on a theological project that refrains from the temptation to submit itself to the
anthropocentric standards erected during the Enlightenment, for the very subject matter which
theology purports to describe-namely, God-demands the assumption that it "cannot begin with
our questions, but rather begins as an act of faith" (2001: 7.2). Thus, Hauerwas's theological
undertaking and the ethics he elaborates in the process are unshakably embedded within the
Christian tradition-a tradition which purportedly discloses "a knowledge rightly described as
revelation" (2001: 8.48).
One of the central objectives of this paper will be to survey the "argument" (i.e., story or,
better, witness) proclaimed by Hauerwas and examine the charge of fideism that it frequently elicits.
Hauerwas aptly summarizes the concern, voiced most prominently by James Gustafson, that his
theological method:
reflects the position of certain 'Wittgensteinian .fideists,' such as Paul Holmer and George Lindbeck, who allegedly
hold that the language of science and the language of religion are totally incommensurable. They do so,
Gustafson argues, in the interest of making theological claims incorrigible, such that persons are socialized into a
particular form of life so thoroughly that they are not open to other ways of viewing the world that might
challenge their religious categories. (Hauerwas 1988: 93)

Before proceeding to this discussion, however, I will briefly examine the potential validity of
Hauerwas's concern that the theological project of those who make the move to which Gustafson
has yielded conclude with a theology so frail as to effect only slight demurring from theology's most
resolute enemies-an issue to which I will devote more pointed attention in the latter sections of this
paper. 1 Submitting one's methodology to modeimty's standards of intelligibility, Hauerwas avers,

1 Early on, I merely indicate the reasons for Hauerwas's concerns and later examine some rather unHauerwasian attempts to
dude theology's contemporary difficulties, including Gustafson's.
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brings undesirable consequences for any theologian who wishes for her theology to offer the world a
substantial and distinctive challenge (though this is not primarily w� Hauerwas takes a significantly
different approach). But despite the upshot for a robust theology in Hauerwas's Wittgensteinian
turn, I will also attempt to evaluate the legitimacy of such a move, which constitutes no easy task in
light of the subtle and sometimes puzzling nature of Hauerwas's work-a characteristic which is
itself revealing about the nature of the "argument" he makes and what is required of his readers.
In the course of the essay, however, lengthy discussions of themes apparently tangential to
Hauerwas's material will foreshadow the fact that I am concerned to move toward conclusions well
beyond the immediate scope of Stanley Hauerwas, assessing the viability of certain (of what I
perceive to be some of the strongest) contemporary theological trajectories. In this regard, Stanley
Hauerwas represents a kind of situated starting point, from which I will abstract outward to other
theological, as well as non-theological, dialogical partners. In the process, I will assess Hauerwas's
understanding of language and traditions and suggest a number of revisions to his insights in these
areas. Accordingly, I will argue that our epistemic plight in a postmodern world is not as bleak as his
"sheer theological assertion" implies. In the end, I find myself most sympathetic with contemporary
theologians who have made the very moves to an "attenuated" theology that Hauerwas resists, yet I
will further examine whether or not, at the end of the conversation, theology has lost its (distinctive)
voice. And, finally, I will consider whether my conclusions entail problematic ramifications in the
arena of ethical discourse.
Given the subject matter of this paper as it ventures beyond the domain of Hauerwas's
position into sketchy and tentative claims on matters as broad and controversial as the validity of
adjudicating between or among truth claims embedded within divergent linguistic conceptions of
reality; specific claims about the nature of the cosmos, humanity, the self, and the intelligibility of
various conceptions of "God"; the character and cultural role of religion and theology; and the
nature of ethical discourse, one rather obvious but important qualifier is in order: namely, the
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admission that I make no pretension of speaking in a tone of finality on any of these issues. My
proposal involves the much more modest aim of making some useful contribution to ongoing
discussions in these areas as I attempt merely to tie together my current understanding of some of
the most important questions humanity faces in our current historical setting. To this end, I will
begin by elucidating the position of Stanley Hauerwas by first drawing the lines beyond which he
refuses to wander.
Spurning the Liberal Project
In The &ligious Significance of Atheism, Alasdair MacIntyre describes the modem retreat of
theologians who "are offering atheists less and less in which to disbelieve" (1969: 24). Hauerwas,
like the protagonist of With the Grain of the Universe, Karl Barth, can certainly not be so accused: he
seeks no refuge in a palatable (read, attenuated, in Hauerwas's view) Christianity. But for Gustafson,
whose theology is reduced to an experience of piety springing from a sense of dep endence on the
"powers that bear down upon us," this charge, at least ostensibly, seems to stick. Hauerwas wonders
how such powers have any relation to the God of Christianity and indeed why one ought to have a
worshipful (rather than, say, rebellious) attitude toward life at all as a result of this feeling of
dependence.2 Reinhold Niebuhr, Hauerwas claims, forwards a similarly empty theology: "Indeed, it
is by no means clear why we ought to call Niebuhr's 'vitality and form and the source of all existence'
'God'-much less why we ought to identify such a god with the Christian God" (2001: 5.17). And
William James's ''There must be more . . . "

epitomizes

this kind of view, which is essentially

naturalism combined with a dash of sympathetic openness to "personal religious feeling" (however
that is construed) and its potential for the construction of meaning in human life. Non-Christians
will be far less reluctant to object-perhaps even eager to accept-the basic premises of these men.

2 Albert Camus might say that our existential condition makes the issue of constructing meaning in a meaningless void (not
grateful worship of that on which we dcpend)-in short, choosing to live or die-the most serious philosophical question
facing us.
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However, the accounts of Christian discourse to which the work of Augustine and Aquinas bear
witness, as well as Barth and Hauerwas, offer no such comp;omise.
Hauerwas notes, ''You do not need to have your conceptual machinery, to say nothing of ·
your life, turned upside down to understand James or Niebuhr" (2001: 6.4). Barth, on the other
hand, "turned his back on the world" that accepted the general theses of these two thinkers with so
little reluctance. Indeed, ''Barth staged a frontal attack on some of the most cherished conceits of
modernity, not the least being the conceit that humans are the measure of all that is" (I-I�uerwas
2001: 6.8). Modern theologians have insisted upon beginning theology just from where, according to
Hauerwas, it should not commence: by examining human experience and the natural world as humans
perceive it. (Hauerwas sees Barth, incidentally, as the archetypal resistor of this primary temptation
of modernity.) Their effort has been to "develop a natural theology prior to or as grounds for
subsequent claims about God" (I-Iauerwas 2001: 1.4). But this project reveals two insurmountable ·
difficulties.

First, establishing warrant for belief in such a generic god has proven problematic

enough in itself.

Furthermore, and more importantly, developing a "natural" theology-that is,

natural theology as conceived in modernity-abstracted from the rest of Christian speech and
practice will not reveal the God of the church, but "a god with a problem" (2001: 1.1 ). Hauerwas
affirms:
Yet the heart of the argument I develop in these lectures is that natural theology divorced from a full doctrine of
�od cannot help but distort the character of God and, accordingly, of the world in which we find ourselves. The
metaphysical and existential projects to make a 'place' for such a god cannot help but 'prove' the existence of a
god that is not worthy of worship. (2001: 1.1)

Hauerwas's Neo-Barthian Alternative

So where does one begin? Lest the theologian end with a god which is but a reflection of
humanity, she or he must begin with God. That is, theology must be carried out theocentricalfy. God
reveals theology; theology does not reveal God (I-Iauerwas 2001: 8.1 ). By taking this point of view,
one comes to see "the necwi!) of the actuality of revelation" (2001: 6.49, emphasis added). Revelation
precedes proofs.

Belief precedes understanding (2001: 6.46).
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Natural theology as conceived in

modernity, in fact, is wrongheaded just to �e extent that humanity is not even in a position to see
nature as God's good creation. That is precisely how humanity, on its own terms, will not interpret
nature, and this will remain the case as long as one continues to regard the world and life from the
perspective that humankind is the measure of all that is.3 Hauerwas puts it this way: "any answer ·
that is truthful must be a witness to God's answer. In other words, theology cannot begin with our
questions; rather, theology begins as an act of faith" (2001: 7.3). Likewise, Barth explains, ''The
Bible tells us not how we should talk with God but what he says to us; not how we find the way to
him, but how he has sought and found the way to us" (qtd. in Hauerwas 2001: 6.18).
And why must this be the theologian's method? God is God, and we are not. God must take
the initiative. God must come to us. Anything less (i.e., humanity striving Godward) inevitably
results in a god constructed by humans. A god proved on humanity's own terms produces a god of the
world: ''Barth learned that 'a proved God is world, and a God of the world is an idol"' (Hauerwas
2001: 6.16). Hauerwas maintains that a similar understanding is evident in the work of Aquinas, who
"understood that the existence of God does not depend on any proof because such a proof cannot
help but submit God to human hands and, as a result, make God less than God" (2001: 6.44). A
god constructed from the ground up (i.e., from an anthropocentric point of view) will never lead to
the God Christians worship, but merely a "First Cause" or something similarly empty.

(One

wonders how a "First Cause" might desire for us to behave.) And the human-centered methodology
resisted by these thinkers represents a principal feature of modernity (2001: 1.32). This theological
approach issues forth in precisdy the wrong direction: "Self-assertion requires that humans give to
themselves the standards of thought and action rather than seeking it from an external source, like
,
God' (Matthew Bagger qtd. in Hauerwas 2001: 1.32).
There will, of course, be immediate objections to the theocentric enterprise advanced by
Hauerwas. Presuming to start with an adequate account of the God of revelation, he anticipates, can
3 This approach might be described in a number of ways: the sin of anthropocentrism, the pride of self-worship, the myth
of autonomy, among others. "Barth ... describes pride as the desire to be the 'judge' of our own life" (Hauerwas 2001: 7.46).
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surely "seem to be no more than sheer assertion for those whose habit of thought has been nurtured
in modernity'' (2001: 1.2). But this is exactly what Hauerwas's argument entails: ''when Christian
theology is done in faithfulness to the gospel, it cannot help but appear 'against the grain' of the
world" (2001: 8.20). Knowing the God Christians worship requires widerstanding God on God's
terms, yet, because this does not constitute our normal way of viewing reality, one must be
transformed, having her entire conceptual machinery realigned in a theocentric (as opposed to
anthropocentric) fashion.
1bis clarifies some initially enigmatic statements Hauerwas makes, such as: "[I]f we could
have the kind of evidence of God the evidentialist desires, then we would have evidence that the
God Christians worship does not exist" (2001: 1.26). If one could simply give the outsider an
·additional piece of the puzzle ("the significance religion can give to one's life," "something more,"
''religious experience" in an otherwise naturalistic worldview, etc.) and a knock-down argument for a
God categorically beyond the ken of-human understanding, the Gospel itself would be falsified by
suggesting that revelation and witness are unnecessary and that one need not be transformed
conceptually and morally in order to know the truth, for the claims Christianity involves alleges that
outsiders have their entire perspective out of order. Their anthropocentric path will never lead to
God no matter how well they are instructed concerning the supposed beneficent telos of the universe,
purported religious experiences, or the allegedly meaning-laden "something more" in life.
Thus, the critical role of witness in Hauerwas's narrative becomes apparent. He makes this
clear from the start, affirming, "I must show why Christians, even Christians who are theologians,
can be no more than witnesses" (2001: 1.2).

If the outsider must be transformed in order to

understand, then the believer can do no more, and should do no less, than witness. The Christian
God is not just one (perhaps significant) concept among others in the Christian language. It is not
some mere additional fact the outsider can come to grasp through "natural" theology or a
philosophically-derived "theism."

God plays an utterly determinative role m Christian discourse.
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Christian practice and speech cannot be abstracted from this God,_ and God cannot be abstracted
from Christian practice and speech, else the meaning of both become distorted. Thus, for those
whose god is not this God-and the world they inhabit consequently not the Christian world-the
only means to "conversion" will be through Christian witness. This was the task Barth conceived
for himself: "In his life and his work, Barth sought nothing other than to be a witness to God's
reconciling and redeeming work in Jesus Christ. He therefore did not try to 'explain' the truth of
what Christians believe about God and God's creation," (2001: 6.9) for any attempt at explanation
would belie the fact that outsiders need their entire lives and understanding of the world reoriented,
not simply given an additional (explanatory) piece to fill out their nearly completed puzzle.
It is for this reason that Hauerwas's work bears the label of being difficult to understand.
But Hauerwas does not pretend that it will be easy (nor did Wittgenstein pretend understanding
would come easily). What Hauerwas demands of his readers and listeners is a complete overturning
· of the well-entrenched philosophical habits of modernity. As Brad Kallenberg recognizes, "to read
Hauerwas rightly is to be transformed in the process" (139). And Hauerwas would gainsay his own
story if he provided a neat, tidy system to facilitate everyone's journey. A system is precisely what he
cannot and will not provide.

What he offers instead is Wittgenstein-like therapy. By reading

Hauerwas's witness-style "argument," one might laboriously come to learn the language of the
church and thus be "converted"-not by doubting everything that was thought previously, but
through a realignment of everything that was formerly believed:
[T]he language of the church is itself already an argument just to the extent that [Barth's] descriptions and
redescriptions cannot help but challenge our normal way of seeing the world. Earlier I said that the Ch11r.h
Dogmatics is a manual designed to train Christians that the habits of our speech must be disciplined by the God
found in Jesus Christ. I can now add that this training, which requires both intellectual and moral transformation,
enables Chnstiam to see the world as it is and not as it appears. (2001: 7.19, emphasis added)

Assessing the Charge of Fideism
This overview brings the discussion back to the primary issue under consideration. DeJJJite
the purportedly empty theology that James Gustafson and others assemble by taking an alternative,
allegedly more compromising course, does the charge of fideism against Hauerwas stick? Is there
7

something about Hauerwas's "position" which commits him to such an insular view of Christian
discourse that Christianity becomes unintelligible-particularly to the outsider to whom Hauerwas
directs a substantial amount of writing? Hauerwas summarizes a key aspect of Gustafson's criticism:
Gustafson argues that insofar as religion and science are rational activities, it must be possible in principle to
subject theological claims to correction and revision in terms of what we have learned from the social and
physical sciences. Any attempt to maintain that knowing religiously and theologically is radically distinct from
other ways of knowing can only result in making Christianity unintelligible in a world in which fewer and fewer
people are formed by the 'Christian language.' (1988: 93)

In this article (in which he responds to Gustafson's criticisms directly), Hauerwas explicitly denies so
insulating Christian language, especially from the claims of the sciences, as to render it unintelligible.
He contends that he has not attempted "to justify Christian belief by making Christian convictions
immune from challenge from other modes of knowledge, particularly science" (1988: 98). He adds,
"Indeed, I have avoided all appeals to a Kuhnian-like position (with which Kuhn may unfairly be
identified) designed to protect theological convictions from possible scientific challenge" (1988: 98).
Nevertheless, Hauerwas qualifies this statement with an ample dose of incredulity toward science: "I
am less confident than is Gustafson that it is meaningful to assign to science qua science an
overriding veridical status" (1988: 99). And this qualifier remains just indefinite enough to indicate a
quasi-disclaimer. The reader is left to wonder, in light of this negative remark about science, exactly
what status he wi// give it. What is the nature of th.e relationship between the two (potentially, but
not necessarily) conflicting fields of theology and science?4
Again, he urges, "I certainly do not believe, nor did Wittgenstein, that religious convictions
are or should be treated as an internally consistent language game that is self-validating" (1988: 99).
This proposal appears straightforward enough and even seems to be a move that would permit him
to evade Gustafson's charge of fideism (though that is not necessarily to acknowledge that this
escape could be made without significant expense to the rest of what Hauerwas proclaims in his
theology). But he further notes, ''\X'hat Wittgenstein has taught me, however, is that if we attend to
the diversity of our language we learn to appreciate what a marvelously diverse world we inhabit and
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how complex claims about the way the world is will inevitably be" (1988: 99). The language game of
the church is not self�validating, Hauerwas insists, but we must realize "how complex claims about
the way the world is will inevitably be." Despite having the appearance of a repudiation of the
complaint of fideism, this statement remains somewhat ambiguous. Axe such claims so "complex" as
to be indistinguishable from claims which are entirely self-referential and self-validating? Or are such
claims sufficiently commensurable with other discourses as to allow for gradual translation (say, into
the language of modernity)? Though Hauerwas surely would not assent to the latter formulation, he
explicitly denies the former way of putting the matter. But where he comes down precisely-if there
is indeed an alternative-remains unsettled.
But perhaps Hauerwas must be obscure here, for lurking in the background is his demand
that understanding the truth does not come without conceptual and moral transformation. I think
that this is revealed very subtly in the following statement: "Indeed, as I have argued elsewhere as
well as here, theological convictions inextricably involve truth-claims that are

in principle

open to

challenge" (1988: 98, emphasis added). My suspicion is that theological convictions are only open to
challenge

in principle

because

in practice

seeing the truth of Christian convictions requires a complete

overturning of one's conceptual machinery. And it would seem that Hauerwas must sustain this
thesis above all lest he begin down the slippery slope which, he worries, leads to a theology void of
any content weighty enough to challenge an outsider's view of the world (though outsiders might be
intrigued by the general insights of someone like Gustafson since "God," on such an account, can be
discarded without significant loss).
Perhaps this can be unpacked via a specific example. Hauerwas challenges Gustafson to
elucidate some particular scientific conclusion which might call for a reassessment of the convictions
Hauerwas narrates. He contends, "I am unaware of any scientific conclusion that would now require
such revision" (1988: 98). What is perplexing about this statement is how it can be reconciled with

4

This is a question. incidentally, to which I will devote more exclusive attention later.
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Hauerwas's judgment that any substantial Christian theology will not remain so if it attempts to
translate itself into the language of modernity. Surely there are some obvious examples (which are
not at all new to Hauerwas) of scientific data that at least appear (especially for the skeptic) to impinge
strongly on certain theological convictions. To state merely one common example, the observation
that the entire animal kingdom (including humanity) evolves defining characteristics on the principle
of fitness for survival in some particular ecological niche (or, at a more specific level, on the basis of
fitness for genetic survivability in a specific ecological setting), resulting in an appearance of "design"
so horrific that any creator responsible for such a scheme (or too passive to revise it) would hardly
be worthy of worship-though, if powerful, perhaps it might be wise to try to appease this monster.
And if it is merely God's impotence that is at issue here, it seems it would be no more reasonable to
worship such a God, except perhaps out of sympathy. In short, the sciences might suggest that our
lives are "given" to us, but the language of "gift" in this context hardly seems appropriate.
It is just such an evaluation of sdence 'sjudgment of theology which I think Hauerwas would say
indicates that one's view of the world is distorted and that the person with such a view needs to be
transformed before she will ever see the world rightly. Indeed, he quotes statements from James,
Niebuhr, ·and Gustafson not far removed from (though in much more eloquent language than) the
ac·count I have given, indicating what apparently (from science) contributed to the emaciation of
their theology (or James's philosophy). One excerpt from James is particularly to the point:
Our solar system, with its harmonics, is seen now as but one passing case of a certain sort of moving equilibrium
in the heavens, realized by a local accident in an appalling wilderness of worlds where no life can exist . . . The
Darwinian notion of chance production, and subsequent destruction, speedy or deferred, applies to the largest as
well as the smallest facts . . . The bubbles on the foam which coats a stormy sea are floating episodes, made and
unmade by the forces of the wind and water. Our private selves are like those bubblcs--cpiphenomcna . . . " (qtd.
in Hauerwas 2001 : 2.1 0-1 1)

James later describes the "enormous waste of nature in producing resul�s that get destroyed because
of their unfitness. [Darwin] also emphasized the number of adaptations which, if designed, would
argue an evil rather than a good designer". (Hauerwas 2001: 3.24). Niebuhr, moreover, laments, ''We
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find ourselves in an impersonal universe. Its laws do not respect those things which are dear to
us . . . It has no place for moral values" (qtd in Hauerwas 2001: 4.24).
Rather than challenging Gustafson to identify a specific example from science that becomes
theologically problematic, I expected him to say something like this: "Sure, certain scientific
conclusions, viewed through the lens of modernity, do not fare well for certain Christian convictions.
Just look at James, Niebuhr, and Gustafson: their theologies (or philosophy of religion for James)
become rather meager after attempting to square their positions with the ramifications of a neo
Darwinian scientific paradigm. But their mistake is this: to the extent that Christian convictions
which fundamentally involve the notion of God's ultimacy (i.e., humanity is not the measure of all
things )-are subjected to the judgment of the natural and social sciences, one ought to expect that
her or his theological convictions will become increasingly tenuous. 5 Theology does indeed fail if it
attempts to play by the rules of a game established in modernity." That, it seems to me, is the
strength (and maybe the downfall) of Hauerwas's argument. A position such as that of Gustafson's
appears to produce, in the end, a theology so void of substantial theological content that its god
becomes the name for something an atheist will probably only have minor reservations about
accepting, perhaps seeing their difference as little more than a slight semantic disparity. 6 And
Hauerwas does arrive at the kind of point I am describing after mentioning that in prindple Gustafson
might be able to raise some specific objection, though Hauerwas doubts that it will come to much.
He indicates that a primary stumbling block "to many who would assess whether Christian
convictions are true" is that "the ve-ry content of Christian convictions requires that the self be
transformed if we are adequately to see the truth of the convictions-for example, that I am the
creature of a good creator yet in rebellion against my status as such" (1988: 99-100). This appears to
be the functional equivalent of a disclaimer of the initial reply to Gustafson. What in principle might be
done (i.e., reassess Christian beliefs in light of empirical knowledge gained through science which
5 I.e., tenuous nlative to classical theological formulations: a God-in-process, for instance, may be more tenable, but it surely
is not a deity as robust and potent as most traditional conceptions of God
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impinges upon specific theological convictions), in practice actually becomes impossible because any
move toward making such a reassessment becomes merely symptomatic of the disease of modernity:
it only suggests that the person has yet to be adequately transformed such that she understands that
God is God and consequently interprets the world properly. This seems to be especially clear in the
following pronouncement about the way things "really are": "Talk of our sin, therefore, is a claim
about the way we are, but our very abiliry to know we are that way requires that we have alreac!J begun a new
life" (1 988: 1 00, emphasis added). Seeing the world rightly presupposes transformation. And this is the
crux of the dilemma: if seeing the world rightly presupposes transformation, witness seemingly
becomes unintelligible by being necessarily ineffectual.

An Unintelligible Witness?
Brad Kallenberg discusses this same issue in defense of Hauerwas. Are we reduced, he
wonders, to the problematic dichotomy of 1) needing to be insiders in order to

gain understanding

or 2) remaining outsiders with such incommensurable languages that communication (and thus
understanding) becomes impossible? Can meaningful (i.e., potentially successful) communication
occur with the outsider given her lack of insider's stance? He asks:
Do those who find Wittgenstein's description of language persuasive thereby surrender the hope of finding
resources by which they can make themselves intelligible to those who do not share this perspective? This is a
very pointed question for Hauerwas, who has made a career of writing to 'outsiders.' If Hauerwas is necessarily
unintelligible to outsiders, then his thinking may be of limited value for insiders as well, since the Christian
identity (by his own admission) hinges upon the practice of witness. (1 19)

Have the lessons Hauerwas has learned from Wittgenstein so insulated the language game of the
church as to make witness unintelligible on its own terms?
Though Kallenberg argues in defense of Hauerwas, he too appears to speak two different
messages out of either side of his mouth. In reply to Gustafson, he quotes some of the same
statements from Hauerwas that I have mentioned above which ostensibly elude the charge of
fideism.

Yet he also articulates a message of intranslatability (e.g., transformation precedes

translation or understanding)-which amounts to a functional denial of the former. He writes, "In
6 This is an issue I will give more thorough consideration at a later point.
12

conclusion, it is �auerwas's view that there can be no evaluation
transformation

of truth claims without commensurate

of the subject doing the evaluation» (133, emphasis added). Elsewhere, he says that

Hauerwas's position entails "that agents be shaped before they can see the world rightly' (113). But
this appears to make witness necessarily unintelligible to outsiders. Being necessarily unintelligible to
those to whom it is directed, witness is rendered meaningless. Kallenberg's claim that "inherent in
Christianity is the assumption that in order to know the truth you must be converted' (138, emphasis
added) makes this problem quite evident.
The real issue is this: to what extent are the ostensibly incommensurable languages (i.e., of
the language of the church versus the language of the person habituated in modernity) divergent? If
one requires so much training that an entire conceptual overhaul is necessary for understanding
(which seems to be the case for Hauerwas's language of the church), then it does seem that the
charge of insulating Christian language in a form of fideism sticks. If the believer's meaning of God
is so insulated from the outsider· as to require not only participation in the believer's form of life
(praying, confessing, etc.), but also participation in that form of life in the proper manner (praying and
confessing, etc. with the commitment of a believer to that form of life), then witness becomes
unintelligible. That is, if it is truly the case that the cross and resurrection demand a "repositioning of
the self vis-a-vis nali!J'' or the "traniformation of the self in order rightly to see the actuality of our world,"
(Hauerwas qtd in Kallenberg 127), then it seems that Christianity has become excessively parochial
for witness to have any intelligibility or force. If the outsider stands in need of training, she will
surely never come to realize it.
Perhaps the following comparison will make this clearer. Hauerwas's position-in limited
ways--overlaps with certain arguments circulated under the rubric of Reformed, and especially
Calvinist, theology. Though the analogy with Hauerwas certainly does not go all the way down, a
strand of Reformed orthodoxy takes a similar theme (i.e., understanding presupposes transformation)
and runs with it all the way to absolute preposterousness, which-by attending to the overlap and
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differences-might help further illustrate the dilemma. Cornelius Van Til is representative of those
who emphasize a Calvinist brand of christocentric methodology in which transformation is necessary
before one will ever see the world rightly. Van Til stresses the importance of the Holy Spirit's
initiative in the work of regeneration-a work which nece.rsari/y and logically precedes understanding
God and recognizing Christian truth (due to sin-here, as "total depravity''). Hauerwas's God, of
course, is not the coercive and arbitrary tyrant of Van Til. With the theme of God's coercive
regeneration of the otherwise-infidel's heart, Van Til's position reduces to absolute absurdity. But
without any notion of coercion (which Hauerwas, for that good reason and because it does not
square with everything else he says, surely does not want), it is difficult to see how witness could ever
amount to much. For someone like Van Til, God might sovereignly utilize a specious kind of
"witness" as part of the process of conversion (though without God's work of regeneration, such
witness necessarily comes to naught.)· But Van Til's account remains absurd because God can be
viewed as nothing but an absolute and arbitrary sovereign. Humans literally become automata in
God's capricious hands on his premises. But Hauerwas's account, without this theme of coercion and
its detestable deity, cannot make witness intelligible either. Hauerwas might insist that he cannot be
suggesting that Christian language is completely enclosed (self-referential and self-justifying), for he
considers witness to be of chief importance. But in the process of explicating this witness, he argues·
that Christian language cannot be translated into the language of the world because that could not
help but betray the God-centered nature of Christian discourse. But both propositions cannot be
meaningfully held simultaneously. Either an adequate translation can be accomplished (at which
point, perhaps Hauerwas is right, Christian discourse-at least relative to its traditional or classical
formulations-will become significantly thinner, perhaps to the point of dissolving any recognizably
"Christian" tradition), or witness will never be effectual (and thus unintelligible on the church's own
terms, for the very effort of witness suggests that it can be potentially effective).
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Along these lines, Hauerwas relates the discussion of Bruce Marshall on the role of the Spirit
of God:
Christian argument rests on witness, and both argument and witness are the work ·of the Spirit. Thus, as Marshall
argues, acquiring a Christian view of the world 'calls for a persistent willingness to overturn the epistemic
priorities (though not the totality of belief) we would otherwise be inclined to have. In at least this sense,
ordering one's beliefs such that Jesus Christ has unrestricted epistemic primacy requires a change of heart and not
simply a change of mind. The gospel ofJesus Christ, it seems, proclaims a truth which cannot be known unless it
is also loved.' (2001 : 8.1 0- 1 1)

But whence comes this "willingness" (language with which I am not sure Hauerwas is entirely
comfortable) on the part of an outsider to love a truth she necessarily cannotyet clear/y see? Later, he
adds, 'Thus the Spirit does not, as Marshall puts it, 'persuade by adding something to the totality of
belief, by giving us reasons or evidence we do not already have, but by eliciting our assent to a WCfY of
structuring the whole' " (Hauerwas 2001: 8.17, emphasis added).

But how could anyone ever be

persuaded about something she necessari/y does not understand? How will an outsider's assent ever be
elicitedr
The Pragmatic Test
Perhaps ,there is one more possibility for how witness might be made intelligible: on
pragmatic "grounds." In fact, Hauerwas indicates this in the context of the discussion about Marshall:
"To put Marshall's pragmatic thesis in the idiom of this lecture: Christianity is unintelligible without
witnesses, that is, without people whose practices exhibit their committed assent to a particular way of
structuring the whole" (2001: 8.17, emphasis added). Also, near the close of this final chapter of
With the Grain, he writes:
For those inclined to so dismiss my argument [ie., not be convinced by this witness], I have no decisive response
other than to ask if they represent practices that can produce a Dorothy Day. Yet if there is no standpoint
external to the practice of Christianity for assessing the truth of Christian convictions, then why should anyone
trust their lives, in Marshall's terms, to an epistemologically afflicted set of convictions? Lives may be required
for assessing Christian convictions, but can such lives be anything more than attractive or unattractive? (2001 :
8.47)7

In the end, perhaps it simply becomes a pragmatic issue-especially given "the diversity of our
language" and "how complex claims about the way the world is will inevitably be" (Hauerwas 1988:
7 Later, I will consider what might in fact be problematic about Hauerwas's paradigmatic saintly lives and the discourses th
ey
represent.
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99), for "Christianity is no 'worldview' . . . that can be assessed in comparison to alternative
'worldviews"' (1988: 100). Since what is required is a complete conceptual overturning-which does
not occur except through successful witness-the "truthfulness of [Christian] beliefs must be
demonstrated in [Christian] lives" (1988: 100). In the end, perhaps the question is: ''What do you
want to get done?" or ''What sorts of lives do you want to produce?" No further argument can be
made besides the witness that is the lives of believers.
Unfortunately, though, this moves things no closer to intelligible witness than before.
Outsiders, to whom witness is directed, already have a way of viewing the world that implies a
metaphysics and practices incompatible (on Hauerwas's own account) with that which they are
seeing in the witness-and thus will, necessarily, always remain unconvinced. A non-Christian can
see the lives Christianity produces, but what will ever make an outsider think the life of a Christian is
desirable if she stands on the outside looking in? Suppose that a non-Christian woman sees a
Christian woman witnessing to God through a life of fidelity to her husband. And suppo'Se that
woman wants nothing to do with such a lifestyle. She does not construe it as a good in the way the
Christian woman does. In fact, she is a sociologist who thinks that the same social norms which
serve to repress sexual promiscuity and adventurousness reinforce possessive attitudes between
spouses, generating a higher percentage of abusive relationships. How will such a woman ever be
attracted to the Christian's witness? If her entire conceptual scheme is in need of overturning, how
will she ever come to assent to its overturning untzl it is overturned-at which point her
"deliberation" about it is equally unintelligible. If Christianity (whatever that might be8) constitutes a
truthful way of viewing reality, how can the outsider ever come to understand its truth apart from
having her entire conceptual framework overturned? And until that happens, what meaning is there
in something like "witness leading to transformation" or some other apparently unintelligible talk?9

8 Tbis point will be unpacked in a later section.
9 Hauerwas would likely retort: "One step at a time . . . " What I am suggesting is that, on Hauerwas's own premises, we are
left with this impasse. I would quickly assent to the possibility of reconstructing our beliefs and practices orie plank at a
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If a person needs to be transformed in order to know the truth, how will she ever succumb to the
processes which lead to conversion? An outsider might ask, ''Why should I become a Christian?"
and hear Christian witnesses proclaiming something like, ''Well, we are joyful, though not always
happy. In fact, we suffer terribly at times, though we remain thankful because we know that through
suffering we glorify God by following the example of our Lord." But such a statement will never be
persuasive to the outsider who is already joyful (i.e., on her own terms-where "joyful" means
something different, as defined outside the church).

Such a person would have no time for

discourse about "faithfulness to God through suffering" and so forth.
Whether Hauerwas's position is characterized as "fi.deist" or whatever else, it seems that
Hauerwas may be right insofar as the modem theological alternative he resists (which reflects the
"natural" theology of the last couple of centuries) might amount to digging its own grave (or,
Hauerwas might say, amount to prolonging its life by making a deal with modernity to not say
anything dis agreeable). But the tum to elude this other side of the dilemma seems to encounter its
own difficulties, as reflected in the charge of ''Wittgensteinian fideism."

An Insider's Understanding
My primary complaint-namely, that the move Hauerwas makes to elude the problems
encountered by Gustafson and others reveals an unwarranted identification of understanding with
belief, which makes witness unintelligible-is no new criticism of such arguments. D.Z. Phillips
summarizes a critique forwarded by Alasdair MacIntyre in which he claims that "one of the fatal
implications of identifying understanding and believing . . .is that one can no longer give an intelligible
account of a rejection of religious belief' (89, emphasis added). Thus, MacIntyre argues basically the
same position as I have been, though from the (negative) angle .of an outsider rejecting the witness of
the believer (or an insider rejecting the faith) rather than the (positive) angle of conversion-though,

time, yet I think this opens the door for the very theological transformations made by modern and postmodern theologians
that Hauerwas wants to resist.
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to switch metaphors, they are just different sides of the same coin. To take Madntyre's angle, if
understanding becomes identified with belief, how can rejection be made intelligible?
In the context of Bruce Marshall's claim that "the gospel . . . proclaims a truth which cannot
be known unless it is also loved" (2001: 8.11), Hauerwas comments, ''The gospel does not require
that we doubt everything we believe but that everything we believe be reordered" (2001: 8.11).
Hauerwas, though, is not comfortable with Marshall's implied assumption "that 'beliefs' can be
isolated from 'changed hearts.' The truth that is loved is not a 'belief that provides the basis of a
subsequent love" (2001: 8.11). There is no way to judge propositions "apart from the speaker" (and
the speaker's practices or life) (2001: 8.11). Thus, Hauerwas weds belief and understanding (or love)
to the greatest possible degree. He utterly identifies one with the other. Similarly, "Barth refused to
use natural theology as a way of attracting those not already convinced by Christianity because he
understood that for Christians everything is related to everything else and that, therefore, the only
truthful way to make Christianity attractive is through witness" (2001: 8.18, emphasis added). To get
theology right, our lives must be in order. But, bam·ng conversion, our lives will never be in the necessary order.
Consider Phillips's articulation of how closely understanding the believer's meaning of God
is to participation in that form of life: "Discovering that belief in God is meaningful is not like
establishing that something is the case within a universe of discourse with which we are already
familiar. On the contrary, it is to discover that there is a universe of discourse we had been unaware
of' (84). Similarly, Norman Malcolm inquires, what is "belief in God" abstracted from "some
religious action, some commitment, or if not, at least a bad conscience"? (100).
However, such an identification of understanding with belief (i.e., genwne, insider
participation in that form of life), argues MacIntyre, renders rejection unintelligible. Phillips seems
to think that there is a sense of "rejection" which is of something one does not fully understand:
"the man who says, 'Religion is mumbo-jumbo as far as I am concerned,' is making a wholesale
rejection of a way of talking or a way of life. That way of talking and that way of life mean nothing
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to him, but this does not mean th �t he cannot reject them" (89). But Macintyre's critique stands: on
this principle, what the skeptic rejects must necmari/y be something different from what the believer
believes. He cannot reject what the believer accepts because understan�g and belief have been
equated. Specifically, if rejecting "God" necessarily entails rejecting something other than God, how
does one reject-and, conversely� how does one accept-God?
Initial Determinations

Thus, I think that it is appropriate to approach Hauerwas's position rather cautiously. With
explicit agreement, he says that "Barth sought not to convince but to witness and, of course, by
witness to convict'' (2001 : 8.64). But it is difficult to see how this conviction will ever be aroused.
Given Hauerwas's assumptions, there is nothing in the Christian witness capable of persuading
outsiders to submit to the training necessary to understand the Christian language. Such targets of
Christian witness cannot help but to see Christian discourse as explicated by Hauerwas as "against
the grain" of the world. Thus, it is difficult to see how outsiders will ever come to assent to the
claim that Christian theology actuai/y runs--contrary to all of their strongest inclinations-"with the
grain of the universe." Of course, little catches Hauerwas by surprise, including the reaction I have
elucidated. He writes, " . . . I do not blame anyone for approaching my work (or Yoder's) with a good
deal of caution and skepticism" (1 988: 97). Hauerwas always seems to hold a trump card: even the
apparent paradoxical talk of which I have charged Hauerwas and Kallenberg may be a kind of
therapy to tell the reader, "You still need to be transformed" (though that is indeed why I have
attempted to show that the problem I have raised is a problem on Hauerwas's own grounds).
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Chapter 2: Language/s, World/s, Tradition/s, & Selves
Underlying Concerns: Language/s & World/s
For this reason, I want to move beyond this critique and attempt to show some faulty,
though very subtle and well-represented, assumptions about the nature of language and interpretive
traditions upon which Hauerwas narrates his project and. present an alternative understanding of
language and traditions as much more porous, fluid, open-ended, diverse, and potentially
commensurable than Hauerwas allows.

His account is carried along on an underlying view of

language and tradition that entails unnecessary occasions of incommensurability and a potentially
dangerous form of authoritarianism.
Contrary to my foregoing accoun� Kallenberg insists that "Gustafsc;>n misunderstands
Hauerwas (and therefore mislabels him) on account of modern presumptions about the way language work.I'
(1 5 1 , emphasis added).

Later, he describes "Gustafson's affinity for a model of language that

Wittgenstein spent over two decades trying to cure us of. At its heart is the belief that language is
one thing and that which languages depict is another" (1 56). Kallenberg concludes, ''To the extent
that Wittgenstein has convinced us to reject this [representational] model of language, the charge of
fideism loses its sting" (1 59).
question in this paper.

These statements point to some of the fundamental matters in

The impulsive response to an unmitigated presentation of Christian

theological claims (as a method of challenging our normal way of perceiving the world) is to ask,
"How can I know your way of viewing, describing, and explaining the world is the right way?" Of
course, this question appears to betray the assumption that there is some way to escape or transcend
our historically and culturally embedded positions to assess rival points of view.

Criticizing

Hauerwas for dogmatically proclaiming a theological description of the world in which we live would
likely be rejoined by an invitation to expl� what alternative we have. On Hauerwas's account,
"fideism" remains a rather empty charge because it is very much beside the point. If it is not the case
that a meaningful (which is not to say absolute) distinction can be made between language and reality,
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then accusing Hauerwas of fideism is merely symptomatic of one's own confusion and problematic
assumptions regarding how language works.

In fact, fideism would simply be a redundant

description of what language unavoidably involves. To put it another way, if it is not the case that
language is one thing and that which languages depict (ie., some meaningful and accessible notion of
an actual world) is another, then not only can no useful distinction be made between the two, but they
also are in all relevant ways synonymous.
While it seems that many contemporary philosophers have surmounted the temptation to
draw sharp and clear divisions between language and our varied conceptions of the world, important
distinctions remain between our linguistic conceptions of reality and the world itself. Language and
world, I will argue, may be in important ways internally related, but this relation does not extend all
the way down. How we conceive the world is constitutive of the "world" in which we live, but we
are nonetheless able to articulate conceptions of the world that more or less "represent" the way
things truly are (the scare quotes surrounding represent simply indicating' a reasonable amount of
distance from overstated notions of correspondence between language and reality).

That is, our

conceptions of the world are relevantly different from the actual world, and it is possible for our
conceptions of the world to be adapted to increasing "fitness" to reality qua reality.

On these

principles, fideism does name something problematic: it names the tendency to obstinately and
persistently insulate one's conception of the world from recalcitrant experiences and observations
which call for conceptual shifts in one's worldview.
In straightforward terms, Hauerwas's dogmatic narration of reality in theological terms
implies not merely a blumng of the distinction between conceptions of the world in language and the
world as it is independent of our conceptions of it, but rather entails an elimination of the distinction
between the two.

Conversely, while I acknowledge an important degree of obscurity in this

distinction, I will maintain that conceptions of the world in language and the world itself remain
relevantly distinguishable. To put it in Kallenberg's terminology, is language one thing and that
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which languages depict another? Or in relation to "truth," it might be asked: is there a meaningful
distinction between that which is true and that which is held to be true? I think there is. Robert
Kirk inquires, "Is there really such a thing as getting it right? Or is the best we can do to tell stories,
stories which may give more or less satisfaction, but which cannot be capable of describing how
things really are?" (Kirk 9). 10 I am convinced that we can do better than merely telling stories. But
in order to make my case, Hauerwas's own implied perception of language must first be more
concretely elucidated.
Hauerwas's Understanding of Language

A selection of specific examples will perhaps serve to illumine how Hauerwas not only
closely links language with the world, but makes utter/y no distinction between them. One case involves
the fact that he makes absolutely no distinction between "natural" theology and "revealed" theology.
The conceptual framework with which we view or interpret the natural or empirical realm has a
"givenness" that resembles the theological category of "revelation." This is disclosed unequivocally
in a quote he cites from Karl Barth:
What the meaning of God the Creator is and what is involved in the work of creation, is in itself not less hidden
from us . . . than everything else that is contained in the Confession. We are not nearer to believing in God the
Creator, than we are to believing that Jesus Christ was conceived by the Holy Spirit and born of the Virgin Mary.
to It is in this sense--our lack of access to the world such that we might meaningfully speak of the way things trufy are-that
I interpret Hauerwas's position as "anti-realist," which leads potentially to strong and perhaps insurmountable kinds of
incommensurability between divergent worldviews. The sense in which Hauerwas is a "realist'' is in the sense that there
really is an unchanging world "out there"; we just do not have any meaningful sort of access to it according to Hauerwas
at least not independent of language. Independent of language (if it is even permissible to talk in those terms), the "actual"
world remains distant and wholly indeterminate. It is in a similar sense that, while Hauerwas's position represents a strong
form of relativism (regarding descriptions of reality), "relativism" designates a rather vacuous category on his account (not
to mention that it does not immediately appear to be an apt label for someone unabashedly articulating a theological
description of the world). On one hand, relativism is somewhat obvious and boring� and, on the other hand, one cannot
coherently be a "relativist'' in practice: one just lives and acts from within her own conditioned perspective. To make the
charge of an excessive farm ef (cognitive) relativism (i.e., fideism) effective, one would have to show that we have some kind of
"access" to the world independent of language such that we might make our conceptions of the world increasingly "right''
or "true" (a position which may nonetheless incorporate relativizing ideas into a moderated realist understanding of our
conceptions of reality); or at least one would have to show that there are more or less adequate (which is only obscurely
different from the notion of more or less tK&11rate) ways of piecing together the contending elements of various traditions
making claims on our lives. Fideism can only be legitimately described in critical terms if one shows how some alternative
exists: for instance, by showing that strong kinds of relativism are not as obvious as Hauerwas presumes, but are rather
erroneous in consequential ways. (Analogously, accusing an emotivist of proclaiming a parochial understanding of values
[or an excessive form of moral relativism) would constitute an empty objection to her position because it would merely
rename what she thinks is inextricably involved in moral discourse. Her position implies that there is no objectiw morality to
get at, so it is an impotent objection to say that she has a parochial understanding of values. To such an objectio� she
would likely reply, "What else?")
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It is not the case that the truth about God the Creator is directly accessible to us [via "natural" theology] and that
only the truth of the second article needs a revelation. (qtd. in 2001: 7.20)

The very manner in which the natural realm is interpreted is no less given or received than
something akin to "revelation. " Whether or not one conceives of the world as God's creation (or
life as God's gift) is no less dependent on our linguistic paradigm than coming to see Jesus as God
incarnate.

Language and world have an entirely internal relation.

"From Barth's perspective,"

consequently, "metaphysics is not a mode of investigation with a subject matter peculiar to itself.
Rather, we speak, and in speaking we discover that we are caught up, together with that about which
we speak, in an endeavor that must be described as 'metaphysical"' (Hauerwas 2001 : 7.31). 1 1
Another revealing (and related) example may b e found in his lack o f endorsement for any
philosophically derived "theism. " Since philosophy can no longer supply the kinds of overarching
criteria for assessing the intelligibility and truth of varied cultural discourses, including theological
ones, it is impotent to provide either some more-fundamental grounds for theological (or religious)
claims in something called theism (where "positive religions and their theologies are like species within
that genus" [Holmer 1 08]) or comprehensive denials of theological (or religious) claims in something
called atheism. What God means is so bound up in a network of beliefs and practices that it cannot
but distort the meaning of God to abstract the concept of theism (and some corresponding god) out
of the rich contextual webs of Christianity or Judaism or Islam. Though each asserts it, they do not
all mean the same thing by the statement, "God created the heavens and the earth." It comes to
mean something different depending on the tradition from which it is declared. (For Christians, the
cross, for example, is not incidental to understanding the character of God.) So, for the church in
particular, a philosophically contrived "First Cause" is an unrecognizable and empty notion of deity.

11 Emmanuel Katongole unpacks what Hauerwas has in mind: "metaphysical thinking, in as far as it is a form of reflection,
must concede to thepriority ofthe social-lingllisticpradia, which is the conditionfor any reflection . . . Hauerwas's rejection of a
'metaphysics' should, therefore, not be seen as equivalent to the denial that traditions entail claims that may properly be
called 'metaphysical"' (164). For example, "Creation (that the world is created by a gracious God) and the Fall (that the
world is marked by sin) are ontological claims made by Christi.an theology. What Hauerwas denies is that these claims 'can
be so isolated that they can be metaphysically construed separately from the [Christian] tradition' that embodies them
through its concrete practices of pacifism and forgiveness" (Katongole 165).
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What is entailed by Hauerwas's view of language might be worked out by recalling the
skeptic's question, ''Why should I become a Christian?'' or "How do I know that the Christian 's
description of reality is the 'correct' one?" Hauerwas might argue that the reasoning which leads to
this question (especially as asked by the skep tical outsider) misunderstands the way we become what
we become (or how we come to think what we think). Perhaps the question ''Why should I become
a Christian?» is tantamount to me asking ''Why should I become a 'Reutzel'?" or ''Why should I
become an 'American'?" Perhaps the reasoning above assumes too much about the possibility of
choosing our own story-about having a certain degree of autonomy (or agency) to choose what
stories we will allow to shape our lives. And, more to the point here, perhaps we have less autonomy
than we might be tempted to suppose with regard to our conceptions of the way the world actually
is. What is the "correct" interpretation of the text of reality? Perhaps the response to that question
is not an answer, but an additional question: namely, ''Who are you?" For to think otherwise is to
imagine sorne kind of pre- or trans-linguistic access to the world. But is the situation really so bleak
and our understanding of reality so inescapab/y parochial? While there are certainly many correct
judgments about language and traditions to be gleaned from Hauerwas's work, perhaps our
epistemological condition is not so dismal.

Proper Insights . . . Theological (Mis)appropriation
Implicit in Hauerwas's theological elucidation of the world are many fine insights concerning
language. It can hardly be doubted that there is a kind of givenness to our interpretive frameworks.
We (initially anyway) do not choose to accept the socially constructed "world" in which we live. As
we come to develop a capacity to participate in the linguistic practices of our own culture, we are
merely initiated into the worldview embedded therein. In this initial sense, divergent frameworks
say, medieval Christian or modem secular-simply represent different ways of viewing the world
(and in some sense constitute different "worlds''). We cannot-not a pn·o ri and not all at once
escape language and measure it against some unconceptualized reality. We must begin and thinkfrom
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within our own view of the world. In this importa�t sense, language is constitutive of what (our ever
changing) "reality'' (or, better, our native conception of reality) is perceived to be. Kirk writes, ''People
brought up in different cultures will speak different language-games, with different rules from ours.
They think of the world from within their own language and culture" (98, emphasis added).
This suggests an interesting sort of relativism: the social construction of human conceptions of
reality (which is not to say the construction of reality-in-itself, to which we purportedly do not have
any independent access). Michael Devitt and Kim Sterelny describe the consequences of this insight:
"Thought is linguistic in form. This thesis opens up various relativistic possibilities. If your thought
is tied to the spe,iftc language you speak, and if languages differ in important ways then your thought
might be deeply mysterious to the speaker of another language" (217).

Many who are more

impressed by the differences between languages than their similarities "suppose that to speak a
particular language is to adopt a parochial conception

of reality'' (Devitt and Sterelny 21 7, emphasis

added).
Furthermore, this givenness does not influence m,erely our original perception of the world;
a significant degree of givenness extends even to our inquiries into and ongoing experience of the
world. Whenever any kind of experimentation (even practical, informal testing) or other form of
inquiry is being executed, much is already necessari/y being presupposed to enable and inform the
questioning, and none of this is subjected to doubt (at least not at that level of inquiry). Malcolm
echoes this idea: ''We are taught, or we absorb, the systems within which we raise doubts, make inquin"es,

draw conclllsions. We grow into a framework. We do not question it. We accept it trustingly. But this
acceptance is not a consequence of reflection. We do not decide to accept framework propositions"
(95, emphasis added) .
In this way, Hauerwas clearly intersects epistemologically with current historicist thinking.
Sheila Greeve Davaney summarizes several of the increasingly assumed tenets in this line of thought:
Epistemologically contemporary historicism has clearly set itself apart from the quest for sure and universal
knowledge and aligned itself with the growing conviction that all knowledge is localized, relative to its time and
place, shaped by its history, infused by interests and interpretive in character, and part of a historical strand of
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other interpretations. Humans have no access to the world in an urunediated manner nor any way to compare an
uninterpreted reality with our various accounts of it and thereby ascertain whose version of reality is the true one.

(23)

Davaney describes the connection between insights concerning language and the emphasis on the
traditioned nature of all our thought made by many so-called postliberal theologians, with whom
Hauerwas appears to overlap in important ways. Postliberalism has been influenced, she explains, by
"approaches that argue for the centrality of language and culture in human life, and theological and
philosophical perspectives that emphasize the 'traditioned' or historical character of all human
experience and knowledge" (30). George Lindbeck, a trailblazer in postliberal theology, she adds,
"disavows the assumption that objective, universally valid knowledge is possible as well as the
correspondence theory of truth that has often attended that assumption . . . The dream of historically
unencumbered knowledge, yielding certitude and available to all in the same manner, is no longer a
possibility to be pursued in a historicist age" (25-26).
Not only do�s this raise potential problems for the hope of adjudicating between or among
different conceptions of reality, for some it signals the legitimacy of turning inward or backward to
the very traditions modernity attempted to rise above via some transhistorical rationality (or Reason).
An awareness of our views of reality as human, contingent, temporally and geographically local
constructions, Davaney explains:
has led certain thinkers to retreat to the confines of their traditions or to separate various e11ltural sphens offfrom one another.
Some, such as postliberals, have located themselves within the boundaries of the Christian tradition, arguing for the
validity of their claims solely in terms they believe emerge from that tradition and subordinating the claims of
other arenas to the assumed mandates of Christianity. (154, emphasis added)

It is helpful (and will become particularly important later) to see how Hauerwas follows this move by
reconceptualizing the notion of God's revelatory activity emphasized by Barth. Davaney explains the
turn taken by Barth:
[Barth and his compatriots] concurred with the Kantian limitation of knowledge to the human realm, thus
denying mzson's capacity to know God. However, they simultaneously rejected the Schleiermachian tum to a
noncognitive nligj,ous experience, asserting that such experience did not yield legitimate knowledge of God but was
only the reflection of humanity . ..Yet Barth did not conclude that thereby humans were condemned to ignorance
concerning God. Instead, he argued that God makes Godself known in an act of radical revelation in Jesus Christ,
and that in this revelation the true natures _of God, the human self, and the world are disclosed. (15, emphasis
added)
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Barth "offered a new foundation, located not in fallible human reason or experience, but in the self
disclosing act of an omnipotent and transcendent deity'' (Davaney 15). Of course, with the rising
awareness of a religiously plural world (not to mention the diversity of the Christian tradition itself),
"revelation, grounded solely in God's decision, proved elusive. It became difficult to discern who
was the recipient of such revelation or how to conceive of a revelation totally distinct from other
forms ·of human knowing" (Davaney 15-16). "In tum," she concludes, "reason, experience, and now
revelation had each been deposed as reliable grounds for theological claims" (16).
The classical, premodem conceptions of Jesus and scripture as God's unique, miraculous,
revelatory intrusions into the world eventually came under scrutiny as culturally relative, humanly
produced ideas that arose quite naturally in a specific historical context. Subsequent reactions, in
tum, were criticized as the notion of a common human experience of God increasingly appeared to
reveal the nature of humanity rather than God (Durkheim, for one, equated "God"--or mana or
however the socially induced sense of "Other" gets expressed-with socie!Y), and the notion of
human reason discovering God at the pinnacle of a quest into the intricacies of the planet and
cosmos began instead to unveil a Darwinian world more suggestive of the absence of God (as
traditionally conceived) rather than God's handiwork.
The consequences have lurked ominously over contemporary theology. Yet these modem
moves, for Hauerwas, have been misguid�d precisely by reducing theology to anthropology. In
contrast, Hauerwas, picking up on the dogmatic theological method of Barth, bolstered by the
postmodern recognition of the overwhelmingly traditioned character of our knowledge and
experience, resists these modem reversals and relocates the "revelation" of God not in some
miraculous, coercive movement of God into the world to reveal Godself to humanity, but within the
Christian tradition and its formative influence on the lives of its community-a revelation of God
singularly evinced in the lives of this community's inhabitants.

Hauerwas's concurrence with

Lindbeck is evident again here. According to Lindbeck, Davaney explains:
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Religions are comprehensive worldviews that express our deepest convictions about reality and about how
humans should relate to such a cosmic context. These overarching frameworks are historical. . . Thus to be
religious is not to hold some indubitable belilf guaranteed by an ahistorical reason or revelation . . . Rather it is to live out of an
interpretive story and to become a practitioner or a specific tradition's way of life. (32, emphasis added)

Rather than deriving theology from human insights into the world or human experiences of the
world, the world and our experience of it become understood and are articulated from within the
language and life of the Christian community. Bruce Marshall's description of George Lindbeck's
theological method reveals how strongly Hauerwas resonates with him in this regard. For Lindbeck,
Marshall explains, "[t]heology presupposes continuing practices of liturgy, sacraments, preaching, prayer,
service and the like, which are indispensable to the identity and continuity of the Christian
community'' (272, emphasis added). He adds:
Religions, including Christianity, are for Lindbeck most plausibly understood as 'cult11ral-lingllistic' systems,
structured networks of belief and practice which shape the primary truth claims their adherents make and the deepest
expen"ences they have. Lindbeck draws on recent social science (especially Clifford Geertz) and philosophy of
language (especially Ludwig Wittgenstein) to support this way of understanding the nature of religion, and he
contrasts it with two other approaches that have held sway in Christian theology: traditional 'propositionalism,'
for which religions are chiefly competing sets of truth claims, and modern 'expericntial-expressivism,' for which
religions are chiefly ways of giving outward utterance to prior inward experiences. (Marshall 272, emphasis added)

Human propositional claims and expressions of human experience entail mere reflections of
humanity rather than legitimate knowledge of God; true knowledge of God comes only as one
allows her knowledge and experience to be shaped by God's own community. This procedural approach
is perhaps summarized best by George Campbell's description of the methodology of Hans Frei,
who launched some of these postliberal traj ectories: "The method for this kind of dogmatic theology

is that offaith seeking understanding'' (Campbell 1 53, emphasis added).
With no unmediated access to reality, and no way of rising above our linguistically
constructed worlds in order to assess them against some "actual reality," perhaps we are reduced to
telling stories and speaking metaphorically and assessing our worldviews primarily on the basis of the
lives produced by them-a criterion that itself is not tradition independent. With such a cautious,
wary attitude toward ontological claims, perhaps it becomes legitimate to surrender the hope not
only for absolute, but even reliable, truth claims and tum back to the narrative resources of the
Christian tradition with the hope of continuing to generate fruitful lives-lives which might speak to
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the "truthfulness" of the tradition itself. "Theology, in this view, is primarily an intrasystematic affair
whose central criterion consists in faithfulness to the originating tenets of the tradition and whose
reference is almost exclusively to the particular community and its history" (Davaney 34).
Does it just come down to the issue of what sort of lives one wishes to produce? Of course,
it appears difficult to obtain an answer to the question of what constitutes impressive or desirable
human lives without drawing some reasonable conclusions about the nature of human life and its
relation to a larger web of existence in other forms of life, our planet, and the entire cosmos. It is
hard to tell what a good human life looks like without background assumptions about human
biological and social needs, conditions which enhance or suppress life, and so on. And if we are so
inextricably entrenched in our parochial, linguistically formed conceptions of reality, how might we
ever ascertain any legitimate conclusions about the character of our world? If the answer to that
question reverts back to the pragmatic grounds of people's lives, it appears that these vital human
questions form an endlessly circular impasse.

Weaving Our Lives Together
As I intimated earlier, I am not convinced that the situation is really so bleak or that our
understanding of reality is so inescapabfy parochial. We surely have no abso/ute/y unmediated access to
reality and no epistemological certainty built on indubitable foundations. But do we really need that
mythical view from nowhere-a "God's Eye View"-to permit adjudication between varied
conceptions of reality or at least to allow us to communicate between or among the various
traditions informing our own lives and weave them together into some coherent pattern? In short,
can we not make sense of our own lives and our own historical situation? Are we not agents with the
capacity · to call into question our own assumptions, not in order to leave all former ideas behind, but
enabling us to pioneer new ideas on the basis of foreseeable alternatives-that is, to generate
speculative hypotheses based on novel experiences, awareness of rival possibilities "external" to
some particular formative tradition (but internal to our own lives), or varying options available within .
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our own "primary'' tradition? Are we not able to distinguish theoretically between our conceptions of
reality and reali"!J itself in the limited space we are able to imaginatively venture beyond our
conceptions of the world such that we might legitimately aim to shape those conc�ptions toward a
better "picture" of reality?
My affirmative answer to these questions will revolve around several partially connected and
overlapping arguments. First, I will argue that thought always retains some limited but important
degree of independence from language-an admission necessary to account for the origin and
development of languages and distinctive traditions of inquiry.

This permits the possibility of

initiating significant alterations from within a tradition even without any rival schemes being clearly
in sight. The reality of perpetual novel experiences and observations, awareness of rival interpretive
schemes, and the internal diversity of traditions exponentially increases the possibility of such
cognitive pioneering. Moreover, given the nature of traditions as arising in a historical process of
appropriation and stitching together of diverse elements, the ongoing internally diverse character of
traditions, and the reality that (except in rare situations of absolute isolation) humans-as traditioned
selves-are never singularly traditioned but are rather subject to various informing narratives that
must be ever-newly arranged in some coherent fashion (if we are to make sense of our own lives in
our own historical context), the viability of reverting back to the authoritative past of a single and
purportedly unified tradition is categorically guilty of self-deception. I will argue that these points
together undercut Hauerwas's move to offer no explicit explanatory arguments for unapologetically
interpreting the world through the lens of the "Christian" tradition, subsuming the world into its
authoritative story.

. Limited Cognitive Independence: Agency
Saussure's understanding of language

epitomizes

a strand of thinkers for whom language is

viewed as so comprehensively determinative that it permits no independence of thought beyond the
utterly constraining confines of language: ''Without language, thought is a vague, uncharted nebula.
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There are no pre-existing ideas, and nothing is distinct before the appearance of language" (qtd. in
Devitt and Sterelny 265). But this view of language leaves the origin and ongoing development of
language a remarkable mystery-a miraculous, ahistorical cultural phenomenon.

The limited and

partial (nonetheless cons·equential) independence of thought from language seems necessary to
explain how ideas and interpretive schemes come to be embedded in language in the first place and
how those paradigms evolve as our collective experience of the world broadens. Whence come the
interpretive frameworks-from within which, of course, we initially view the world and construe our
experience of it-in thefirst place? There is a quite relevant sense in which they are "just there," but
they are not "just there" arbitrarily. And they do not remain static. Linguistic frameworks do not
arise ex nihilo, but originate and are adapted via experiential interaction with the one world in which
we live. Language can only be prior to thought to a limited extent and not prior in an ultimate sense.
If language were prior in an ultimate sense (and thus language and world a completefy internal relation),
th"en "there could be no plausible explanation for the origin of language. How could [any particular
community] have come to have their particular linguistic conventions?

It would be as if their

language sprang miraculously out of nothing" (Devitt and Sterelny 219).
Devitt and Sterelny skillfully explicate how thought appears to have some independence
from language in the development of linguistic concepts. First, acknowledging the sense in which
language precedes thought, they write, "Clearly the vocabulary a language provides does influence
thought. It is much more difficult to coin concepts than to use ones already available. And language
makes many concepts available.

Consider thoughts about unobservables; for example, about

genes . . . Darwin's own writing on evolution and inheritance is confused in places precisely because he
lacked this concept" (21 9). Nevertheless, they proceed to demonstrate that thought must retain some
autonomy in order to account for shifts in our interpretive schemes: "[I]t is not impossible to have
the thoughts without the word If Mendel had not had thoughts about genes without benefit of the
word 'gene,' the convention of using that word to refer to genes would never have been created. So
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the absence of a word does not prevent or constrain,

1n

any strong sense, thought about

unobservables" (219). Consequently, it is difficult to see how creative additions and revisions to
linguistic frameworks could ever occur if it were not the case that there is at least some "respect in
which the existence of a public word with a certain conventional meaning [is] dependent on the
existence of a mental word with that meaning . . . [I]n certain circumstances, the existence of a concept
in some people creates the convention for a word; this convention explains the existence of the
concept in many others" (Devitt and Sterelny 219).
Summarizing this understanding of the reciprocal relation between thought and language,
they write, "This view acknowledges the influence of language on thought while giving ultimate priority
to thought'' (219, emphasis added). The pattern of influence runs in both directions. Language
influences thought (and surely retains the more dominant influence), but thought also effects the rise
and development of linguistic concepts and interpretive schemes. The same "pre-"linguistic thought
mechanisms that enabled us to form a language · in the first place persist even when we are
acculturated into a preestablished language.

We are inclined to see the world in the patterns

anticipated by the language by which we are shaped, but we are not prevented thereby from
experiencing problematic anomalies and perhaps pioneering novel paradigm shifts to account for
observations of the world which better account for these inconsistencies. Again, Devitt and Sterelny
describe the impact in both directions: "Indeed, there is probably a close relationship between the
language a person thinks in and her public language. On the other hand, the development of that
public language and the system of conventions it embodies must depend on the achievement of
cognitive pioneers in having thoughts not then expressible in their public language" (12, emphasis added).
If language and world have the comprehensivdy internal relation Hauerwas's story assumes,
then language would certainly constrain our view of the world, leading to occasions of insurmountable
incommensurability between rival communities of thought (Devitt and Sterelny 218). But if we
possess some sort of reflective freedom-and it seems we must have unless worldviews arise
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ahistorically and change arbitrarily (which would be quite a mystery indeed)-then the worldview we
inhabit strongly infaences, but does not con.ftrain, the way we come to perceive reality. · On this
account, rival communities of thought and inquiry might encounter situations of mutual
unintelligibility, but not to the extent that potential communication is entirely forestalled. Devitt and
Sterelny point out an obvious instance of pnma fade incommensurability and mutual unintelligibility
in the example of attempting to use the language of Plato to express the ideas of quantum physics.
The example brings out the sense in which thought is limited and influenced by language, but it adds
no strength to the view that language entirely constrains thought. Indeed, it merely suggests that the
pioneering thought of twentieth century scientists produced elements of a language (arising through
semi-controlled empirical observations and interaction with an "external world" against a
background of time-tested assumptions fashioned by those who preceded them) that no one in
Plato's day had; they not only lacked the language, they lacked the thought that led to the language
and the background of linguistic constructs that might have enabled such pioneering thought. The
example emphasizes that thought does indeed depend on langu age, but langu age to some limited but
important extent depends on thought. Nor does it provide a case against thought being in an ultimate
respect prior to language. Vocabulary cannot force thought entirely, for such a situation would
preclude the very mechanisms which engender language in the first place.
And while this may at first appear to be a rather mundane observation, it has considerable
ramifications for resisting the Hauerwasian move inward or backward to some presumably
authoritative tradition based on the assumption that traditions are somehow sealed off from one
another in entirely incommensurable worlds. Devitt and Sterelny urge that the foregoing insight
entails the conclusion that "[t]he argument for an important [form of] linguistic relativity evaporates
under scrutiny" (224). Moreover, the partial autonomy of thought appears to permit the possibility
of making a meaningful distinction-to the (finite) extent that thought remains unconstrained by
language-between our conceptions of the world and the world itself and perhaps enables the
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possibility of shaping our conceptions of reality toward increasing "correspondence" to the actual
world. But I will leave these suggestions aside for the moment. 12
Applying this insight to the aforementioned comments of Norman Malcolm, some
weaknesses become apparent in his constraining view of language. He argues, ''We are taught, or we
absorb, the systems within which we raise doubts, make inquiries, draw conclusions. We grow into a
framework. We don't question it. We accept it trustingly. But this acceptance is not a consequence of
reflection. We do not decide to accept framework propositions" (95, emphasis added). There is clearly

a sense in which this is true, especially as the individual becomes habituated into the worldview of
her own culture. But there is also an important sense in which the collective, ongoing acceptance and
perpetual development of a linguistic framework is a matter of reflection. A community, over ti.me,
attempts to "make sense of'' (or bring into coherence) an expanding horizon of experiential
interaction with the world-adding new beliefs, discarding other beliefs, shifting the arrangement of
fundamental principles and background assumptions, and ·so on.

(Given other functions of

language, some particular culture may or may not exhibit openness to revision in practice.) It is true
that we are acculturated into a conceptual framework, but over ti.me, this collective social framework
changes as the range of human experience enlarges. And a crucial element of human experience is
(interpretive) interaction with a world that isjust there independently of us. Kai Nielsen describes this
open-ended process:
We think within an inherited belief system that we just learn and take on trust . . . But the system is not fixed and is
nothing like a formal, axiomized system . . . It is more or less continuously changing, though slowly . . .There is no
way of challenging this system-this Weltbild--as a whole. However, in the interaction of this network of
complex parts-which occurs as human beings act and interact-and with the development of thought and with
continued human action, some beliefs will come into conflict or at least will not fit well together or there will
come to be anomalous situations. With such eventualities, certain beliefs, including sometimes rather central
beliefs . . . will come to be questioned. The questioning here, as the pragmatists stressed, will be a live questioning
in the context of actual inquiry and not a ritualistic Cartesian questioning. (1991: 1 06-1 07)

Robert Kirk likewise explains the way in which recalcitrant experiences that reveal inconsistencies or
general interpretive inadequacies may elicit reflection on the more fundamental elements of our
12 I will typically retain scare-quotes around "correspondence" to distance my conception of it from less plausible
"mirroring" metaphors.
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worldview. Even as our web of beliefs is c�n�tantly being revised, the more theoretical aspects of
this framework are better "insulated from the flow of experience" (J6), yet, he argues, "reflection on
that theoretical framework itself may lead me to .change some of my more central beliefs. Such
reflection . . . may be prompted J,y expenence'' (76).
So there is a clear sense in which we do not decid� to accept the worldviews we initially
accept uncritically, yet there is a relevant sense in which we do "decide" (at both the collective and
individual levels) whether or not to accept a view of the world. Jeffrey Stout concurs: ''We may have
no power to transcend our traditional inheritance completefy--for we are finite, historically situated
beings-but we do not have to rise above history to call assumptions in question" (Stout 142). Of
course, our situated perspective does, however, determine whether or not any rival worldviews are
readily available as well as what sort of alternatives might even be conceivable (that is, to what extent
thought might creatively venture by standing on the shoulders of those of the past).
Critical Application to Hauerwas's Theological Method

If the application of these points to Hauerwas's theological method remains elusive, Sheila
Greeve Davaney provides concrete guidance.

The purpose of the foregoing account has been

primarily to insert a meaningful notion of self-conscious agency into an understanding of language
properly chastened by postmodern insights into the formative influence of language and culture on
the "worlds" in which human selves reside.

And this broad insight can be more specifically

employed at various levels.
On the principles Davaney unpacks, Hauerwas's introsystematic method of theological
"reflection" presupposes several problematic assumptions about the nature of traditions. Similar to
my general argument above, Davaney maintains, ''Languages . . . emerge over time; they do not appear,
complete in all essentials, in .some instantaneous moment of birth" (38-39)-a fact which entails a
number of important, specific conclusions.

First, traditions, as distinctive currents of thought,

35

obviously do not arise in some detached, miraculous, ahistorical moment; they are, rather, stitched
together from diverse elements. Traditions "emerge as the novel syncretistic combining of varied
strands of historical existence" (Davaney 1 09): "[e]very tradition is in reality many traditions" (1 1 2).
Consequently, "while historical existence is always concrete and particular, it is not thereby isolated
and disconnected" (Davaney 1 55). ''Relationality and s�cial connectedness," Davaney adds, "do not
vitiate particularity but fund it" (1 55). The establishment and ongoing development of recognizably
distinctive traditions of inquiry involves a number of collective and individual human decisions
concerning what will function for this particular community as central interpretive tenets and
background assumptions, what beliefs are most immediately susceptible to revision, what ideas need
to be discarded, and so on. And these human decisions are, of course, made in concrete historical
contexts. The nature of Jesus in the Christian tradition might be highly unstable and contested in
one historical moment or setting and largely fixed and "indubitable" in another.

Thus, these

decisions cannot be made arbitrarily or based on that which will give the tradition maximum unity or
cultural distinctiveness, but in fight of the community's actual historical context.
This relational character of any particular tradition with vari�us other traditions during its
incipient stages does not end there. Once traditions arise and begin to take some distinctive shape,
they do not remain static, but continue to evince a shifting, unstable character and possess often
unclear and porous boundaries with the potential for change as significant as the historical causes
that gave rise to them. Rather than being "self-contained and impermeable," "[t]raditions, including
religious and academic ones,· have porous, temporary, and continually reconfigured boundaries.
Though particular, traditions are not self-enclosed; they emerge out of historical interactions and
continually take different shapes through new interactions" (Davaney 1 55). Of course, a prominent
worry in the midst of these historical interactions might involve the concern to maintain the
tradition's (recognizably) distinctive cultural shape and role. The Christian tradition, for instance,
might worry that accommodations to its "outside" context will produce a "diluted" Christianity. But
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this concern assumes that there is something essential that must persist in order to preserve the
tradition, betraying an idealized view of certain past human choices as arbitrarily authoritative. If one
uses historicist insights to call attention to the finite and uncertain nature of all human claims, it
appears glaringly inconsistent to subsequently look to the past and raise select�d human claims to a
plane of indubitable authority. In relation to "classical" understandings of Christianity, modem
revisions may indeed appear attenuated, but this cannot be the primary concern, particularly when
one is sensitive to the historicity of all claims.
Given the way traditions originate and develop, their ongoing, internally diverse nature
further precludes the legitimacy of striving to maintain some stabilizing, authoritative essence. 1bis
is not to suggest that recognizable traditions can only change and never disintegrate (by offering
nothing recognizably distinctive), but simply that traditions are not univocal.

Davaney, citing

Gordon Kaufman as representative of those who resist such moves, explains, "For Kaufman, a
tradition is not something that receives its definitive content in its inaugural moments or textual
expressions; it is, instead, a dynamic pr�cess in which real change occurs and diversity is everpresent'
(87, emphasis added). Applied to the Christian tradition, this entails that "[t] here is not and never
has been one self-same story found in the originating narratives of the Christian tradition, nor in the
early theological decisions of the church; there have been various stories, of God, Jesus, [and] what it
means to be human" (Davaney 39). And, again, no human decisions along the way concerning
"primary'' organizing themes ever get beyond the possibility of revision. It is not acceptable "to 'rein
in' the diverse and even conflicting testimonies of the Bible through appeal to the Christological and
Trinitarian developments of the early church. These are part of a t!Jnamic history with which contemporary
Christians must contend.

They are not ahistorical, still points �at 'trump' all else in Christianity's

history'' (Davaney 39, emphasis added).

Recognizing the historicity of these claims involves

potentially seeing them as options among other past and present, available and creative, alternatives
as testimonies within the tradition.
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In fact, the specious principle of "subordinating all to God, who is ultimate" is endlessfy
problematized by the simple recognition that all such claims can be none other than human

constructions and claims, and "we may not claim . . . an absolute status for any human construction"
(Davaney 84, emphasis added). Davaney adds that "all our notions of God are human constructions,
and hence, like all other human creations (and claims], are open to question" (Davaney 157). Human
claims, precisely because they are historically contingent, fallible human claims, must always be
criticized and held with at least some degree of tentativeness. Even the "classic" Christian tradition's
principle of subordinating all to God on the basis of some coercive, miraculous revelatory entrance
of God into the world in the person of Jesus or the biblical narrative can never escape this problem
of human fallibility (not to mention many other problems associated with such claims). But especialfy
without this view of an ahistorical, miraculous revelation, why arbitrarily prioritize the past? As
Davaney points out, "that past is just as contingent and fallible as the present and merely by being
past does not acquire some authoritativeness denied the present" (63). The past has no privileged
status. "The past and present are on, so to speak, an equal ontological footing. The new and the old,
in [Sallie McFague's] words 'are in the same situation and no authority-not scriptural status,
liturgical longevity, nor ecclesiastical fiat-can decree that some types of language or some images,
refer literally to God while· others do not. None do"' (Davaney 94). 13 So, some other criteria are
13 The dilemma-i.e., what we require or need (presumably in light of God's nature) is God's revelation, yet all we have are
human constructions and claims-surfaces in Hauerwas's theology when he cites John Howard Yoder, saying, "Since for
some even the phrase 'truth claims' evokes echoes of theocratic compulsion or ofpretensions to infallibility, let us use the more
biblical phrases 'witness' and 'proclamation' as naming forms of communication which do not coerce the hearer" (qtd. in
200 1 : 8.33, emphasis added). It seems that, given the understanding of language on which Hauerwas builds his story, even
the believer who desires to proclaim the ultimacy of God and accept what God (not humanity) says about God has good
reasonsfor worrying that she lacks even an adequate (much less complete) or even any understanding of Goel. How can Yoder's
avowal of fallibility be harmonized with Aquinas's notion that certain convictions cannot change because they rest on
infallible truth? Evidence for God is unintelligible to a believer whose life is subordinated to God God judges the believer,
not vice versa. But this makes convictions unintelligible .from even the believer'spmpeaive, for it begs the question of who God
is and what God demands of the believer. Even Barth acknowledges this concern: ''We can only speak of [our knowledge
of God] again and again in different variations as God in His true revelation gives us part in the truth of His knowing, and
therefore gives our knowing similarity with His own, and therefore truth. And the question alwqys remains whether we stand in
faith so that this can be said of us, and therefore whether we are aa11af!ypartakers true knowledge God. In this matter we have
definitely no last word to speak. If we think we have, we have already pronounced our own judgment, because we have
deniedfaith'' (qtd. in Hauerwas 7.3, emphasis added). So even insiders have sufficient-perhaps even necmary--reason to
wonder whether they are really focused on the subject upon whom they purport to be focused, and, thus, whether they are
truly "partakers of true knowledge of God." Of course, as Barth declares, claiming anything more would denyfaith. Yet it
is just such a portrayal of an ostensibly groundless faith which elicits the charge, from Gustafson and others, offitkism. (It is

of
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necessary for upholding the centrality of selected strands of a tradition; n_othing legitimizes arbitrarily
raising the preferences of the past to the level of nonnativity for no other reason than the
preservation of some imagined essence.
In light of these reflections about the open-ended character of traditio�s and their necessary
link to a historical context which makes their very existence possible and out of which tensions arise
and changes occur, traditions can on/y become t:11ltural/y isolated I!] denying their very historical nature. That is,
to suggest that traditions might become insurmountab/y incommensurable with other forms of
discourse in their cultural environment neglects to recognize the tradition's ongoing, necessary link to its
historical context:
[I]he various spheres of culture and experience cannot be cut off from one another. Religious communities or
academic institutions, for example, come into being andf11naion within the complex sets of social, political and cultural
relations that structure human existence. To assume that they can be treated in isolation or that somehow they
yield sets of internal norms disconnected from other social realities is fandamental& to misconstrue the nature of
historia!J. (Davaney 155, emphasis added)

Elsewhere, Davaney outlines the ramifications of this point:
(\V]hile historical configurations or meaning and practice are always particular, they do not thereby exist in
isolation from one another or in some sort of splendid self-enclosed purity or incommensurability. Traditions
continually interact with one another and are reshaped by those encounters. Traditions, while distinctive, are also
porous . . . having boundaries but moveable, negotiable ones that are never set or final. Distinctions between them
are hence real, at least for some purposes, but relative and ever changing. (113)

Furthermore, not only are recognizable communities of thought originally and perpetually
fashioned out of a variety of constitutive elements, but human selves also evince a similar constitutive
makeup. Selves are not singularly (that is, only theologically or otherwise) constituted, but are rather
multitraditi'oned-. "humans are. . . shaped by many conversations, by plural traditions that not only affect
each other but are commingled in historically specific- ways" (Davaney 1 10). Inde�d, the very way
languages form and the way we are formed by a multiplicity of informing narratives implies the
possibility of our ongoing stitching together into some coh_erent story the various threads of
divergent interpretive schemes forming us. The various communities of thought that have a formative
influence on us were themselves developed in a fashion similar to the situation facing us-and other

interesting that, while believers often humbly acknowledge uncertainty regarding their claims about God, many seem to
have little doubt that "he" does not like most expressions of sexuality and is clearly opposed to marijuana use.)
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multitraditioned persons-in our present historical context.

The Christian tradition itself wove

together different strands of thought influencing it at vari<;>us stages of development to piece
together something slightly or significantly novel and appropriate for different places and different
eras. We likewise have unclear boundaries as linguistically shaped selves.
Of course, it seems there are more or less cogent ways of bringing together the various
influences making claims on our lives in the present. One patchwork quilt is not necessarily as
skillfully and thoughtfully woven together as another. But none of what has been said heretofore
requires that any of Hauerwas's specific convictions about Jesus or the biblical tradition are in need
of revision, save that their authority over even "Christian" lives (whomever might fall under that
rubric) is not beyond critical scrutiny. At another level of abstraction, my arguments imply that turning
inward to some particular formative influence upon our lives as an "overriding" tradition which is
given absolute primacy would apparently involve some degree of self-deception or self�denial. If, for
someone like Hauerwas, "[a]scertaining theological truth has less . . . to do with seeing how claims
'cohere with reality' than with determining how they cohere with and conform to the tradition within
which they arise" (Davaney 35), then to just that extent theology has misrepresented our historical
situation. Proclaiming that the text of the world is properly understood only as subsumed under the
authoritative narrative of the Christian story is to imagine that our reality is singularly formed by one
tradition-a tradition which is itse!f not univocal.

In reality, as Jeffrey Stout insists, most

"contemporary persons are shaped by religious traditions as well as secular ones" (Davaney 1 37).
And, more than being subjected to the influence of varying traditions, we are also constitutive agents
of those very traditions. (It would be quite curious how languages and cultures have arisen and
evolved if not as a result of the formative influence of conscious agents.) Davaney describes our
present situation similarly, contending that "many contemporary persons interact not with single
traditions but with multiple ones that compete for our loyalties and that we are forced to integrate in
novel ways" (1 50, emphasis added). In the US, we can hardly escape the formative influences of the
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Judeo-Christian tradition, an increasingly religiously plural culture, scientific views of reality, etc.
with all their inconsistencies, overlapping and incongruous demands, and so on. Davaney observes,
"Humans listen and contribute to numerous conversations simultaneously'' (113). Tying all of this
again to the open nature of traditions, Davaney concludes that "what makes a tradition a particular
tradition is not that something specific is retained, . . . but that something is contended with and that out
of that contention new, even widely deviant, portrayals of reality and of human life take form" (113,
emphasis added).

And we must contend with the formative influences of our past as

multitraditioned selves.
So, in short, it is necessary, given the nature of language, traditions, and human selves, to
either contend openly with the various traditions that influence us in the present, or live in self
deceived isolation. We are both shaped by our past and potentially innovative historical agents in the
present giving shape to future trajectories.
We are [on the principle of givenness] . . . created and constituted by what we inherit and the current network of
relations within which we reside. But on the other hand, historicists also assume another principle---the principle
of agency. We are not only created but also historical agents who impact, transform, and bring into being new
forms of human and natural existence. We are, thus, both constituted and matiw, made by the past and our
environments and constructive agents of the present and the future. (Davaney 1 04, emphasis added)

And we are, moreover, multi-informed or multitraditioned human selves. Multiple conversations are
within us whether we like it or not-indeed, even whether or not such personally internal multiplicity

entails the dissolving of some particular tradition giving shape to our lives. "Hence in our individual
and communal lives we are forced to contend with not one set of influences or one communal context
but many.

One central example of this can be seen in the claim by a number of pragmatic

historicists that persons in the present historical context live in a world in which certain scientific
assumptions have gained widespread credence and shape many arenas of present-day life" (Davaney
155). The slippery slope that Hauerwas wishes to avoid by retreating to the confines of a Christian
tradition to which absolute primacy is given is a slope we are on whether we like it or not:
"Contemporary persons cannot just retreat to supposedly isolated religious traditions without also
dealing with [the] other traditions, including scientific ones, that shape our world" (Davaney 156).
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So, while it is true that all hypothesizing and experimentation and observation issues from
somewhere and with many unquestioned background assumptions, this alone does not entail that we
have no way of bringing together all that we know from various spheres of influence into some
coherent web of beliefs. And to do so, we do not need the Archimedian point Hauerwas properly
rejects nor must we take on the myth that, in Hauerwas's witty terms, "the only story we have is the
story we chose when we had no story." We can and apparently must (if we are to be intellectually
responsible), even from a historically embedded and conditioned position, attempt to creatively
discover how the totality of our belief, as Kai Nielsen puts it, "hangs together" (1 991 : 5). We can
attempt to find coherence among the conflicting accounts our various stories offer about the world
around us and, thus, make sense ofour lives.
So, in short, "[h]istorical situatedness does not mean an incapacity for critical reflection
about our own locales" (Davaney 132). Catalysts to interpretive shifts might be rival views or other
clear alternatives, novel situations or recalcitrant experiences, or internal dialogue with the intrinsic
diversity of our own tradition or traditions. Davaney indicates Stout's advocacy for this perspective,
as he "presents a view of traditions that both supports and invites critical reflection, forms of
immanent criticism responsive to alien traditions and new situations and capable of harnessing their
diverse internal resources in new and creative ways" (Davaney 133). Davaney concludes, "Thus to
be historical and traditioned does not mean that humans are prisoners of their own contexts or
histories; languages, traditions, and cultures are all, for Stout, dynamic realities that are open to
ongoing change through a process of hermeneutical responsiveness to what we encounter both
within and beyond our boundaries, a responsiveness that involves not only understanding but also
critical judgment" (1 32).
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Chapter 3: A Patchwork Quilt: Weaving Coherent Lives
On Whose Criteria . . . ?

So, we can still "choose" from among the competing claims on our lives that come from
competing traditions that course through and partly form our very lives. But precisely how do we do
so? If our task involves weaving together strands of diverse traditions, perhaps with differing criteria
of judgment, different primary claims, and so on, how might we determine what traditions are more
or less favored, whose central tenets are retained and whose are deposed? The process proceeds
piecemeal, of course, but that still begs the question of some criterion by which to weave contending
patterns of thought together.

Hauerwas would readily admit that a bewildering plethora of

contending claims intersect through our diverse lives, while doubting whether there is any agreed
upon criterion that supplies a satisfactory means of adjudicating among the motley elements of
inconsistent stories.
By following Hauerwas's understanding of the Christian tradition as a concrete example-as
well as his predecessors in the postliberal movement, Frei and Lindbeck-and citing specific faulty
methodological assumptions therein, perhaps criteria will be shown in the process which might allow
for such a weaving together of our lives. It will be helpful at this point to recall Bruce Marshall's
description of Lindbeck's theological method: "Religions, including Christianity, are for Lindbeck
most plausibly understood as 'cult11ral-ling11istic' .rystems, structured networks of belief and practice which
shape the primary truth claims their adherents make and the deepest experiences thry have" (Marshall 272,

emphasis added).
Applying what has been gleaned thus far, it has been acknowledged that our truth claims are
·historical, contingent, and indeed shaped by our formative past. Hauerwas and others appear to use
this insight, however, to permit the move of giving the Christian tradition a kind of overriding truth
status. On this understanding, for Hauerwas and others similar to him, the process of assessing rival
claims in relation to the Christian tradition involves viewing the Christian tradition as a kind of
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primary influence on our interpretation of the world (and corresponding description of reality): "The
theologian does not seek to correlate Christian beliefs with other independently validated theories or
systems of truth. Rather, givingprimary to Christian language, beliefs, and practices, the theologian seeks
to deepen the church's understanding of the faith" (Campbell 1 53, emphasis added). Yet, in our
present context, no single tradition has this influence: we do not live within just the "Christian"
"cultural-linguistic system." And, even if we did, we still possess the critical agenry to call the
assumptions of our own traditioned starting points into question. They give shape, but never
constrain. "For their part, postliberals insist that we .do [for Hauerwas] or should so reside within
primary communities, subordinating the claims and influences of other competing traditions and
communities to these central ones, 'absorbing the world to the text"' (Davaney 37, emphasis added).
I have argued, though, that such a conclusion involves a significant degree of self-deception. We
neither do nor should so reside within "primary'' communities. Davaney concurs:
It is not only a question of appearing intelligible to a public, including most certainly those within religious
traditions who are deeply informed and shaped by the tenets of contemporary science, it is also that we, whether we
a&knowledge it or not, work out of sets of assumptions about the world and humanity. Unless theologians are willing
to live in either .ref-deflating ignorance or internal sef-contradktion, it is imperative that we seek a critical congruence
between our theological assumptions and our other beliefs and practices. We can neither pretend that we have no
such assumptions nor adopt the assumptions of an earlier, long-departed time and worldview; rather we must
analyze our theological assumptions in light of what else we know and claim and set forth clearly their
compatibility with or variance from these other components of our current worldview. And in our historical
moment science is a central contributor to and ingredient in our worldviews. (59)

Elsewhere, she urges that "for pragmatic historicists numerous persons today cannot so easily
distinguish such a primary, encompassing perspective but are compelled to fashion creatively and
critically the diverse traditions that impact them into some new conceptually and functionally
coherent perspectives that work for today'' (37). Theology conducted in the manner of Hauerwas
"does not acknowledge that humans, especially in our twenty-first-century world, are in fact
multitraditioned, shaped by more than one strand of history, weaving together inheritances from
varied historical lineages. A historicist perspective entails taking account of this multiplicity and
finding a means by which to relate its various, often tension-filled component/' (Davaney 37, emphasis
added).
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This becomes particularly clear when we consider what it would even mean to subordinate all
else to the "Christian" tradition in terms of claims about the way

things are. How might we

detennine the principal elements of this tradition-.what is "essential" and what can be discarded?
For Lindbeck, Marshall argues, "[t]heology should aim to construct a comprehensive vision of the
world, which does not ignore but rather tries to make Christian sense out of apparently alien beliefs
and practices" (274). But even if we purport to give this tradition such primacy, who decides what
constitutes the Christian language and the Christian manner of appropriating and subordinating outside
claims? And even if we are able to locate some semblance of a settled past, we have no reason to
arbitrarily privilege the claims of the past and accept them uncritically. Fallible human decisions
produced even what became prominent and recurring themes in the Christi.an tradition.

Nothing Eludes Potential Revision
The application of this theological method becomes concretely evident in certain views
forwarded concerning the role of scripture or the relevance of Jesus for Christians. Consider, for
instance, scripture's role for Frei: "the authority for Frei's theology can best be understood as
scripture read within the Christian community.

For Frei, the church's theology begins with

scripture . . . Significantly Frei never developed a theory of the authority of scripture. His approach to
the Bible . . . was not theoretical, but practical, based on the assumption that this text fan,1ions
authoritative/y within the community of faith" (Campbell 155, emphasis added). For him, this text
"just does" function authoritatively for the church. According to Bruce Marshall, Lindbeck endorses
a similar point of view, maintaining that "[t]he narratively centered biblical text ought to have
primacy in shaping a Christi.an vision of all life and reality" (275). Such a position requires no
explanation, just description: this just is the authoritative text of the church. On these principles, "the

task of theology is more closely related to the descriptive work of social sciences like cultural
anthropology than to the explanatory work of philosophy" (Campbell 153). This analogy is telling:
theology here involves a description of a worldview embedded in human beliefs andpractices. Yet why
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privilege the admittedly human,fallible preferences and choices of agents of the past by raising them to
a status of normativity in such a way that they are beyond criticism? How did scripture come to
possess this presumed authority if not in historical moments and decisions that must be ever
checked and always subject to revision? On postliberal principles, theology involves an ongoing
effort of the church, in its life and decisions, "to be faithful to the God depicted in this narrative"
But why take for granted these particular human claims and

(Marshall 276, emphasis added).
constructions?

Positions elaborated by Lindbeck and Frei concerning Jesus (especially as Christ) are similar:
''Jesus' meaningfulness depends not on an explanation

ofhis relevance, but on the church's faithfulness as

a community shaped by his identity'' (Campbell 1 56, emphasis added). ''Theology," accordingly,
"should ascribe consistent primacy to the scriptural story of Israel and Jesus Christ in articulating
both the meaning and the truth of a Christian vision of reality'' (Marshall 274). Marshall summarizes
the consequences for assessing truth claims on these grounds: ''Judgments about truth and falsity are
ultimatefy, though not solely, judgments about the coherence of beliefs and practices with the Christ
centered world depicted in Scripture, rather than judgments about how this Christ-centered world
fits with some other criterion" (275).
But this is to suggest that the Christ-centered world of scripture is insulated from revision.
It is the case that something always stands in the background unquestioningly, but not just arbitrarily
or as "ahistorical still points that trump all else," as Davaney puts it. It is only sensible to wonder if
God real/y is discovered in this narrative and approach critically the human decisions of the past which
claimed God is found therein.
Encountering a Wider World
''Through most of the church's tradition, as [Hans] Frei argued in Eclipse, the 'world of the
Bible' had been the one 'real world' within which life was interpreted" (Campbell 1 52). But this is not
the world of today: "during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, a great reversal took place. . The
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'biblical world' ceased to pr.ovide the primary frame of reference, but rather came to be interpreted
into a purportedly 'wider' modem framework" (Campbell 1 52). This "wider" world included a
historical contextualization of Jesus's messiahship, Christian claims of resurrection, the church's
canonical texts, and so forth. It is not as if problematic elements of these "unique revelatory acts of
God" were not known before, but a lack of better alternatives forced creative intellectual managing
of some of these problems (as in the case of Origen) or .the descent into insulating claims from
revision on the specious grounds of faith preceding understanding. The principle of Jesus as the
unique savior of a benevolent God encountered the realization that this supposedly benevolent God
apparently has difficulty making this known to but a small percentage of humanity; consequently, for
many thoughtful persons even within the Christian community, the notion of J esus's universal
relevance eventually came to require an explanation, not uncritical acceptance. And alternative views
of the authoritative biblical canon became increasingly obvious as intensified light was shed on
inconsistencies between its purported God and some of its contents, in addition to the growing
awareness for many of a vast am!J of other claims concerning revelations of God or gods and a more
naturalistic understanding of the canon's development in human hands. Once the Bible and Jesus
become historicized and naturalized (ie., in our historical setting), it becomes less clear that
"submission to God" or ''letting God be God" issues from those traditional Christian starting
points; it becomes less clear where the "authority of God" resides. While it is true that those have
been common starting points in the Christian tradition, we are increasingly aware of the fact that, even
in their beginnings, their authority grew out of human claims and decisions and preferences. In short,
when alternative views come clearly within our purview, we, in order simply to make sense of our
own beliefs and bring them together in some coherent fashion, naturally require explanations to
vindicate current or revised beliefs, else we are guilty of self-deception or, perhaps worse, choose to
dangerously live on the principle of uncritical acceptance of some arbitrary (i.e., unquestioned';
authority.
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Submission to biblical authority or to the formative influence of the Jesus narratives
encounters alternatives at the point of explaining what such submission amounts to or entail.r, as well as
at the level of the continuing relevance of such claims of authority in light of other interpretive
options which question the legitimacy of taking for granted the continuing relevance of the Bible and
Jesus. Again, background assumptions are always in place, but not arbitrarily. A scientist who
assumes the framework of the evolutionary model contrasts in important ways with the church
assuming the framework of the authority of the biblical narrative. No clear, tenable alternative is in
sight for explaining the development of the often horrific, sometimes even poorly "designed,"
characteristic features of the various forms of plant and animal life we observe on this planet (past
and present) that permit living organisms to survive and continue struggling for survival in some
specific ecological niche. No other model can plausibly account for the range of empirical data that
has been uncovered in the various natural sciences.

This informing story of the evolutionary

paradigm is, thus, not arbitrarily held in the background and not presently subjected to scrutiny for

defensible reasons-reasons which hang together well with all our beliefs about reality. In the case of
biblical authority, obvious alternatives make claims on our lives, even on the lives of Christians.
So, might religious beliefs be comparable to other background beliefs we legitimately
maintain-now, in our historical position-without question?

Are they simply background

assumptions which legitimately serve to judge all else like the evolutionary paradigm overriding
aberrant findings ? They clearly are not: theological convictions tied to traditional understandings of
Jesus and scripture encountered experiential data that forced significant conceptual realignment.
Grounds do come to an end at some point, but, again, only where there are no clear rivals or
observations that force scrutiny at that particular level of belief.
Truly Indubitable Beliefs
There are, then, always background assumptions in any interpretive paradigm that are at a
given historical moment not subjected to explicit criticism. But what is currently in such a position
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depends on the historical context .in which the claims are made. It depends on the various informing
narratives influencing our lives in the present. Nothing, though, is ultimately beyond revision such
that one could say that things "just are" this way for this particular community. To treat Jesus or the
biblical narrative as ever-judging all other claims without explanation or defense is to treat them as
claims that ,-annot be doubted. But that is clearly not the case. These beliefs are n·o t part of the web
of our lives in such a way that, in the present, they cannot be discarded. Indeed, many within the
tradition have rejected formerly central themes or have even rejected the tradition altogether.1 4
So, the formerly central themes of the Christian tradition cannot be held as indubitable
starting points. The only beliefs which seem to qualify as legitimately beyond question are beliefs for
which we see no alternative whatsoever. There are some beliefs we take for granted in the present
(such as evolution) for which we could not imagine concrete alternatives, though we could speculate
that something else (who knows what?) might replace it as a theoretical model. We can imagine this
because even the basic tenets of the evolutionary model are �bviously not universally accepted
There are some beliefs, though, that we cannot imagine ever being able to doubt without being able
to continue living coherently: beliefs in the past, other minds or intentional agents, a world of objects
external to our minds, some likeness of a notion of cause and effect, and so on. Even if not
acknowledged in theory, such beliefs must be present in practice to permit even basic social
interaction. As Robin Horton puts it, these and other beliefs constitute a "conceptual apparatus"
required "not only for the very business of staying alive, but also for the sheer possibility of
assembling at given times and places" (1 61).
The religious beliefs of a particular community, though, are disanalogous to such indubitable
beliefs in many relevant ways. It might be the case, if in our present historical setting we were
singularly traditioned, that calling into question some of the beliefs Hauerwas maintains uncritically
1 4 It might be the case, however, that the life of the tradition as viable and distinctive stands or falls on such beliefs, but this
alone does not constitute a valid defense. Forms of life do come and go. Traditions arise, flourish, and die. Sustaining
certain beliefs purely to sustain distinctiveness is not a legitimate move. Some historical situation might entail the death of a
recognizably distinctive tradition that had formerly thrived.
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(because they just are the practices and beliefs of the "Christian" community) would result in the
collapse of our worldview entirely. Perhaps then they could not be doubted without bringing into
question everything we believe, which we cannot do if we are to go on living. Yet there is clearly not
the kind of disagreement over belief in an external world as there is over theological convictions
even the most essential of such convictions, such as the belief that the God to whom a believer prays
truly exists. And this universal agreement with regard to an external world follows from a further
dissimilarity: religious beliefs are not analogous to beliefs like "There is an external world" because
we cannot doubt that statement and still make all our other beliefs hang together. Belief in God can
be set aside and we (living in a culture in which theological convictions overlap with nontheistic,
scientific construals of the world) can still reasonably go on. Indeed the failure of this analogy is
evident in the fact that many do indeed live their lives without a practice which embodies belief in
God, while no one in any culture can go on without belief in the external world (even if some
paradoxically claim to do so or believe in an external world while doubting its ultimacy). Nielsen
supports this conclusion of disanalogy, as:
there is the problem that there is a great diversity of very fundamental beliefs about religion, while, by contrast,
and disanalogously, there is no such diversity of belief concerning �egitimately indubitable beliefs such as] the
external world or other minds. Anthropologists have not unearthed a culture somewhere that does not believe in
the external world or other minds . . . Concerning religion there are real-live doubts and diverse and conflicting sets
of belief. (1996: 1 26)
So, even granting the

necessiry-as

opposed to s omething akin to plausibiliry-of belief in God for the

devotee within the Christian community (an argument which appears to resemble versions of the
specious ontological argument for God as necessary being), there still remains a strong disanalogy
between such a belief and true framework propositions. Unlike true framework beliefs, one might
coherently conclude that, of the propositions 'God's exists necessan"!J" and 'God's existence is impossible," the
latter is more plausible because it better coheres with the rest of what we believe. Such a conclusion
does not betray a misunderstanding of the way God functions in the life of the believer.
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A Thin Universal Criterion
None of what I have said to this point explicitly indicates by what criteria we might weave a
contemporary perspective together into some coherent web of beliefs out of the multiplicity of
contending claims intersecting within us, but following some of the problematic presumptions
underlying the postliberals' truth criteria has been suggestive. We are multitraditioned, and we are
aware of multiple linguistically constructed conceptions of reality--some of which have a significant
effect on our lives, some tangenti� and some nearly no effect on our lives. But by what criteria do
we maintain the prominent beliefs of some informing traditions, and alter or discard the suggestions
of others? Continuing with the thread of Bruce Marshall's description of the Lindbeckian notion of
religious traditions as primarily cultural-linguistic systems, it has been argued that, while such
traditions indeed are cultural-linguistic systems, that observation alone does not insulate them from
significant alteration on the basis of internal diversity, or experiences of the world inconsistent. with
one's worldview, or the contending claims of other traditions informing the lives of members of that
community. Seeing religious traditions, then, primarily as "structured networks of belief and practice
which shape the primary truth claims their adherents make and the deepest experiences they have"
(Marshall 272) becomes problematic if and to the extent that such a view suggests we are singularly
shaped by one tradition and that this one tradition has perpetual, ahistoric� static concepts which
stand in judgment of all other beliefs and to the extent that this view denies creative agency which
shape those very cultural-linguistic systems.

Overriding or central beliefs demand not simple

description of the practices of a community, but rather explanation-the very sort of apologetical
enterprise Hauerwas resists. In this sense, I agree with Russell McCutcheon when he urges that
"[o]ne of the most intriguing aspects of the postmodern movement . . . is that in the study of religion
this critical technique (of historicism] has thoroughly protected, rather than destabilized, discourses
that claim as their basis of authority some kind of inspiration from beyond history'' (107); "the
relativizing brought about by the postmodern tum has provided what some theologians see to be the
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means for reclaiming lost ground" (104). Of course, Hauerwas does not purport necessari/y to fall
back upon anything utterly "beyond history'' -though at times he does seem to suggest as much
but he uses postmodern, historicist insights to speciously "justify'' leaning upon a web of theological
presuppositions which are apparently insulated from critique on the basis of the historical
contingency of all claims.
Above, I indicated that one of the problems with maintaining certain "central" beliefs as
overriding criteria 'of judgment becomes inappropriate as the context "widens"-that is, where
formerly central beliefs come to encounter specific rivals or experience yields severe interpretive
incongruities that call for creative alteration.

Since our propositions and . expressions are not

singularly determined, not so parochial and closed off to rival interpretations of reality as some
imagine, and always subject to the influence of our own agency, the sense in which religious
traditions are propositional becomes potentially commensurable and comparable with other competing
claims, and the extent to which they are expressive becomes potentially understandable in broader
terms. And on what criterion?: by the very criterion ptesupposed by the process by which cultural
linguistic traditions arise and take shape. That is to say, latent within the very process

by which cultural

linguistic traditions (or linguistic conceptions of the world) come into being and take shape amid diverse interat1ions and
exchanges with various geographical and temporal historical contexts presupposes one very significant criterion for
choosing among the beliefs we will retain, revise and adapt, or discard: name/y, predictive success. In Kai Nielsen's
terms, "'Reality' may be systematically ambiguous, but what constitutes evidence, or tests for the
truth or reliability of specific claims, is not completely idiosyncratic to the context or activity we are
talking about" (1982: 91).
Foreshadowing some of my culminating points in this section, it will be instructive to
contrast this criterion of predictive success with suggestions Davaney makes in her discussion of the
contemporary move of many theologians to reconciliation with insights gleaned from the sciences.
Perhaps by attending to her discussion, it will become apparent . why I think a criterion similar to
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predictive success is necessary to bring together the contending claims on our lives. In describing
this turn to an "engagement with contemporary science," marking "a shift from the manner in which
early modem theology and science were separated" (Davaney 56), Davaney asks w�y this move
(which she too makes) has paradoxically been made during a time when '�the privileged position of
science has been increasingly undennined" (Davaney 57): "If the sciences are being deprivilegized, if
they are being displaced as singular bearers and guardians of truth, why then should theologians turn
again to these fields of inquiry?" (Davaney 58). In defense of this turn, she often seems to legitimize
the move on the basis of something akin to "continuing viability" or "relevance for today." But this
justification appears so thin as to allow, it seems, someone like Hauerwas to continue urging that,
since the assumptions out of which we work might be wrong, perhaps it is acceptable to turn to the
past or elsewhere to creatively describe the world in some other equally tentative or uncertain
manner.

This appears to be a legitimate escape depending on how one interprets Davaney's

assertion that traditions "give imaginative portrayals of reality· but offer no way to get out of
themselves in order to ascertain whether or not they correspond to some external reality" (Davaney
35). In being so epistemically cautious, she seems to leave room for the very turn Hauerwas takes.
If we must be so modest about claims about reality, why not select an available (theological)
worldview on the basis of it posing a challenge to a (secular) worldview that produces certain
undesired effects (e.g., if you are opposed to euthanasia, one that denies, rather than upholds, its
legitimacy)? Perhaps Hauerwas would say, as he does to Gustafson, that he is not so quick to offer
to science some overriding veridical status in light of the extreme fallibility of our claims. Perhaps
the assumptions Davaney thinks are inevitable in our historical context, Hauerwas would say we need
not have. Indeed, I think that the criteria Davaney makes explicit for bringing together "all we now

know'' are tnuch too thin.
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If we have no way of ascertaining whose "picture" of reality is superior, how can we even
fashion our own historical situation into some coherent narrative, given the variety of competing
claims we encounter? At one point, Davaney asks:
Why specifically should the sciences be listened to at this juncture of theological history? One reason is that if
theology is to be able to respond to the crises that confront the contemporary world we can only hope to do so
by talcing account of the widest and best range of information that we can obtain in order to fashion a rrlevant and
effective interpretation of our situation. Although the natural and physical sciences may no longer make claims to
ultimate truth, they do continue to provide the parameters of at least tentative knowledge within which most westerners
fanction. (Davaney 58, emphasis added)

Davaney seems reluctant to use language that would imply the possibility of being more or less
accurate (more or less "rig�t'') about our descriptions of reality. I maintain, however, the possibility
that, in bringing these varied informing traditions into coherence, we are in very limited ways ever
so-slightly and gradually reconfiguring as agents our situated perspective in order to attempt to
fashion a view of reality that is increasingly "accurate." (Of course, we have no way of assessing this
all at once, but only piecemeal and in process.) And the criterion used to measure these attempts is
predictive success. As Russell McCutcheon acknowledges, theories may simply be "models that have
yet to be thrown away'' (1 12), but they persist (ideally) for defensible reasons: "a postmodern
theorist can acknowledge . . . that theoretical models are only as good as the past instances in which
they have stood the test . . . [and] that predictions are a matter of more or less (statistically probable
but hardly certain)" (1 14). All models of reality are not created equal. Some better account for the
for the successes and failures of former models than others. 15

15 Along the lines I am arguing, Jennifer Herdt insists that one of the most attractive features of Alasdair Maclntyre's
thought has been his argument that it is possible to accept the historicity of human experience, to live within the limits of
our particular contexts and limited perspectives, while nonetheless holding on to some degree of objectivity in our rational
and moral claims. "Historicism and nonfoundationalism without [any radical form of] relativism are what MacIntyre offers"
(Herdt 524). According to Herdt, MacIntyre insists that "[a]ll are expected to agree that if one tradition succeeds in
accounting for the crises facing another tradition without itself being faced by crises unsolvable from within, that tradition is
superior'' (Herdt 537). She argues that the criterion he establishes-something akin to explanatory or predictive success-is
not appropriately described as independent of all traditions, but rather as prrsllj)posed l!J all traditions of inquiry and therefore
"in a logical sense, situated before all such existing traditions" (538). This explanatory criterion, then, is not based on an
Enlightenment hope for tradition independence or ahistorical Reason, but rather as "'traditional transcendental."' (538). It
is "implicit in practices of enquiry generally, not dependent on a particular tradition" (Herdt 538, emphasis added).
Traditions represent varied presupposed starting points, but those background presuppositions are not just arbitrarily
maintained or maintained in a way that permits no way of cross-culturally adjudicating between or among various claims to
truth.
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Davaney does say some things that �ply slightly more substantial criteria than relevance.
Quoting Gordon Kaufman, Davaney argues that we must "construct a conception of the world (and
of God) appropriate to the knowledges we have available and . to the problems with which we
humans today must contend" (59). But what does ''knowledge" amount to here if we must be so
tentative about our claims? Must we be so tentative that we are reduced to telling stories, with no
hope of making accurate claims about the world in which we live? She writes, "For their part,
pragmatic historicists claim the natural sciences-from microbiology to quantum physics to
cosmological speculations-while not providing final truth or uncontestable solutions to our
problems, do widen our view and locate us in the broadest possible context" (60, emphasis added).
Perhaps, if by ''widening our view" she means something like "better accounting for" an expanding
horizon of human experience, Davaney's criterion looks something very much like predictive success.
Accordingly, she argues at one point that "because a current belief or practice resonates with or is
faithful to some dimension of a tradition's history tells us about historical connectedness but does not
settle the issues

of validity' (152, emphasis added). In different circumstances, perhaps legitimate

"evidence" for something being immoral might consist in the practice being explicitly "unbiblical,"
but once our scope has been widened in such a way that this principle can no longer function, in light
of new knowledge or beliefs, as an unquestioned background belief, then the explanatory principle
itself demands an explanation. The admission of an inherited past, Davaney avers, "should not
obscure the critical responsibility we bear for deciding what is of value from the past, what we will
embrace, reject, transmute, or defend in our current context'' (1 53). Consequently, in the present,
''Jesus or the Bible, or whatever, may be the source or cause of [some particular] vision, but not its
justification. For pragmatic historicism that case will need to be made on otherground.I' (Davaney 152,
emphasis added).
The criterion for adjudication implied here seems stronger than what Davaney explicitly
acknowledges.

Indeed, if she is to provide any legitimate justification for moving out certain
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theological convictions while reinterpreting and salvaging others in light of scientifically derived
knowledge, or provide warrant for legitimately calling some worldviews "outmoded," then its seems
she must have some underlying sense that we are able to more or less, in historically contingent ways, get

things right. If not, I see no clear reason to deny Hauerwas's tum. Precisely what we are saying in
purporting to have the ability to weave together the various claims on our lives into some coherent
web is that we have some means of adjudicating between those informing narratives such that we
can make meaningful decisions about which beliefs to retain, revise, or deny. We need some
criterion for determining what getspushed aside, what gets labeled outmoded, and so on.
This weightier understanding-properly chastened, historic�y contingent claims of
"truth"-can be maintained, moreover, without any modern presumptions of certainty or finality: we
can both be open to significant alteration of our beliefs in light of future experiences and,
simultaneously, maintain with confidence the proposal that we have fashioned a more accurate
picture of our world than those of the past which have contributed to shaping our lives in the
present. rwe can make warranted assertions which we know to be superior to others that were
declared in the pas½ but which nevertheless remain subject to revision in light of ongoing human
interaction amidst the world "out there.") In this limited sense, the present is ontologically privileged
over the past (to the extent that actual explanatory progress is made, for theoretical regression is
certainly possible).

Explanatory superiority and "truth," however, always involve superiority-in

relation or truth-in-relation to various other rival conceptions of reality. Indeed, we can, while not
presumptuously claiming absolute Truth or certain knowledge (and thus free of any purported
historically transcendental position), "articulate a coherent web of beliefs and make their acceptance
plausible" (Nielsen 199 1 : 12).
So none of this entails ahistorical claims, presumptions of indubitability, or hopes for some
utterly nonperspectival access to reality. It is s� maintained "that reality remains in a significant way
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a mystery to us" (Davaney 64). We can still acknowledge "the speculative and imaginative quality of
our theories and assumptions" (Davaney 64). ''Yet/' Davaney continues,
acknowledgment of the tentativeness, fallibility, and speculative character of all human claims docs not lead to the
conclusion that such claims can be merely jettisoned, nor that they are condemned to an arbitrariness in which
each is eqll2lly valuable or valueless. Instead, it suggests that we fashion our pictures of reality in conversation
with the broadest range of inquirers and out of engagement with the most defensible, albeit contestable, proposals of
our time. (Davancy 64, emphasis added)

My only contention with this is that "defensible" must come to something more substantial than
Davaney, at times, is willing to make explicit. Descriptions of reality can be better or worse, and the
manner by which cultural-linguistic paradigms arise and change implies a criterion by which that can
be established.

Coherence & "Correspondence"
Although it constitutes a sidebar, perhaps it bears considering at this juncture that I might
have missed the major anti-realist point--one Hauerwas might be inclined to emphasize.
Attempting to maximize the coherence of our system of beliefs may yield nothing like correspondence
between the way we conceptualize reality and reaiit'} itself. Davaney evinces such concerns, arguing
that "we can never get outside of natural and human history to decide whose picture of the way
things are most closely corresponds to reality" (1 61, emphasis added). Elsewhere, with regard to her
position on giving critical attention (as opposed to unquestioned authority) to the past, she is careful
to warn: ''What these assertions do not suggest is that the present is ontologically privileged over the
past, that somehow here and not there authoritative truth resides. Instead the claims of the present have
the same historical character as those of the past" (1 62). Her caution is understandable, as all claims

must be recognized as historically contingent and ultimately fallible. But the degree of caution she
indicates here seems to be in tension with the positions she takes on specific issues related to these
points. On the principle she elucidates here, what we know is held in such indefinite suspense that
even our best historically situated claims become all but arbitrary. For instance, what does "critical
attention" to the past amount to if the present and past are on equalfy uncertain ground? Surely
claims in the present, like those of the past, are fallible, revisable, historically situated, and so on. We
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hold our claims tentativdy, but, in acknowledging this, we need not further concede that some claims
of the present are no better than many claims of the past. How would we engage our past criticalfy if we
thought there were no meaningful revisions to make in the conception of reality our past depicts for
us? And for what reason should theological claims seek coherence with the claims of science if not
out of a desire to fashion a more tenable--i.e., more accurate--conception of the world and
humanity? To have accuracy in sight, we must have some (admittedly historically circumscribed)
means of discovering which of various pictures most closely "correspond" to reality.

(I have tried to

suggest above that predictive success provides a criterion by which this might be assessed.)

If

accuracy is not in sight, the postliberal move to insulating truth claims appears legitimate, even
ineluctable. The assessment, of course, is not of whole interpretive paradigms, but a process that
takes place on the move, piecemeal, in practical situations, and with interested motives. We must
rebuild our ship at sea and always leave enough in place to keep the ship seaworthy, but that does
not preclude the possibility of building a better ship. We can perpetually, through our limited
agency, assess alternatives presently on the table and conceive (in limited ways) of novel alternatives
and revisions of our conceptions of reality which provide a greater degree of explanatory capacity,
predictive success, and control of the world in which we happen to find ourselves. In short, we do not
need to escape natural and human history to decide whose picture
inevitabfy as we attempt to make sense

of reality is the

of our lives-bringing into

''truer" one. We do this quite

coherence the various traditionI influencing our

lives-determining which onesformerfy informed us in outmoded ways, which ones persist, etc.
The notion of a flat earth does not constitute a merely different way of describing our
planet, but represents a description that encounters various explanatory and predictive problems
inconsistencies obviously better accounted for by conceiving of the earth in spherical terms. It is not
that all our beliefs that go into the description (or meaning) of "the spherical planet earth" gets it all
right, but it is a more true description than all that went into our conception of "the flat world
around which the sun and stars rotate." The contemporary vision, in this case, does not have
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authoritative status (i.e., it is not beyond revision), but is certainly a description superior to the fonner
conception and is relative!J (i.e., relative to the former) privileged as such. This reflects the moderated kind
of relative ''correspondence " that I am arguingfar: more or less accurate depictions of realityjudged by virtue ofgreater

or lesser degrees ofexplanatory capaci!J.
A process of critical reflection, Davaney insists at one point, ''will not tell us whose complex
theoretical symbols have captured the nature of cosmic reality correctly'' (1 63). But we need not
have the ability to "get it all right'' (if this is what Davaney means by comctfy capturing the nature of
cosmic reality) in order to recognize that some theoretical perspectives demonstrate a greater
explanatory capacity than others-that is, that some capture the nature of reality better than other
known alternatives.

In light of what she says here, it is not clear on what basis she revises

"outmoded" theological positions.

If there is not something right about such theological

maneuvering and reconstruction, then why make concessions to other disciplines? Why is there
something wrong with reverting to a detached parochialism with regard to one's most precious
convictions? The reason is clearly that some linguistic conceptions of reality or contingent claims to
truth, among those of which we are informed, are better than others. A set of beliefs fundamentally
constructed around a literal view of the Genesis creation narrative presupposes and anticipates
various observations. When conflicting observations appear and begin to create tension in this
worldview, revision begins to be required. Of course, because a worldview cannot be abandoned
altogether, this revision must either occur piecemeal to the extent that imaginable alternatives are
foreseeable or in conversation with some rival scheme (that has arisen earlier within the same
tradition or has arisen independently and become known) which appears to better account for these
persistent or escalating observational incongruities. Yet there are no guarantees that the reasonable
revisions will be accepted (as in the case of contemporary Creationists): there may be strong factors
inhibiting alterations of a belief system, such as beliefs serving the dual function of expression and
explanation.

If a particular set of beliefs (as is often the case with religious beliefs) provides
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psychological comfort, gives expression to the "unseen" forces of society, or whatever, recalcitrance
to alteration may be quite strong. Such persons may be resistant to self-initiated, creative revision as
well as to alternatives of which they become aware in the historical process.
In light of many things we have come to know reliably about common creation themes in
many cultures, the manner of construction of the Torah (including the piecing together of
conflicting "Genesis" narratives), and many other reliable pieces of knowledge that cannot be tenably
reconciled with a literal, historical understanding of the Genesis stories in general makes it not just
"untenable" or "inadequate" but flatly erroneous to continue to maintain that traditional view. To
persistently espouse such an understanding is not a legitimate option that "might portray reality
rightly, though we have no way of knowing," but is rather symptomatic of blatant self-deception,
intellectually irresponsible fideism, or simple epistemic insularity. In the historical process, it became
clear enough that a literal understanding of many of the stories of Genesis was an inept (in a
predictive sense) . interpretive scheme.

It hardly seems pretentious to say that explanatory

replacements, by better accounting for a greater horizon of experiential data of the world around us
(better enabling us to make sense of our lives), depict the world in a way more closely corresponding
to the way things truly are. The same goes for the inadequacy of demon possession as a principal
component of an explanatory framework for interpreting mental illness.
Davaney appears continually concerned, though, about the impossibility of "directly
depicting reality'':
If it is the case that a historicist sensibility far from ruling out the legitimacy of underlying theories and
convictions about reality indicates instead their inevitability, and therefore the necessity of continually making
them more explicit and relating them to other assertions about reality, it is also the case that contemporary
historicism renders such assumptions contingent, fallible, emergent in history, conditioned . . . and hence always
open to modification . . . Tbis contingent and fallibilist status applies . . . [even to] fully developed theories about
humanity and the rest of the cosmos, be they scientific, philosophical, or literary. Neither implicit convictions nor
more comprehensive and systematic theoretical frameworks di�ct!J depict �aliry, human or otherwise. (Davaney 55)

But do we really need this notion of "directly depicting" or "picturing" or "mirroring"
correspondence? Cannot we meaningfully speak of partial or relative correspondence as in the case of
the relative inadequacy of the Creationist paradigm. . Davaney appears to say some things tantamount
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to this: "generalizations, theoretical frameworks, and encompassmg visions do not in and of
themselves harbor Rorty's feared 'platonic urges'; they do not of necessity embody absolutist and
ahistorical intentions" (127). She proceeds to say, though: "nor do they depend upon theories of
correspondence or representation" (127). Yet it seems some sort of relative correspondence is
needed to justify the legitimacy of advocating a specific "biological, historical, and social portrait of
human existence" (Davaney 127). %ile the generalizations Davaney draws concerning the world
and humanity may not depend on ,xcessi've!J strong versions of correspondence or representation, it
seems that some notion of partial correspondence and reference must obtain in order to make
legitimate her moves to tenable or more or less adequate generalizations.
Davaney writes, ''While Rorty has little doubt that the world is 'out there,' that is, 'that most
things in space and time are the effect of causes which do not include human mental states,' he
nonetheless rejects all claims that we have access to that world in a direct or neutral manner that
provides us with a means of accessing our ideas and their correspondence to the way things really ·
are" (Davaney 120). ''Language, in this view, takes on a particular, nonrepresentational, character. It
is not a 'medium that is gradllaJ/y taking on the true shape of the true world or the true self " (Rotty qtd. in
Davaney 1 21, emphasis added). According to Robert Kirk, Rorty suggests that "any non-trivial
realism is committed to regarding truth as correspondence in a sense in which 'the world might, for
all we know, prove to contain none of the things we have always thought we were talking about"'
(142).

But linguistic conceptions of the world do not mere/y involve "posits" or some set of

"existents," but also claims regarding the explanatory or causal ,-elations among those various posits.
Creationists do not merely categorize the world or cut it up in some distinctive way; they make
explanatory claims, presuppose predictions, and attempt to make their way through the world
accordingly. To the extent that a worldview involves explanatory purposes, then, it can be assessed
in the long run as more or less successful in its ability to generate accurate expectations of what one
encounters in the world. Again, this is a moderated kind of "correspondence," but it does retain the
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meaningfulness of relative degrees of "truth." The relative "truth" of an interpretive scheme is never
beyond revision and, hence, never complete. We will never describe the world as it really is in its
entirety. -in some perfect language of nature. But we might speak in ways that are more or less
"true" or more or less "befitting" our world.
Davaney rightly wonders if Rorty advocates a form of cognitive relativism in which '�every
claim is as good as another" (122). She describes Rorty's "affinity with postliberal theologians" on
this point: "one can never get outside of his or her linguistic framework to compare it with reality so
in a central way the question of truth is an intrasystematic one" (123). He abjures, though, the move
to make linguistically shaped communities "self-enclosed and impenetrable" such that "critical
assessment can only take place within a framework, not across differing systems" (Davaney 1 23).
She adds, "Among the reasons for needing to undertake such comparison is the fact that humans do
not live in only one community and through one vocabulary but in and out of loyalty to a number of
sometimes compatible but often conflicting ones" (123).

This resonates with Davaney's own

position, but the mere presence of contending claims within our own lives is not sufficiently telling: on
what criteria would we adjudicate between or among the various. conflicting traditions by which we
are informed if we could not legitimately assess them in relation to their explanatory success as we
interact with the world we inhabit? We would be reduced to either arbitrary selection of some over
others or living with unresolvable tensions constantly giving us incompatible expectations and
conflicting guidance. Davaney seems to suggest as much when she scrutinizes Rorty's position:
"The first issue to be enjoined relates to Rorty's reluctance to engage in any general reflection about

the nature of reality or the cosmos or human nature" (126, emphasis added). My attempt is to argue
for no more and no less than this: the legitimacy of reflecting on the nature of reality and the viability
of assessing claims along those lines.
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Causes of Concern
The (often-incommensurable) "worlds" of the anti-realist "do not exist 'absolutely but only
'relative-to-theory'. All that exists 'absolutely' is a 'nature' beyond reach of knowledge or reference: a
Kantian 1bing-In-Itself' (Devitt and Sterclny 253).

This worry about language utterly lacking

reference in the world, as Devitt and Sterelny argue, seems to spring from allowing our very sketchy
understanding of obscure ideas such as language and truth to override a commonsense realism that
has undergone pragmatic scrutiny for ages:
First, they start with a theory of language, in particular a theory of reference. Second, the theory they subscribe to
is a description theory [in which meaning is a wholly internal phenomenon, ahistorically wrenched from its link to
the world in relation to which it was devdoped] . . . Applying this theory, they conclude that, from our present
perspective, none of the tenns of past theories refer. For, from that perspective, the descriptions associated with
those tenns do no pick anything out. So, still from that perspective, the purported referents do not exist. (253)

Clearly, if it is supposed that our concepts only refer if they are beyond revision-if we "have it all
right"-then the referential link between language and world is surely severed (in theory). But on
these principles, I could never have a conversation with a Creationist: if she spoke of "giraffes," I
would question whether we had in mind the same sort of creature, and communication would be
curtailed. "If meanings are determined wholly by relations within a language system, how can the
elements of one structure be [approximately] equivalent to the elements of another?" (Devitt and
Sterelny 266). Our understanding of the concept giraffe surely differs; we describe its biological
history differently, place it within different sets of beliefs, etc. In short, all that descriptively goes
into our divergent giraffe concepts differs in important ways. Yet there is much to bridge the
translation gap, just as there is in translating a foreign language or the words and practices of an alien
culture. Communication is not entirely forestalled. In fact, in such a dialogue, we would both likely
be well aware that we were talking about the same thing in different ways, borrowing from uses of
the term "giraffe" as coined and used by people who have experienced giraffe-like-things . And it
would be quite mysterious how a Creationist might ever, as many in modernity clearly did, come to
see the legitimacy of evolutionary insights without this presupposed sharing of reference for many
concepts. Devitt and Sterelny suggest that radical forms of skepticism can be resisted by not making
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conclusions about the world in light of a partial aspect of it-namely, human language: "The
literature is full of arguments seeking to illuminate the structure of the world on the basis of
considerations about language" (233). They add:
We have urged an opposite procedure. We start with metaphysics. As theories have changed, have we
abandoned our belief in entities that we previously thought to exist? First, consider observables. Theoretical
progress certainly results in the addition of new observables, terrestrial and celestial, to our catalogue. But there
have been very ftw deletion.I. Cases like witches, Piltdown Man, and Vulcan (it was once thought that there was a
planet, Vulcan, between Mercury and the sun) are relatively rare. There have been some mistakes, but there is
nothing in our intellectual history to shake our confidence that we have steadily acC11m11/ated knowledge of the
make-up of the observable world. We have been wrong often enough about the nature of those entities, but it is
their nature we have been wrong about. We have not been wrong about the fact of their existence. (Devitt and
Stcrelny 254, some emphases added)

Our understanding of the world changes, sometimes dramatically, but in comparatively few cases have
we come to reject things that we formerly thought existed. But the rather obvious observation that
our understanding of even our commonsense posits changes does not entail the radical conclusion
that we can never have any confidence that our words and sentences do not (in some limited way, to
some degree) refer to reality. Regarding skeptical worries, they argue that "we should be sufficiently
confident of this metaphysics [i.e., commonsense object in µie observable world] to reject any theory
of language that fails to fit it'' (254). "At most, the history of science should make us cautious in our
commitment to unobservables" (254).
So the "truth" of our theoretical schemes is always limited, and our posits (in most cases)
"refer" to a limited degree.

It is not (excluding those cases in which we come to reject, not

reinterpret, former posits) an all or nothing affair.

Consider a child's theoretical scheme that

includes the theoretical posit of "Santa Claus." Children are certainly closer to "getting it right"
when they come to find a superior explanation for the sudden arrival of gifts on December 25 than
Santa.

Of course, "Santa Claus" does not arise as a theoretical, explanatory hypothesis; some

children are merely initiated into a language that includes this concept. But to the extent that "Santa
Claus" comes to function for a child as an explanatory concept (and in some cases it clearly does) in
the form of a temporary way to explain the overnight disappearance of cookies from the table and
the sudden arrival of gifts labeled from Santa himself. The concepts are not just posited "existents,"
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the child thinks certain relations among them obtain during the early morning hours of December
25. She thinks that Santa interacts in a causal way with cookies and milk, with gifts, and so forth. Of
course, the specific conception of Santa Claus eventually becomes terribly problematic as it comes
under scrutiny and rival explanatory options become available. A literal understanding of cookies
and milk and gifts will survive the alteration of belief, but Santa Claus will lose its explanatory status
and be understood in purely metaphorical terms. The child's understanding of the gifts under the
tree will be revised to some extent (perhaps now more connected with gratefulness to her parents as
the actual gift-givers), and this revised conception of the gifts under the tree will reflect a more
accurate understanding of the world. But there is an important different between the gift-concept
revision and the Santa-concept revision. Her former gift-concept "referred" to some partial degree
to something in the world, while the Santa concept was categorically replaced by another concept
within the child's set of beliefs: the parents.

The understanding of the gifts simply required

alteration; the understanding of Santa Clause became superfluous and required discarding in its
explanatory sense.

Even if we say that the Santa Claus concept has been reinterpreted to

fundamentally include the parents, it is still the case that everything that went into the former

conception of Santa Claus is overall less accurate than the revised concept that sees Santa Claus as a
metaphor for the parents. The new description of «Santa Claus" "refers" to a far greater extent than
the earlier description that fundamentally involved an esoteric fellow living at the North Pole of the
earth who makes an incredible around-the-world journey to every home in a single night, troubling
himself to climb down the chimney of each house. To the extent that it involved these descriptions,
it clearly did not refer at all. 16
16 This analogy indicates that I make a meaningful-though not sharp or complete--distinction between fact-claims and
value-claims. Consider the ongoing assessment of two beliefs: 1) that the planet on which we live takes the shape of a globe
and 2) that adultery is universally wrong. First, both beliefs, in our own context, are initially acquired (to the extent that they
are) via cultural-1.uiguistic training amidst a web of many other beliefs that form the framework with which we view the
world (and thus both beliefs are theory, value, and interest laden, not self-evident and not foundational). Second, both
beliefs are, at least in principle, subject to revision in our ongoing assessment of all that we believe, and, thus, if reasons
become adequate in light of all else we believe, we might alter our belief about the shape of the earth or the propriety of the
proscription against adultery. Yet, despite these two similarities, they are relevantly different in relation to a third
comparison: that with which individllals interact in the process of contributing (as self-conscious agents) to the ongoing
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Chapter 4: Modem Alterations to a Theological Past
Multilevel Constructions: Expression and Explanation
As mentioned before, cultural-linguistic systems do not mere/y involve truth claims or
propositions about reality. Indeed, certain developments may not involve "hyp otheses" at all. So
predictive success is not a criterion by which every linguistic development within a form of life may
be assessed. Other factors are certainly involved in their origin and ongoing development besides
propositional, explanatory claims about the world.

Languages do much more than explain and

predict "there is no one purpose that all language seeks to fulfill, such as accurately depicting or
predicting reality or creating a moral universe; the languages of science, poetry, and morality play
different roles in human life" (Davaney 123). Nevertheless, some initially non-propositional (e.g.,
merely symbolic or expressive) linguistic developments within these systems often come to involve
specific propositional claims and observational expectations, even if these are not straightforwardly
presented in the scientific idiom of hypothese�, predictions and observational expectations,
experimental data collection, and theoretical revision in response to predictive failures or successes.
My argument, developed in the next several pages, however, will be that, to the extent that
these systems arise or come to take on a propositional role, the supposedly idiosyncratic "scientific"
criterion of predictive success is a legitimate "tradition transcendental" measure (to borrow the
language of Jennifer Herdt) by which such claims may be assessed. And to the extent that such
claims function (originally or in an ongoing sense) as merely expressive language, or to the extent
that they function on such a plane, they cannot be so judged, yet they lose some of their significance

assessment of these pieces of our collective framework is importantly different. While there is merely one planet to assess as
round or flat, there are myriad selves for whom it might or might not be desirable or even reasonable (Le., conducive to one's
well-being) to reinforce the cultural belief that adultery ought to be legally proscribed and culturally condemned (though
some courses of action or culturally valorized moral beliefs will be desirable for nearly all human selves). Rules of language
that involve propositional claims about the world develop via selves, cultures, and a more or less stable world; rules of
language that involve normative claims develop via selves, cultures, and the more or less overlapping interests of selves.
Tbis is a crucial difference which, I think, justifies a meaningful (but not total) distinction between facts and values and the
legitimacy of small-I truth claims about the world but not moral positions (unless one wishes to ascribe "truth" to the very
thin moral agreement that one might discover universally).
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and fascination as such. My argument for this is concretely exhibited in the following discussion of
Robin Horton's and H.0. Mounce's understanding of the mystical beliefs and practices of the
•Azande-particularly as their perspective contrasts with that of Peter Winch.
Robin Horton, responding to Peter Winch's assessment of Evans-Pritchard's analysis of the
mystical thought of Azande culture, summarizes Winch's primary objection to Evans-Pritchard: "[I]n
interpreting [Zande] mystical utterances as statements of hypotheses whose point lies in the area of
explanation, prediction and control of everyday events, [Westemers] are simply projecting their own
obsession with the goals of science and technology on to cultures where such goals are of peripheral
importance" (162). H.0. Mounce applies a similar point to a specific magical practice: "One point
that Winch emphasizes is that Azande witchcraft is not a form of science and, in particular, not a
form of bad science. Thus when he speaks of the Azande practice of consulting oracles, he argues
that what the oracle says is not to be taken as a prediction" (1973: 351 ). In support of this view,
Winch offers the evidence that "Azande will continue to consult their oracles whatever occurs in the
future" (Mounce 1973: 351 ).
Winch proffers an alternative understanding of these magical practices. On his view, rites
practiced amid the planting season, for instance, do not entail the conclusion that such actions are
misguided technological efforts geared toward effecting a good harvest. Rather, it is better to see
them as expressive activities of an attitude that "one's life is subject to contingencies, rather than an
attempt to control" such contingencies (Winch qtd in Horton 163). Similarly, a Christian prayer
might express one's "complete dependence on God" rather than serving as a means of influencing
future events or outcomes: "they may be regarded from one point of view as freeing the believer
from dependence on what he is supplicating for" (Winch qtd 4i Horton 163). In this sense, prayer
exhibits a way of accepting the circumstances necessitated by our finitude. Not being a (mistaken)
form of science, the anthropologist's projection of scientific standards or criteria of judgment onto
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certain mystical practices and utterances is categorically misguided.

The criteria of science are

applicable only to scientific or comparable propositions.
Counter to Winch, Horton argues that a thorough search of Evans-Pritchard's data actually
reveals something quite different about the magical practices of the Azande:
Again and again, by means of anecdote and incident, Evans-Pritchard shows .us mystical concepts mobilized in
connection with the concern to accountfar and rtmet!Jpnsent mefortune, and with the concern to pndid and avoidfatllrt
misfort11ne. He portrays the Azande as a people who struggle constantly, manfully and cheerfully to overcome their
troubles in this world. . . The system of 11!JSti&al belief, serving as a compnhensive apparatus far explanation, pndktion and
contro4 is the principal means whereby they are able to maintain this attitude. (Horton 164, emphasis added)

With specific evidence for this interpretation, Mounce explains that if what the oracle reveals "was
not intended in the first place as a true statement about the future, it would seem a matter of
indifference if in the future it turns out not to be true" (1973: 351). But, Mounce contests, they do
not at all react with indifference to the actual outcome, particularly if the outcome is inconsistent
with the prophetic proclamation: "In fact . . . the Azande are not at all indifferent to such occurrence
but, on the contrary, take elaborate steps to explain it away," perhaps citing problems with the
substance used to ascertain the vision, procedural errors of the operator, or countervailing witchcraft
activity (1973: 351).

Hence, the practical context reveals magic's underlying rationale far the

practitioners themselves. Horton explains that:
there are many occasions when, during the course of their everyday lives, Azande do put the predicted
experiential consequences of their mystical beliefs to the test: as for instance when the oracle has told them that
measures taken have cleared mystical obstacles from their path, and that they are therefore free to go ahead with
projected plans. On such occasions, they are anything but indifferent to the relation between the predictions
generated by their beliefs and subsequent experience. If such predictions are confirmed by experience, they point
to this fact with satisfaction as evidence for the correctness of the original oracular revelation . . . If the predictions
are refuted, they worriedly look for reasons: e.g. sorcerers interfering with the revelation or spoiled oracle poison.
(1 67)

Nevertheless, it is the case that certain explanatory beliefs appear categorically distinct from
straightforward empirical claims or explanatory hypotheses. Those who utilize magical, mystical, or
religious beliefs in this explanatory and predictive manner often evince a steadfast resistance to
alteration of their beliefs.

Seemingly, no matter how contrary experience proves to be for the

Azande, "their observations are always subordinated to their beliefs" (\'Vtnch qtd. in Horton 1 65).
Yet this need not force the conclusion that such beliefs are not intended at some level to be
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explanatory.

Perhaps it does suggest, though, that there is much more at work here than

straightforward explanation, prediction, and control (i.e., that they are not simp/y--Or even
originally-hypotheses).
In some cases, in fact, the purported "theoretical error'' seems so large as to count against
the notion that they are mistakes at all. Mounce asks, "[H]ow is it po5sible for anyone to believe in
such practices? How is it possible for anyone to believe that a person's guilt can be established by
administering poison to a fowl? The mistake, one feels, is just too big to be a mistake at all" (1 973:

353). Thus, he concludes, "One thing at least seems to me quite clear: no one arrives at the belief
[that sticking a pin into the eye of an image of a person will have a causal effect on the actual
person's eyesight] through having subjected a hypothesis to controlled experiment, i.e. the belief does

not arise through an application of anything remotely resembling, even in a distorted form, the
methods of western science" (Mounce 1973: 354, emphasis added).

That is, it does not seem

possible that such a belief arises on the scientific principles of hyp othetical speculation,
accompanying predictions, sustained observation, and explanatory revision.
Sketching the general theoretical positions regarding the origin of such beliefs, Mounce
distinguishes between the intellectualist and symbolist perspectives: "On the intellectualist view,
primitive religion and magic are to be seen as the precursors of science, arising, as did science, out of

the desire to explain and control the world" (1978: 468 , emphasis added). Theorists under the diverse
"symbolist" title generally "maintain that primitive religion and magic, whilst involving literal and
instrumental beliefs, nevertheless arose as symbolic expressions of feeling . . . and continue at some
level to perform these functions" (1 978: 469 , emphasis added).

He adds, "There is nothing

distinctive in the view that primitive religious and magical practices involve beliefs that are literal and
instrumental. This view is shared by the majority of people who write on the subject. What is
distinctive is the view that these practices have arisen primarily out of a desire to explain and control
the world. But it is just here that the intellectualist position is at its weakest'' (1978: 469). The
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straightforward theoretical belief that the earth is flat, for example, is in many relevant ways unlike the
"belief that the sun is a god whose life is sustained by the prayers of people on earth" (Mounce 1978:
469). Intellectualist interpretations of the origins of mystical beliefs encounter difficulty in explaining
the often bizarre character of some beliefs in addition to why believers seek to shield their beliefs
from revision instead of perpetually investigating them. Mounce writes, "At this point it is difficult
not to suppose that people come to accept these beliefs because they satisfy needs or desires that are
other than intellectual. This means not that these beliefs are held merely symbolically but simply that
they would not have come to be accepted as true if they had not also given expression to powerful
and widespread feelings and desires" (1978: 470). So, while war dances are often viewed by their
practitioners as having "a kind of causal efficacy . . . ":
it is surdy quite impossible to believe that these dances arose in the first place because people noted a correlation
between victory in battle and dancing, devdoped the hypothesis that they were causally rdatcd, and instituted the
ritual on the basis of this belief. It seems a matter of common sense to suppose that these rituals arose in thefirst
place as an expression of war-like feelings and that it was only in the course of time that some, though by no means all,
of the peoples who performed them came to attribute to them ca,ual e.fficaq. (470, emphasis added)

Therefore, many so-called magical, mystical, or religious beliefs may not arise or persist
primarily on the theoretical or "intellectualist'' principles of explanation, prediction, and control.
Yet, that fact does not preclude their coming to involve such functions over time. They may not
arise as hypotheses, but rather as expressions, yet they often subsequent/y serve to explain. They are not

simp/y in error-as if that were the only function of such culturally produced beliefs. There is more
going on than-though such beliefs often come to involve-mistaken hypotheses. It is much easier
to imagine concepts like

mana,

spirits, gods, or God arising as conceptual expressions of feelings

associated with tribal gatherings or the weight of social demands on the individual consciousness,
among other historical factors; but once expressed in such language, it is not difficult to imagine
such concepts assuming a life of their own and developing in part an explanatory function as
unobservable causal influences in the cosmos and the lives of society's members.
So resistance to revision does not necessarily entail that a particular form of discourse is not
at all geared toward explanation, prediction, and control. Winch's mistake is that he draws "an
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inference, from the premise that the Zande mystical thinker is unwilling to make radical revisions of
his core beliefs in the face of adverse experience, to the conclusion that the point of such beliefs
cannot be explanation, prediction and control" (Horton 1 69). This observation does, however,
suggest that there is more going on, particularly in the development of mystical beliefs and the force
behind reluctance to changing them. Ascertaining how sacred forces are operating, need to be
avoided, or can be manipulated for favor is surely not a matter of straightforward empirical
investigation. And clearly the belief in such forces did not arise through theoretical reflection about
what might underlie certain observed phenomena.

Such beliefs arose by other means than

explanation and continue to serve other functions than explanation, but those admissions do not,

ipsofacto, entail the conclusion that they do not at all come to serve principally as explanations. Citing
Evans-Pritchard, Horton says, "[Azande] are interested, not in what [witchcraft emanation] is in
itself, but in what it doe� in the observable world. In this sense, their attitude to witchcraft influence,
like that of scientists to their unobservable entities, is highly empirical, indeed 'highly operationalm
(1 67).

The chief difference between the scientist's unobservable entities and the mystical thinker's
unobservable forces is that the latter were largely prodllced "by means other than reflection about the
potential causes of visible phenomena-specifically, by independent sociocultural (as well as
biological, psychological, etc.) phenomena that produced beliefs which s11bseq11ent/y came to explain
certain observable phenomena. Consequently, the scientist's electron concept could be much more
easily discarded if theoretically necessary because it serves little other purpose than as a
straightforward hypothesis concerning the underlying causes of observable events. The spiritualist's
beliefs, however, while serving in an explanatory capacity at a� important level, do not only serve
that function. Once expressive ideas develop into comple� comprehensive systems of explanation,
resistance to changing them may become quite strong. Explanatory elaborations come to account
for most foreseeable predictive errors: "where predictions generated by the central core of mystical
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beliefs are refuted by experience, they do not, under any circumstances, respond by rejection of this
core. Rather, they produce ad hoc secondary elaborations, which account for the refutation of the
predictions whilst leaving the core intact'' (Horton 1 68). And this sort of response may constitute
the only solution when no alternative core beliefs are in sight or are imaginatively possible. Thus,
they do not exhibit a "thoroughgoing skepticism about established beliefs, and readiness for radical
revolution in the face of adverse experience" (Horton 168).17

''This lack of tentativeness or

scepticism vis-a-vis core beliefs is, presumably, what Winch is thinking of when he says that, for
Azande, such beliefs are not hypotheses" (Horton 1 68).
Even in this sense of resistance to alteration, there is no clear difference between scientific
and mystical attitudes.

When scientists are "primarily concerned to follow up the detailed

implications of a core of established theory [e.g., the evolutionary paradigm], particular failures of
prediction evoke a response which differs little from that of Azande placed in similar circumstances.
Only when failures begin to come thick and fast does some sense of unease arise" (Horton 168).
Horton shows how, even in scientific discourse, beliefs can be held simultaneously as hyp otheses
(i.e., in principle) while not being doubted in the process of investigation (i.e., in practice)--especially
the non-research "scientific technologist who puts well-established theory into practice" by accepting
"established theory in an unquestioning spirit'' (170). "He too treats his theory as an article of faith,
not as a hypothesis" (Horton 170). As the person in this role applies theory, she will be inclined to
resist theoretical change upon the occurrence of predictive failures, citing failures of procedure or
instruments instead.

The scientific technologist is "'closed' to adverse experience yet plainly

dedicated to the linked ends of explanation, prediction and control" (170). So "even the research
scientist tends to tolerate . . . patches [of contradiction and inconsistency], albeit uneasily, so long as
current theory still seems to be generating interesting predictions and so long as no more promising
theoretical alternative is in sight" (Horton 171). The scientist is often simultaneous/y resistant and
17 1bis is likewise evident among many in the Christian tradition today: the wicked suffer the punishment of God, believers
face the discipline and testing of God, and-when the ramifications of these explanations are pushed to the limits of
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open to change (yet with an overriding willingness to make significant changes if necessary). Nielsen
makes a similar comparison in relation to belief in God: "It may well be true that questions
concerning evidence for God's existence do not arise in workaday religious instruction and practice.
But questions concerning the existence of electrons do not arise in workaday scientific practice
either. Their existence is presupposed But once their existence was a live issue and there are
theoretical contexts in which it is still a question" (1982: 98).
So it remains the case that in an important sense, many mystical ideas, while not necessarily
(indeed, most likely not) arising via "scientific" methods, often come to be viewed as beliefs which
explain and predict circumstances in the world: "mystical thinking is everywhere associated with the
same dogged determination to gain control over the contingencies of life" (Horton 174). Resistance
to change does not entail a non-explanatory interpretation of such beliefs.

In fact, numerous

examples of similar phenomena could be cited in our own culture. One obvious example is in the
antiquated understanding so-called Creationists ·have of the Genesis creation and "Fall" narratives.
They evince a resistance to changing their understanding of the text so reactionary as to betray other
motives for maintaining their position no matter how frequently and lucidly its inconsistencies are
shown. They sense that their "entire world" would collapse upon the admission that this narrative is
not historical, betraying the fact that this "explanatory narrative" functions in other explanatory and
non-explanatory ways, as it expresses the infallibility of the scriptural canon, the legitimacy of the
indictment of the human race by Paul on the basis of the original sin, humanity's corresponding need
for atonement, and so on. Yet this resistance to revision and its expressive functions clearly does
not entail that such a story does not continue to serve explanatory ends for them-no matter how
wrong those explanations are. In fact, many Creationists w�uld argue that these narratives are
primari/y explanatory.

respectability-God's ways are claimed to be ultimately beyond human understanding.
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So how does all of this apply to my argument that the very hi.rtoricalfy interdependent manner in
which cultural-linguistic systems arise and take shape belies the elusive adjudicatory criterion for
which I have been searching? The cultural divide of incommensurability some attempt to erect
between religion and other forms of discourse is, I think, specious. "It has been argued," Mounce
writes, " . . . that religion forms a language game of its own, having its own standards of reason, and is
therefore not subject to criticism from outside" (1973: 347). My attempt has been to show that, at
least on one plane and in many (of its most interesting) manifestations, religious discourse does

intersect in many relevant ways with more straightforward scientific discourses concerning claims
about reality.

Even in these cases, religious discourses and traditions often continue to serve

expressive and symbolic roles in their adherents' lives and on that level they are certainly not
measurable by "scientific" methods, but to the extent that they come to serve explanatory ends, they do
overlap with more straightforwardly scientific pursuits, and are assessable by its same standards of
explanatory capacity and predictive success.
In dialogue with the perspective of Evans-Pritchard, Mounce builds to a similar conclusion.
"[Evans-Pritchard] wishes to maintain that our [scientific] forms of explanation are superior to those
of the [mystical thinker]" because "our forms of explanation . . . are 'in accord with the objective
facts "' (1973: 348). The point is not to criticize mystical thinking "because it is illogical but because
it is not in accord with reality" (Mounce 1973: 348).

Positing witchcraft activity is not just a

"different" way of describing "the real," but a less adequate way of doing so. Mounce, however, says
that what Evans-Pritchard does "is to use the scientific notion of reality as a standard by which to
assess magic" (1973: 348). "But this would bejustified," he adds, "onfy if he hadfirst shown that magic is a
kind ofscience" (1973: 348). And Mounce (as Horton does) proceeds to s�ow that at one level, magic (as

religion) often does function in this way.

At least at one rather consequential level, religious

discourse and scientific discourse do not, in fact, constitute different language games. If ''being
rational is doing whatever you suppose will tend to help you achieve whatever it isyou wanf' (Kirk 105),
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then to the extent that a magical rite, a religious prayer, or a scientific �eory have the same ends in
sight-the explanation, prediction, and control of the environment in which we r�side-standards of
rationality are not utterly form of life dep endent. At tb:eir functional level of explanation, then,
"there is nothing to stop them, or 11.r, comparing [other cultures] in respect of their ability to achieve
their objectives given their culture, their beliefs and their oi:her desires" (Kirk 107).
Hence, the purported "misunderstanding" of atheists, with their contention that "the
explanatory hypothesis of God" ought to be rejected is,_ at least on one plane, not a
misunderstanding. Kallenberg, arguing that this way of putting the matter misconstrues the role of
God in believers' lives, insists that God is not held by the faithful in the sense of a "plausible
hypothesis," but in a more absolute sense:
Religious believers frequently complain that they are misunderstood by atheist dialogue partners, while atheists,
for their part, claim to understand what is being said by religious believers well enough to challenge those
religious claims . . .This point may be taken as an admonishment to both sides of the discussion; both have
overestimated the extent to which an atheist may have imaginatively crossed the communication gap so long as he
or she cannot imagine how an immovable concept---a concept for which the language of (im)probability iJ id/4-can
function in one's life . . . This understanding may not be attainable by way of imagination. Rather, some direct
participation in the theistic form of life may be required of the atheists. (1 1 0, former emphasis added)

D.Z. Phillips similarly argues, ''Many philosophers assume that everyone knows what it means to say
that there is a God, and that the only outstanding question is whether there is a God" (82). The god
the skeptic rejects as eminently improbable, they might say, is not the God of believers. But I am
convinced that Kallenberg and Phillips are guilty of failing to make a theoretical distinction between
the explanatory role of "God" for believers and the expressive or symbolic role of this concept. In
its explanatory sense (to the extent it has this sense), "God" and other unobservable causal forces are
in principle hypotheses that are subject to revision or outright denial. While the conc ep t of God in
its propositional sense is often not held in practice as a kind of tentative hyp othesis, this does not
preclude that sense of the concept; many straightforwardly scientific propositions likewise do not
have a tentative status in the process of their application.
Moreover, given Kallenberg's insistence upon a participant's understanding of religious
forms of life, it is pertinent to mention that many people, beginning.from within the Christian tradition,
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have rejected classical understandings of God in their propositional or explanatory sense or have
rejected the tradition altogether (Nidsen 1992: 1 1 9). There are many, explains Kai Nielsen, "who
have thrown themselves wholeheartedly into these [religious] forms of life, and who have gradually,
as they have explored the logic of their faith, come to find such beliefs not simply mysterious but
incoherent'' (1992: 1 19). In fact, most people in the West have been at least partly formed by
theological language. ; Devitt and Sterelny explain that "once we have words like 'god' and 'sacred' we
can think religious thoughts, but we can still end up atheists" (219). Such was the case for many in
modernity.
Furthermore, in light of the practim to which religious beliefs are often integrally tied such as
prayer and ritual worship, it seems quite natural for believers embedded in a theological language
game to reflect on the God to whom they pray, God's nature, whether their historically particular
beliefs might adequately reflect this God, and whether and how God responds to their prayers and
worship. One wishes to know "the truth," yet conflicting claims are forwarded; one goes forth with
clear convictions, but recalcitrant experiences appear. to threaten some of them; one wishes to
obediently follow Jesus, but she knows not whether to warn her loved ones with a coercive message
about hell and the narrow path through Jesus to a very literal salvation or to follow him in the
example of the cross and live a life of nonviolent resistance against the evil-working powers of the
world. Reflection is just necessary in this language game. (And, in these examples, the person has
not yet even encountered a Muslim or Hindu or nontheistic ethicist.) Is this simply because such
reflective believers, some of whom have left the faith, are guilty of the same sort of conceptual
mistake as the modem philosopher?

It is, rather, Kallenberg, Phillips, and others who

misunderstand many believers when they say they "believe in God."
Yet none of this entails the hubris of intellectual or cultural superiority: ''What gives rise to
these [mystical] beliefs is not . . . a deficiency in intellect, but certain tendencies or reactions . . . in
connexion with certain deep human emotions" (Mounce 1973: 362).
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When we encounter

taking rival claims seriously actually entails assessing their accuracy. If a native

differences of belief,

culture evinces a strong resistance to certain diseases or purports to cure others with various herbs,
the legitimate response is to test those claims. In short, if we encounter alien claims about reality or
propositions about the world inconsistent with our own, '<we must decide who is right'' (Devitt and
Sterelny 251).

Doing so_ merely follows from taking the claim.r of others .reriom/y.

"It would be

condescension to refuse to apply to their views the same critical standards that we apply to our own"
(Devitt and Sterelny 25 1).
So, while religious explanations do not typically arzse a.r speculative hypotheses of
unobservable influences, followed by careful observational scrutiny of such ''hypotheses," they still
often come to function in such a way while also giving expression to the phenomena which produced
the beliefs in the first place. These frameworks of belief, though, to the extent that they become
explanatory, are, contra Malcolm, a consequence of collective reflection over time. At this level, the
ostensible gap of incommensurability between religious and other propositions is bridged.

The Retreat of the Sea of Faith: God as Propositional
Therefore, to the extent that even religious or theological cultural-linguistic systems come to
function in explanatory ways-including God as an explanatory concept-they are revisable on the
"scientific" criterion of explanatory capacity (or predictive success). And precisely what arrived in
modernity, it seems, was a historical context in which the revision of theological claims was
necessitated by a broadening horizon of human knowledge and experience. The modem period, in
part, has been marked by insights in the natural and social sciences and other fields of inquiry which
have forced radical theological revision, limiting the range of legitimate possibilities for meaningful
assertions about God.
In "Dover Beach," nineteenth century poet Matthew Arnold imaginatively depicts the
retreat of the Sea of Faith in modernity. Picturing the idealized scene of centuries of faith, he writes:
The sea is calm tonight,
The tide is full, the moon lies fair
Upon the straits; --on the French coast the light
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Gleams and is gone; the cliffs on England stand,
Glimmering and vast, out in the tranquil bay.
Come to the window, sweet is the night-air! (1-6)

Yet, for the sensitive soul, the world conveys to the senses not merely the glorified vision of this
metaphor, but the acute awareness of a tragic existence:
Only, from the long line of spray
. Where the sea meets the moon-blanched land,
Llstenl you hear the grating roar
Of pebbles which the waves draw back, and fling,
At their return, up the high strand,
Begin, and cease, and then again begin,
With tremulous cadence slow, and bring
The eternal note of sadness in. (7-14)

The ancient tragedian, Sophocles, heard in a similar sound from the Aegean Sea "the turbid ebb and
flow/Of human misery . . . " And ''we/Find also in the sound a thought,/Hearing it by this distant
northern sea." The thought we come upon is thus:
The Sea of Faith
Was once, too, at the full, and round earth's shore
Lay like the folds of a bright girdle furled.
But now I only hear
Its melancholy, long, withdrawing roar,
Retreating. to the breath
Of the night-wind, down the vast edges drear
And naked shingles of the world. (21-28)

A world which for so long had seemed to ''lie before us like a land of dreams,/So various, so
beautiful, so new . . . "
Hath really neither joy, nor love, nor light,
Nor certitude, nor peace, nor help for pain;
And we are here as on a darkling plain
Swept with confused alarms of struggle and flight . . . (33-36)

Faith's departure was not, of course, singularly inspired. Many problems were not new ones.
Even Augustine had struggled profoundly with the problem of horrific evil in a world supposedly
created and overseen by a benevolent and powerful God. And Origen wrestled even earlier with
difficulties related to the absurdities and inconsistencies of various biblical texts, self-interested
manipulations of biblical contents, and human decisions about contending manuscripts and
authoritative books, in addition to confronting philosophical dilemmas embedded in a Christian
theology being progressively stitched together from a variety of sources. These issues were not
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newly problematic

in modernity. The novelty of modernity's theological challenges, rather, resided

in the pervasive nature of such obstacles. Former places of refuge had become dangerous ground.
The range and magnitude of theological challenges created an acute situation of skepticism regarding
all religious claims.
A Changing World
Charles Darwin, of course, contributed significantly to the broadening scope of the modem
scientific worldview, postulating a branching history of plant and animal evolution by "adaptive
radiation" and revealing an underlying principle behind the "designed" features of living organisms
as geared toward fitness for survival in some specific ecological niche as opposed to being
''wonderfully made" by the hands of a well-intentioned God. Humanity itself consequently became
historicized and relativized as one creature among others, fully dependent upon a larger web of
existence. At the tum of the twentieth century, Robert Frost creatively described the ramifications
of evolutionary science in making the notion of special design not only superfluous, but quite
undesirable for those wishing to maintain God's goodness in creation. With skillful imagery, Frost
describes what he sees in the details of our world:
I found a dimpled spider, fat and white,
On a white heal-all, holding up a moth
Llke a white piece of rigid satin cloth
Assorted characters of death and blight
Mixed ready to begin the morning right,
Llke the ingredients of a witches' brothA snow-drop spider, a flower like a froth,
And dead wings carried like a paper kite. (1-8)

The ironically pure, delicate descriptio� contrasts sharply with the dark reality of its characters and
events:
What had that flower to do with being white,
The wayside blue and innocent heal-all? (9-1 0)

Could a benevolent Providence really lurk sovereignly behind
What brought the kindred spider to that height,
Then steered the white moth thither in the night?
What but design of darkness to appall?-lf design govern in a thing so small. (1 1-14)
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the scenes of such a repulsive episode?

The poem's mundane setting is not accidental. It is not a portrayal of the emotional struggle of a
parent over the death of a child, the horror of an adolescent suicide, or the devastating events of a
hurricane or flood or famine. The scene's banality reveals precisely the pervasive nature of its
underlying theme: tragic struggle is not the exception in life; it is the rule ef}ife.
Moreover, for the first time, humanity gazed into the vastness of the cosmos and recognized
its detached, lonely state.

Walt Whitman acutely reflects this heightened awareness of cosmic

isolation in "A Noiseless Patient Spider":
A noiseless patient spider,
I marked where on a little promontory it stood isolated,
Marked how to explore the vacant vast surrounding,
It launched forth filament, filament, filament, out of itself,
Ever unreeling them, ever tirelessly speeding them.
And you, 0 my soul, where you stand,
Surrounded, detached, in measureless oceans of space,
Ceaselessly musing, venturing, throwing, seeking the spheres t.o connect them,
Till the bridge you will need be formed, till the ductile anchor hold,
Till the gossamer thread you fling catch somewhere, 0 my soul. (1-1 0)

Discovering something meaningful to cling to in life had become, theoretically and perhaps
pragmatically as well, a formidable challenge in a world in which modem individuals suddenly found
themselves afloat in a sea of ostensible insignificance.
Amid this escalating sense of evolutionary relativity and cosmological insignificance,
believers were directly confronted by the challenge of the historical nature of their most cherished
beliefs. Jesus began to appear less like a divine worker of miracles and more like a typical first
century itinerant revolutionary who was-not at all uniq�ely-deified by followers of subsequent
generations, with Christianity growing in popularity as the result of some fortuitous historical
coincidences.

The historical and humanly constructed nature of the Bible made its internal

discontinuities and questionable ethical suggestions much more compr�hensible, curtailing the need
for untenable and sometimes bizarre efforts to harmonize its tensions. A rising tide of religious
pluralism flooded the hallowed ground of a unique revelation of God in Jesus and Scripture.
Scholars traced the development of monotheism and the eschatological concerns of Jews, Christians,
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and Muslims through a polytheistic Hebrew religion that changed radically after consequential
Zoroastrian influences during decades of exile.

Hopes of immortality, eternal bliss, and the

retributive justice of hell for one's despicable (but distressingly prosperous) enemies appeared less as
given convictions and more as wistful ideals and controlling ideologies.
If �owledge of God and rev.elation were increasingly relativized and called into question,
the uniqueness of religious experience fared no better. Durkheim, Feuerbach, Freud, and others
provided astute naturalistic explanations of sensitivities epitomized by Rudolf Otto's mysterium
tremendum-a distinctively religious "feeling of the numinous." It proved much easier to explain how
human sensibilities produced the creation of God rather than how God created the capacity for
religious sensibilities.
Combined with all of this was the continuing concern of the prevalence of evil, voiced so
dramatically by Dostoyevsky's Ivan in The Brothers Karamazov. As the character Ivan indicates, it is
not mere/y the troublesome Humean matter of being unable to infer God's existence from a world
that includes evil, but the more pointed issue that no concomitant good, whether human freedom, or
spiritual lessons, or whatever, could be so valuable as to justify-or ''harmonize," as Ivan puts it
the outrageous instances of suffering that occur in the world. Describing a deplorable parent-child
relationship, Ivan says:
These educated parents subjected the poor five-year-old girl [their daughter] to every possible torture. They beat
her, flogged her, kicked her, not knowing why themselves, until her whole body was nothing but bruises; finally
they attained the height of finesse: in the freezing cold, they locked her all night in the outhouse, because she
wouldn't ask to get up and go in the middle of the night (as if a five-year-old child sleeping its sound angelic sleep
could have learned to ask by that :age)-for that they smeared her face with her excrement and made her eat the
excrement, and it was her mother, her mother who made her! And this mother could sleep while her poor little
child was moaning all night in that vile place! Can you understand that a small creature, who cannot even
comprehend what is being done to her, in a vile place, in the dark and the cold, beats herself on her strained little
chest with her tiny fists and weeps with her anguished, gentle, meek tears for 'dear God' to protect her--can you
understand such nonsense, my friend and my brother [Alyosha], my godly and humble novice, can you
understand why this nonsense is needed and created? Without it, they say, man could not even have lived on
earth, for he would not have known good and evil. Who wants to know this damned good and evil at s,1ch a price? The
whole world of knowledge is not worth the tears of that little child to 'dear God." (242, emphasis added)

Ivan, moreover, cannot accept that the harmony of it all might one day be disclosed, in that moment
when the faithful shall exalt the justice of the Lord:
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'But there is the hitch [of the suffering of the innocent]: that is what I cannot accept. And while I am on earth, I
hasten to take my own measures. You see, Alyosha, it may well be that if I live until that moment, or rise again in
order to see it [i.e., the revelation of God's overarching purpose], I myself will perhaps cry out with all the
rest . . . 1ust art thou, 0 Lord!' but I do not want to cry out with them. While there's still time, I hasten to defend
myself against it, and therefore I absolutely renounce all higher harmony. It is not worth one little tear even that one
tormented rhild who beat her chest with her little fist and prayed to 'dear God' in a stinking outhouse with her
unredeemed tears! Not worth it because her tears remain unredeemed They must be redeemed, otherwise there
can be no harmony. But how, how will you redeem them? Is it possible? Can they be redeemed by being
avenged? But what do I care if they are avenged, what do I care if her tormentors are in hell, what can hell set
right here, if these ones have already been tormented? And where is the harmony, if there is hell? [Should it make
the child feel any better to know that her parents will experience eternal torment in hell?] I want to forgive, and I
want to embrace, I don't want more suffering. And ifthe suffering of (hildnn goes to make ,p the sum ofsuffering needed to
b1f) truth, then I a.uerl beforehand that the whole t1'11th is not worlh n,rh a pria. . . I don't want harmony.for love ofmankind
I don 't want ii. . . I'd rather remain with my unrequited suffering and my unquenched indignation, even if[ am wrong.
Besides, they have put too high a price on harmony; we can't afford to pay so much for admission. And
therefore I hasten to return my ticket. . .It's not that I don't accept God, Alyosha. I just most respectfully return
him the ticket.' (245, some emphasis added)

of

of

Ivan does not reject in principle the notion of a go� just that the only sort of god we could make
cohere with the events of this world is hardly worthy of his worship; he returns his ticket. And why?
His love of humanity constrains his rebellion against anyone or anything that might have purposes or
intentions compatible with some of the instances of human suffering in our world. Ultimately, Ivan
confronts Alyosha directly:
'Tell me straight out, I call on you-answer me: imagine that you yourself are building the edifice of human
destiny with the object of making people happy in the finale, of giving them peace and rest at last, but for that
you must inevitably and unavoidably torture just one tiny creature, that same child who was beating her chest
with her little fist, and raise your edifice on the foundation of her unrequited tears-would you agree to be the
architect on such conditions? Tell me the truth.' (245)

Alyosha's reply is painfully honest: " 'No, I would not agree,' Alyosha said softly'' (245).
Of course, extreme instances of suffering reached unprecedented proportions in the wars
and holocausts of the twentieth century. The gratuitous nature of such evil not only appears obvious,
but it also seems one must, of necessity, interpret such suffering as utterly unnecessary. The theist
who imbues these tragedies with meaning theoretically effaces the very meaninglessness necessary to
provoke change. If we somehow found a way to obliterate poverty and disease and natural disasters
and other sources of extreme human suffering, would we regret having done so because subsequent
generations would not experience the "larger benefits" of growing through such processes by
overcoming hardship or would resent the limitations we placed on their freedom to abuse children
or rape women? We must see the terror of events as grotesque as the Jewish Holocaust as ultimately
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meaningless lest we fall into the trap of thinking there is something ultimately more valuable we miss
by struggling to resist their reoccurrence. We should not, despite Paul's admonition, ''be thankful in
all circumstances."
In short, whereas Hauerwas claims that the mista�e of modernity was to presume
theological convictions guilty until proven innocent-a plea, according to him, symptomatic of false
hopes for epistemological certitude, I, on the other hand, maintain that many theological convictions
that had for centuries been presumed innocent encountered an era of sustained empirical
observations of aspects of the world that made it difficult to presume such convictions innocent any
longer without a serious examination of the degree of their guilt. Religious beliefs had to be brought
into reflective coherence with a vast array of changing ideas. It was perhaps once appropriate--even
largely inescapable-in the West to begin all inquiry against a background of unquestioned Christian
convictions. It is not so now. The world began more and more to appear not just "religiously
ambiguous," as Huston Smith has submitted, but seemingly void of any distinctive role for religion
at all. The intricacies of the world began to bespeak the absence of any consequential notion of deity.
In a "post''modern milieu, where conceptions of God are as numerous as the contexts in
which the idea is found, it is probably best to see "atheism" as naming the rejection of any
cofl.fequential conception of deity any longer cohering with our web of beliefs about reality: that is, the
denial of any conception of deity that adds something substantial or distinctive to our understanding
of reality and the interdependent relations of the "existents" that constitute reality. This is not a
suggestion that we have reached such a level of certainty with regard to our conception of the world
that we have some sort of indubitable knowledge of God's nonexistence.

That would be an

absurdity. Admittedly, a significant degree of mystery and uncertainty remains in our best current
understanding of reality. Important unknowns obviously persist in our web of beliefs, but traditional
causal, explanatory construals of God and other supernatural forces do not serve as reasonable
conceptual fill-ins for these gaps of uncertainty. The element of mystery Stephen Hawking leaves at
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the conclusion of A Brief History

of Time, for instance-epitomized by the-question "Why should

anything exist at all?"-is not appropriately completed with posits similar to classical conceptions of
God. The notion of some causality-eluding, ultimate principle, utterly indifferent to anything like
benevolent ends, hardly seems well-described by reconceptualized God-language. Why should we
call the most fundamental unifying principle or principles underlying our best theories of the cosmos
"the mind of God"? Is it meaningful (or in any way informative) to speak of an amoral or causally
impotent God? This description can only be misleading given that our current understanding of the
universe, our planet, and living organisms (including humans) infers speculative underlying principles
quite at odds with any traditional notion of God
James Gustafson epitomizes those who resist insulating their theological discourse in a form
of fideism, but only to end up with, as Hauerwas recognizes, a theology so devoid of theological
substance that most atheists will have little problem assenting to its conclusions. Jeffrey Stout
likewise sees Gustafson as one who has struggled as "valiantly'' and "honestly'' as any recent
academic theologian "with theology's dilemma" (184). A theology worthy of a hearing today must
be "[a] voice in conversation, unlike the chorus that speaks for the new religious right" and "must
take its place among the other voices, as often to be corrected as to correct" (Stout 164-165). But
the question then becomes whether or not there is anything distinctively theological left at the end of
the conversation. In short, writes Stout, "A conversable theology must have something distinctive,
something recognizably theological, to say. It must at least make clear what difference theology
makes and how an educated person could reasonably believe its distinctive claims" (169).
But in the end is Gustafson's "God" any different from the (non-intentional, "indifferent")
mystery to which the atheist would gladly assent? Even the "religious affections" he describes-a
sense of the powers external to us that partly form us and on which we are dependent-seem to be
something no atheist would deny (though using different language to describe this sense). Stout
concurs:
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One need not be religious, in any standard sense of the term, to recognize that we are finite, limited, and
conditioned beings who owe our existence to forces beyond our own control and who exercise whatever freedom
• we have only under cira.umtanccs we have not authored oursdvcs . . . 1bis recognition can give rise to a sense of
awe in the face of the powers that bear down upon us; a sense of gratitude and obligation to that on which we
depend for our existence, our identity, and the satisfaction of our desires. (170)

For good reasons, Gustafson rejects a superhuman-looking God of intelligence, volition, and
control, and finds "insufficient warrant . . . for postulating a clear telos in God's creative and sustaining
powers" (Stout 1 71)� He also finds insufficient warrant for maintaining belief in eternal life or even
the thought that humanity is "so centrally, so exclusively, the object of divine beneficence" (Stout
173). Stout explains, ''To Gustafson, the traditional doctrines of eternal life, of God as the one who
redeems us from death, who loves us as a supremely intelligent agent would love his children, of
human happiness as the chief end of creation, are all supremely attractive. They are all-too-attractive
to us, for we are all too human, too eager to be consoled by wishful thinking" (1 72). 1 8 Notions of
God intending our good in any meaningful 19 sense appears difficult to sustain in light of events such
as the Holocaust. In light of myriad examples of gratuitous suffering, we would have to conclude
that God has "interests" or "purposes" that are so incongruent with what we perceive, even on our
18 Of course, there are alternative theological trajectories that resist Hauerwas's kind of fidcism than just the camp
by Gustafson. A number of process theologians would be willing to make concessions to contemporary non
theological sources of knowledge similar to those Gustafson makes, but perhaps with important differences. Charles
Hartshorne provides sufficient reasons for not ascribing to God various traditional conceptions of absoluteness. Some of the
traditional "perfections" (utter immutability, complete independence, etc.) attributed to God would entail absurdities
surrounding issues of tragedy and suffering, instances of injustice, human freedom and responsibility; moreover, they entail
a denial of any meaningful notion of God as personal or social. Besides, we do not admire in humans total dependence nor
total independence; there are admirable and detestable forms and degrees of both dependence and independence. As a
result, he writes, ''We shall see . . . that the really usable meaning of divine reliability is quite different and is entirdy
compatible with a profound relativity of God to conditions and to change. For the present, I suggest that all we can assert
to have obvious religious value is the faith that God is to be relied upon to do for the world all that ought to be done for it,
and with as much survey of the future as there ought to be or as is ideally desirable, leaving for the members of the world
community to do for themselves and each other all that they ought to be left to do" (82). I admire Hartshorne's skillful way
of handling knotty problems that classical theologians often swept under a fideistic rug of "God's ultimate mystery," but I
do not see how his reasonable qualifications of the absoluteness of God (in light of God's personal nature, human freedom,
etc.) escape the reality that there are circumstances that obtain in this world that any well-intentioned God able enough and
sufficiently willing to eliminate them 011ght to diminate. If God is analogous to a personal, involved, loving, wise, and strong
parent, for instance, we ought to expect that human freedom (like the freedom of a parent's child) should not be permitted
to create states of affairs that produce degrees of suffering that are not outweighed by concomitant goods. A loving parent
would not allow an elder sibling to beat a younger sibling to death for whatever concomitant "goods" might follow from
this (or might be precluded by the parent's intervention). There are such states of affairs in this world that, if a loving and
powerful God existed, we would rightly expect to have been forestalled by such a God. Yct if God's intentions are simply
impotent in these cases, then it is not clear how the divine adds something to or challenges the notion of reality as basically
indifferent and not directed toward any benevolent telos. In light of such occurrences of apparently gratuitous suffering, it is
difficult to bring into coherence with our web of beliefs the notion of a God who "will promote the highest cosmic good,
come what may'' (Hartshorne 84).
epitomized
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most unselfish days, to be in our own best interest that in the end it makes no sense to assert that a
benevolent and powerful God intends our good in any meaningful sense. In the end, all Gustafson
feels comfortable saying is that "God is for [humanity] in the sense that the possibilities of any
human flourishing are dependent upon what we have received and on forces that are not ultimately
under our control" (qtd. in Stout 175, emphasis added). In other words, Stout explains, "whatever
happiness we do have and whatever happiness we can plausibly hope for depend upon the beneficial
consequences of forces beyond our control" (175). Of course, these "forces beyond our control"
also result in much unnecessary suffering for which we should hardly be grateful; in addition, we
self-consciously influence our external circumstances and contribute to the making of our happiness
(and misery) to some degree. So, these "forces beyond our control" begin to appear, after Darwin,
more and more indzfferent (in a non-anthropomorphic sense) to our plight. Stout concludes similarly:
Gustafson does not show . . .why . . . we are not bound to conclude that God is ultimately against us, given the
likelihood that human life will soon be snuffed out by the next major tum in cosmic history . . . [I]f the more
comforting consequences of the powers that bear down upon us are to be taken as evidence that God is for us,
why should we not conclude that cosmic catastrophe for our species, which hangs like a dark cloud at the horizon
of Gustafson's outlook, is not evidence that God is probably against us in the end? (176)

On this point, I am very much in agreement with Hauerwas, who wonders if a god like Gustafson's
is worthy of worship. Why construe the powers external to us that partly form us (for better or
worse) as divine powers? Why equate these forces with God? Stout agrees that "it remains unclear
why, despite his stress on theocentrism, Gustafson insists on speaking of God or divine purposes at
all?" (178). He concludes:
Mine is not a theocentric vision. I do not postulate divine purposes, let alone divine intentions, in order to
explain the data of modem science or to explicate the sense of dependence I feel. But there is room in my vision
for wonder, awe, and even gratitude-a kind of piety, in short, for the powers that bear down upon us, for the
majestic setting of our planet and its cosmos, and for the often marvelous company we keep here. (1 81)

Interestingly, Stout adds, "[t]he affinity between Gustafson's outlook and my own may finally be as
troubling as it is pleasing" (1 82). Indeed, it appears suggestive of the lack of distinctively theological
content that is left over after Gustafson's theological reflection is complete; Gustafson's legitimate
qualms with "traditional religious doctrines create a momentum that seems bound to carry us
19 • • • or conseq11entiaf. perhaps God could exist and intend good, while being incapable of bringing it about.
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beyond his own position to atheism . . . [to] something like :Midgley's sane and sober vision of our
place among the other species in a vast and largely unknown universe" (Stout 1 82). In short,
worshipping the powers that bear down upon us and sustain us, Stout argues, "once Gustafson has
pruned away various traditional theological attributes that make the divinity seem worthy of worship,
strikes me as unfitting and incongruous" (1 82). Gustafson ''never explains clearly why one ought to
speak of 'the powers that bear down upon us' as divine or what this addition infact addl' (1 82, emphasis
added). Gustafson's God is precisely the kind I view as an inconsequential sort of deity. His vision is
very much like my own, except that his God simply names something that I am reluctant to portray
with traditional theological symbols.
Science is appropriate for investigating empirical claims, Brad Kallenberg says, "but for
those with theological eyes, those with proper religious affections, can see something else in the
configuration of ultimate reality as well. They are able to make out an 'Other' . . . " (154) . The question
is 'What does this 'Other' amount to in light of our present knowledge and understanding of reality?" (Of course,
there is no rule against radically reconceptualizing our notion of God, but the question then becomes
whether or not it is useful to retain such language in light of the baggage it carries from the past and
the outmoded conceptions of God this use might sustain. 20) Contra Hauerwas, modem theologians
were right to attempt to bring their theological convictions into coherence with a rapidly changing
understanding of the world. The problem, as Hauerwas seems to realize, is that the consequent
subtractions left little, if any, remainder.

2o I will consider this in the next section, examining continuing metaphorical uses of theological l
anguage.
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Chapter 5: "God," "Morality," and Ethics
God as Metaphor
Rather than discarding theological language altogether (in particular the God-concept), there
is nothing that immediately excludes the possibility of not only reinterpreting the concept of God and
other theological resources to go along with it (which theology inevitably involves anyway), but
radically reinterpreting it in pure/y symbolic and expressive terms. Prior to presenting my main
concern with this use of theological language, I will first mention two unproblematic issues related to
this turn: namely, that this mere/y symbolic use of theological concepts is unrepresentative of many
within the Christian tradition and that the original fascination with the language of mystical concepts
fades with a loss of their explanatory function.
For many of the faithful, a non-realist notion of "God" and other theological language is
quite foreign--even unthinkable. For them, God continues to function at some crucial level in a
very literal explanatory mode. After the events of 9/1 1 in New York City, Washington D.C., and
Pennsylvania, those for whom God continues to play this role in their worldview scattered for
explanations that would exonerate God or leaned upon narratives of the unlimited freedom of
humanity or the inscrutability of God in order to account for �eir benevolent God's apparent
inactivity. For the majority of Western Christians up until the last few centuries, Robin Horton
contests, "beliefs about God were first and foremost the constituents of a theory in terms of which
they explained, predicted and attempted to control the events of the world around them" (177).
Though I am not sure what Horton me�ns in this statement by "first," it is surely true that God's
foremost role has commonly been the one he describes. ("First," however, God has merely been a
prominent element in the cultural-linguistic paradigm into which most people in Europe and
America over that time period have been trained.)
Recalling Peter Winch's example of the expressive function of Christian prayer, suppose a
believer takes time to kneel in prayer in her upstairs bedroom before escaping an impending tornado
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in the security of her basement; concluding that she is merely " expressing her sense of finitude" in
light of the potentially deadly storm encounters the problem that this feelin�were that all her
prayer exprcssed--could be more wisely signified by speeding downstairs in those precious last
seconds. Rather, she clearly thinks God plays a causal role in her life.21 Even . mor� outrageous
would be the interpretation of a starving person's prayer for �ustenance or an abused child's prayer
for the father's beatings to end as expressing "freedom from dependence" on that for which she or
he prays.

These prayers clearly long for a benevolent God who might modify catastrophic

circumstances. Hauerwas even acknowledges this literal sense of God in the believer's life: "Whether
the God to which prayer is directed exists does not seem to bother [William] James . . . The difficulty,
of course, is whether James's understanding of such subjectivity is the same as the understanding ofthe one

who is (,Wing the prt!Jing, given that the latter at the very least assumes that there is a God to whom he or
she prays" (2001 : 3.2, emphasis added).
Moreover, to the extent they are merely "expressive," much of the initial appeal and
fascination of theological language and claims evaporates. Mounce relates an illustration of G.K.
Chesterton, saying that the charm of a sentence such as "Pluck this flower and a princess will die"
(1 973: 358) depends largely upon its peculiar suggestion of some sort of mysterious causal
interaction between plucking the flower and the death of a princess. · But the fascination subsides
when a more commonplace explanation is proffered: pulling the flower "killed a princess because it
was a signal to a band of assassins who immediately rode off to see her death" (Chesterton qtd. in
Mounce 1 973: 358). It is reasonable to see the practice of voodoo, on one level, as an expression of
anger or a desire for vengeance, but such explanations of voodoo make it much less appealing as a

practice once it is no longer viewed as possessing a power to be tapped into in order to harm or heal.
Indeed, referee dolls, whose arms and legs can be plucked off, would take on a whole new level of
attraction if fans thought that actions performed on the doll would have effects on the actual playing
21 And the fact that all the bases are often covered in such a context does not refute this interpretation. If her child dies in
the storm despite her prayer, she might view the misfortune as "God's will" or as a punishment for some wrongdoing and
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field. (Probably the least malicious thing fans would do wo�d be to put prescription lenses in front
of the doll's eyes when things are not going well.) Perhaps it remains interesting for scholars to
ascertain the origins of bizarre beliefs, but their fascination as practices of a magical or mystical
nature wanes once their causal efficacy is denied. I doubt if many believer� would continue praying
if they knew they were merely speaking into the wind or expressing feelings.
But perhaps this gradual tum (if it is even occurring much at all outside academic circles)
marks a positive theological step forward-a "progressive casting off of superstitious dross"
(Horton 178). Horton describes Peter Winch's move in this direction:
[Winch] points firmly to that strand of Western religious discourse which features God, not as a being who might
help one control the vicissitudes of everyday life, but rather as a being through whom one learns to transcend any
care about such vicissitudes. Defined in such terms, religion is naturally seen as having ends quite different from
those associated with science and technology, and as removed from any competition with the latter. (175)

Given its lack of causal or explanatory role, it seems "expressive symbol" would be preferable
lan guage to ''being, " in relation to Winch's God. Nevertheless, this does exemplify an understanding
of religion that separates itself from the sciences and the criteria for assessment of claims in that
domain. As Horton explains, though, this separation does not seem to have been voluntarily
initiated from within theological circles, but necessitated from outside. The modem separation of
science and religion seems to have proceeded from "the success of the sciences with non-theistic
paradigms" (Horton 178). He continues, insisting that:
up till this late date in Western history, there was little or no sense of contrast between religious discourse and
scientific discourse . . . It was later, when post-Newtonian paradigms in the physical sciences began to dispense
with the theistic component, and when the achievements of these sciences in the sphere of explanation,
prediction and control became increasingly difficult to challenge, that religious leaders began to grope for
definitions of their calling which emphasized its distinctiveness from the sciences. (Horton 178)

Yet this still might mark a theological improvement. Religious belief and theological language, in this
sense, have little to do with evidence. Davaney explains, "Theology in this mode acknowledges its
fictive and constructive character. It eschews any claims . of being directly referential or of offering
literal descriptions of reality or God" (Davaney 93). In this sense, I assume she views theological
language as not "intending the real." (Of course, no language absolute/y depicts reality, but I have tried
pray again the next day. In this sense, "God" is probably both causal or explanatory as well as a comforting story.
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to leave room for a meaningful distinction between literal and metaphorical ways of speaking
categories which are blurred, but do not entirely collapse into each other.) ''Lindbeck," likewise,
"repudiates . . . an older, premodem cognitivist view that religious assertions were primarily
propositional claims about reality . . . " (Davaney 25).
Though fictive modes of speaking about traditionally literal/y understood symbols ostensibly
seems confusing and potentially misleading, perhaps selective resources of theological traditions can
be called upon in creative ways, alongside our growing knowledge in the sciences, as language
expressing the mystery of our existence or as expressing our ethical concerns for a rampant
materialistic culture that threatens the well-being of millions of people around the globe at the
expense of our exorbitant lifestyles.
While I have complete sympathy for the motivating concerns of many who pursue this
route, I wonder if theological language used in this manner does not help sustain language that
others continue to use in less admirable ways to perpetuate ethical problems. That is, I wonder if the
continuing acceptance by many in our wider culture of antiquated, classical conceptions of God
together with an outmoded ethical outlook-does not entail the more pressing responsibility to
continue to disabuse a multitude of laity and a broader culture of beliefs that sustain ethical problems
in our society. I know of no other way to make my points here without a segue to a discussion of
ethics, and unpacking what I mean will require some setup and elaboration.
Getting to Serious Ethical Concerns: A Life of Nurtured Sensibility to Others
In How An We to Live? Ethics in · an Age

of Se!f-lnterest, Peter Singer argues that the dominant

construal of the "good life" in Western culture-particularly in the US-as a life of material luxury is
counterproductively pushing us not only toward lives that ar� often unfulfilling, but also toward
ultimate global destruction: "[I]f we continue to conceive of our own interests in materialist terms,"
he urges, "then the collective impact each of us has in pursuing our individual self-interest will
ensure the failure of all our attempts to advance those interests" (Singer 22). Part of the deceit of the
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guiding vision of materialism involves the false claim that happiness correlates strongly with wealth.
While human well-being surely is integrally related to the acquisition of l?asic human needs such as
adequate nutrition, good health, satisfactory housing, and a reasonable expectation of safety, beyond
that, the connection generally fails to obtain. "[M]ost of the time, the pursuit of material affluence
cannot bring happiness. That may be why the glaring disparities of wealth between Nigerians and
West Germans [at the time of writing], or between Filipinos and Japanese, do not give rise to any
differences in how people from these nations rate their level of happiness" (Singer 52). Coupled
with the destructive consequences for ourselves and future generations of a cultural mindset of
insatiable consumerism, Singer argues that we must change our basic outlook on what constitutes the
good life. Narratives that equate exorbitant wealth with happiness must be replaced with some other

more accurate and more healtf?y theme. Human selves are, of course, different, but to the extent that
reasonable generalizations can be drawn, we must discover what tends to engender a sense of a
happy, fulfilled, pleasurable life.
One possible replacement for materialist-oriented self-interest that deserves exploration,
Singer insists, is the ethical life-a life of reflective and consciously nurtured sensibility to the
"other" (in my terms)-which is more healthy and sensible and feasible in the long run and actually
is more fittingly aimed toward ends that will create a sense of fulfillment in human lives. The
presumption that an ethical life is categorically antithetical to human happiness rests on an outmoded
notion of ethics and misguided views of self-interest. In short, "to live an ethical life is not self
sac.rifice, but self-fulfillment" (Singer vii). Though I am more inclined to blend the distinctions
between rational self-interest and a reflective, ethical life than Singer does and might set the terms of
the discussion in the language of a radically reconstructed sense of "�elf'' -interest, where the self
recognizes its dependence on a larger web of life and existence for its "personal" well-being, I am
nevertheless in significant agreement with him.
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Developing a Positive Ethic (or, If Plato Had the Benefit of Darwin,
Could He Have Convinced Glaucon that the· Ethical Life is the Good Life?)
Singer describes the outlook of self-interest, conceived in a materialist way, as an approach
generally antagonistic to an ethical and fulfilling life, in which the legitimate value of the individual is
distorted into the ideology of maximizing self-interest. Current evolutionary models challenge the
utility (even for the individua� of culturally valorizing such an approach to life.

Prima facie,

evolutionary science might seem like an odd starting point for a discussion of ethics. How might
one approach ethics in light of the fact that the evolutionary paradigm points to ''a ruthless and
chance-ridden process in which the powerful prey on the weak and some forms of life are eclipsed in
favor of the emergence of the new'' (Davaney 97)? In light of the evolutionary innovation of self
conscious creatures biologically predisposed to social attachments, however, "self-conscious concern
for the other is now an evolutionary possibility'' (Davaney 1 79). Where self-conscious animals exist
with the capacity to recognize that their well-being-even "self' -interest-is highly dependent upon
nurturing cooperative relations with a larger family unit and social group (which is certainly not a
uniquely human awareness), in addition to a larger web of life and existence (which probably is a
uniquely human awareness), there may be more room "in the scientific picture of reality for forms of
evolution not reducible to a species-against-species version of evolution" (Davaney 179).
To put it another way, it is beginning to appear undeniable that "self'-interest acquires a
new, broader sense in the evolutionary branch of the social mammals and particularly at the stage of
more complex primates, where a capacity for concern for the "other" is imporlantfy linked to self
interest or personal welfare.

Chimpanzee mothers appear to take pleasure in certain caring acts

directed toward their young, for example, and the grooming of others helps ensure one's own status
and sense of belonging to the group. Chimpanzees also have shown a concern to nurture valuable
friendships by showing others to the location of food sources-a demonstration of benevolence
with obvious advantages for the individual as a member of a group. Elephants have been shown to
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exhibit ambivalence between a purely "selfish" interest in securing personal safety and providing aid
and defense for a wounded family member in danger. Wolves share food, even if in a competitively
established hierarchical order. So, even "rational" self-interest takes on new possibilities at this
evolutionary level. 22 And, of course, at the level of human beings ' increased capacity for selfconscious behavior, this potential for nurturing a concern for the "other" increases even more. Our
conscious awareness of an even wider dependence becomes possible.
So, as social mammals, we have clearly developed biological bases for familial concern,
group bonds, and perhaps a broader sort of compassionate interest-a kind of non-specific
compassion that can be applied to strangers or even other sentient creatures.

Of course, the

22 My point here is not to suggest that we can 11Jtimate!J ound moral claims in human biology, but rather that a
gr
sociobiological ca11sal explanation of our moral inclinations removes the mystery that proiiolus the my demand for ultimate
foundations for moral claims and makes "any further inquiry redundant,, (Ruse 124): my point is to remove any motive for
longing for ultimate foundations in the first place. In light of our biology, we are predisposed to developing moral ''beliefs"
(and embedding them in various cultural forms); beyond that--beyond human nature (and subsequently human culturc)
"[t]herc is no foundation for this 'out there"' (Ruse 124). As Michael Ruse argues, former sociobiological approaches to
questions of morality have been problematic on certain levels, particularly where such an approach was attended by the
mistaken belief that leaving natural systems to ruthless competition leads inevitably to progress (1.c., the overambitious
salvific hope of many modern Enlightenment thinkers). But current evolutionary science can serve as a corrective to former
errors, and explanations of the origins of animal altruism may be found therein-namely, in its evolutionary utility. "Social
behavior," in short, "can be a good biological strategy" (Ruse 1 1 6). Cooperation is a useful mechanism in the struggle for
existence. Safety, security, and the genetic success of relatives (with similar genes) are just some of the (genetic survival)
benefits of social cooperation. While genes might be necessarily "selfish" (in the non-anthropomorphic sense), organisms may
be cooperative (Ruse 1 17). Michael Ruse describes various ways that socially cooperative behaviors (kinds of "altruism")
might evolve: as blind instinct led by chemical provocation as in the social cooperation of insects and (to some extent) the
instinctual care of a mother for a child; as the self-interested, rational negotiation ("contracts" or mutually beneficial
friendships or partnerships) as in many self-conscious human behaviors; or as a biologically based (and socioculturally
nurtured) sense of oughtness as exemplified in a case in which it might be in one's (purely rational) interest to murder
someone, yet he still feels revulsion (not just fear of being caught and punished) at the prospect of doing so. So, in short,
"[m]orality is no more--although certainly no less-than an adaptation" (Ruse 1 1 9). Sociobiological inquiry serves as an
attempt to explain wl[y we experience a sense of ought, reflect on ethical issues, and confront moral dilemmas. So, for
instance, it is not a Rawlsian effort to argue specifically for justice as fairness, but a metaethical attempt to "ground" our
interest in something like fairness in the first place. And the fact that human biology (and not a Realm of Values or God),
along with the human capacity for self-conscious, rationally motivated and mutually beneficial social cooperation, is the
ultimate "ground" for the moral claims suggests that it is probably ultimately impossible to find more than very thin
agreement on ethical issues among diverse groups and individuals. "Moral philosophers tend to think that their own
favored moral system can solve all of the problems . . . , and perhaps this is a reasonable belief if you think that morality is
backed by a good God or a Platonic form or some such thing. But, if you deny such a foundation, it could just be that
there are some problems to which there are no proper moral solutions" (Ruse 122). (This is why I am hesitant to assign
truth-status to moral claims except perhaps on matters of universal agreement, such as "It would not be good for any of us
to collectively perish as a result of the deployment of nuclear weapons.") Of course, a great deal of disagreement, argues
Ruse, "is precisely what the evolutionist would expect. Adaptations are rarely perfect'' (1 22). But, although evolutionary
adaptations certainly are always ad hov--working with what is available in a given moment-it is more to the point to just
acknowledge that the primary principle driving the evolutionary process is not our happiness (which would entail solutions
to all our moral problems), but rather our fitness for successfully reproducing our genetically based traits. Thus, if genes
favoring sexual jealousy coexist with genes promoting sexual promiscuity, yielding increased genetic competition as well as
mating the potentialfor serio11s moral conflicts, it is of no "concern" to the principle driving evolution.
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personal and social benefits of such outward concerns are obvious. The capacity for concern for a
larger social group helps ensure family (and consequently personal) safety and thus promotes greater
potential for genetic success. One does not need to look far--especially in the field of religious
studies-to see powerful examples of the fact that the welfare of human selves is integrally
connected to the condition of our social relations.23
The Ethical Hindrance of Rampant Individualism
If personal well-being is highly contingent upon an outward-looking mindset, it is clear that
the guiding vision of the ideally detached individual associating freely with other ideally detached
individuals, each pursuing a common materialist end-in the manner of the "American Dream" or
some other mythical quest-constitutes a patently self-defeating enterprise. (This is obviously an
overgeneralization, but the general trajectory seems descriptively apt in our present context.) On the
principles of such a scheme, self-interest becomes increasingly separated from the ethical life: others
are merely a means to an end. Relations might be utilized, but are in principle not sought for their
intrinsic value. Charity might be a good public relations strategy, but it has no innate value. Tax cuts
to allegedly ''boost the economy'' become more desirable than tax increases to create better health
care for the poor and elderly and better public educational systems. So we need a positive ethic to

23 Incidentally, I used to think that awareness of the obscurity of the division-if there is any at all-between self-interest
and benevolence had important philosophical ramifications, as it seems in principle to undermine the notion of genuine
altruism. Now I think this issue is simply beside the point. The question, in its philosophiGal sense, of whether there can be a
truly altruistic action--somehow unconnected to self-interest, whether in the form of deriving pleasure, avoiding social
stigma, avoiding guilt, or whatever-is a rather empty question. Even if "self-interest lurks somewhere beneath the surface
of every ethical action" (Singer 1 67), the point has no practical ramifications (except in the positive sense as a discourse to
convince people that ethics is not categorically opposed to the idea of self-interest). Relating a story of Thomas Hobbes,
who cynically held that "we always act out of self-interest," Singer says: "Once a friend observed [Hobbes] giving money to
a beggar and asked Hobbes if what he had just done did not refute his own theory of human motivation. Hobbes replied
that he had given the money to the beggar not because it helped the beggar, but because it made him, Hobbes, glad to see
the pleasure that the beggar obtained from the gift" (Singer 104-105). Hobbes's view of human motivation is "entirely
compatible with the existence of all the altruism (m the ordinary sense of the term) that anyone would ever want to argue
for" (Singer 105). Explanations of the biological basis for our altruistic actions (actions self-consciously pursued with
others' welfare in mind) are, except perhaps in an ultimate sense philosophically, beside the point. One can complain to
God about having no autonomous volition beneath our biologically and socioculturally (in short, situationally) constrained
agential behaviors (where even our self-conscious acts are constrained by the sort of .rilllated self we happen to be in any
given moment). In the present, though, this squabble is very much beside the point "Our feelings of love towards our
brothers and sisters are no less genuine because we can explain how such feelings evolved" (Singer 140). Likewise, "[o]ur
pleasure in being close to our friends may have evolved because it brings us benefits, but friendly feelings are no less
genuine for that" (Singer 141).
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supplant this counterproductive agenda-an ethic that is not viewed as oppositional to self-interest,
but rather conducive to the happiness of human selves.
The Ethical Hindrance of Negative "Moralities"

Singer contrasts his view of the ethical life not only with counterproductive themes of
materialist-oriented self-interest, but with another vision that drives a wedge between the ethical life
and the self: the destructive negative ethics (or, better, ''motality") of traditional religious views, where
ethics typically involves static lists of prescriptions and proscriptions often narrowly focused on
strict sexual prohibitions. Even "[t]he more enlightened Christian readers have themselves now
recognized that their Church's preoccupation with sex has been a mistake . . . Once it is generally
understood that ethics has no necessary connection with the sexually-obsessed motality of
conservative Christianity, a humane and positive ethic could be the basis for a renewal of our social,
political and ecological life" (Singer 16-17, emphasis added). This statement foreshadows one of the
proposals toward which I am building, particularly in considering the wisdom of perpetuating
recognizable theological metaphors: it is precisely this negative morality that has not yet been wide!J
jettisoned.
In the past, "[b]elief in God, or in many gods," in many cases "prevented the free
development of moral reasoning" (Derek Parfit qtd. in Singer 15). Open and moderately widespread
disbelief is a rather recent phenomenon. "We are only now breaking with a past in which religion
and ethics have been close!J identified' (1 6, emphasis added). The break between ethics and outmoded
forms of religion is a process that is currently far too incomplete. To realize this, one need look no
further than the arguments that are made for allowing dying persons to live through unnecessary
suffering when they are capable of self-consciously choosing to t�ate their suffering; or
narratives that sustain anti-abortionist ideas with undercurrents of otherworldly religious principles
overriding secular interests and values; or the absurd preoccup� tions with former President Bill
Clinton's sex life (amid a culture whose premodern "morality" created a situation in which perjury
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was unfortunately what Clinton perceived to be in his own best interest rather than acknowledging a
consensual sexual relationship that would have provoked the condescending moral judgment of
many). The majority of relisious persons in our culture continue to advocate a moral outlook that
impedes possibilities for adventurous, pleasurable lives that might potentially help ease the transition
of moderating our materialist pursuits in favor of more fulfilling, thoughtful, ethical lives.
Some Cases: the Materialist, the Moralist, and the Exotic
To illustrate the contrasts I am attempting to sketch, perhaps some specific cases will be
instructive. As a representative example of the unfulfilled lives that our consumerist cultural mindset
has stamped out (to use an appropriate assembly line metaphor), Singer refers to women interviewed
in the research for Betty Friedan's The Feminine My.rtiq11e and the dull lives they had become subjected
to as "successful" suburbanites:
As a magazine writer in 1950s America, Betty Friedan interviewed many women who were living the classic
American dream: they were young and healthy, they lived in fine suburban homes, their husbands had well-paid
jobs, their children went to school, their housework was made easier by many labour-saving appliances and (we
can add with the benefit of hindsight) no-one worried about drugs or AIDS . . . Yet when Friedan talked to them,
she found that they had a problem. They didn't have a name for it, and nor did Friedan, so she called it 'the
problem that has no name.' (Singer 1 96)

One interviewee commented, "I ask myself why I am so dissatisfied.

I've got my health, fine

children, a lovely new home, enough money . . . Then you wake up one morning and there's nothing
to look forward to" (Singer 1 97). These women describe the dull, isolated existence they had come
to live as their goals-goals established by a materialist culture-had been attained, and the romance
of their marriages naturally waned. "The modem housewife in her tidy household," Singer notes,
suffers from "the elimination of purpose" (198)-a need for purpose that "lies deep in our nature.
We can observe it in other animals, especially those who, like us, are social mammals" (1 98) .
The void was filled by any number o f superficial antidotes: antidep ressant drugs, alcohol,
and "that other great modem tranquillizer, going shopping" (Singer 200).
Many people readily admit that shopping is not so much a means to obtain goods that they need, but rather their
major recreational activity. A large dose of it seems to help overcome depression. Shopping is a modern
substitute for more traditional hunter-gatherer activities. It can take a large portion of the day, and allows for the
development of specialized forms of knowledge and skill. (How do you select the right items to gather? Where
and when arc the genuine bargains to be found?) (Singer 200)
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A culture that, at least in Singer's estimation, peaked in the 1980s' forthright approbation of greed
has proven its inability to generate meaningful, joyful, adventurous human lives and has set us on a
collision course with self-destruction.
Furthermore, consider the moralizing "spirituality'' for which Oprah has become a far
reaching pop culture medium-a moralizing tendency that pervades the lives of a substantial
percentage of a generation of people too postmodern to believe Jerry Falwell, but too reactionary (or
unreflective) to consider sweeping ethical modifications. One Oprah program, representative of the
sort of problem I am highlighting, featured a set of unfortunate guests not argumentatively equipped
to defend the moralizing assault that besieged them that day, as audience members (and in subtle
ways, Oprah Winfrey too) attacked them explicitly for their lifestyles and implicitly for their
destructive impact on our society (especially on children) . One woman had been fired from her
child-counseling position for posting, solely on her personal time, entirely legal nude photos of
herself on the Internet. Another woman's husband had been likewise fired for his wife having legal
nude photos on the web. But my point is not to bemoan the fact of their lost jobs in lieu of
moralizing employers afraid of some sort of "perverted" woman's influence on children or fearful of
public outcry concerning the "distasteful" image being projected by a company condoning "deviant"
lifestyles, telling though these points may be. Rather, the reactions ofaudience members acutely reflect the
problematic notion of "morality'' promulgated by a vast number of people in our culture.
A young, attractive, wealthy-looking white woman was one of the first to raise a concern
about the first guest's ability to counsel children in light of her leisure-time behavior: "When you're a
counselor to kids, whether it's [i.e., her recreational activity] legal or not, . . . something public like that
[i.e., her nude photos being on the Internet] is going to affect the way [parents] think you can
counsel their children."

Another- somewhat more hostile-woman followed: "I personally

wouldn't want her counseling my daughter . . . If my daughter was in counseling, I would want her
with a counselor that had the same Christian values . . . " The passionate applause that followed her
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statement revealed the audience's general concurrence that the woman's recreational behavior not
only made her expressly unsuitable for providing counsel to children, but also essentially .inhuman
(i.e., some sort of valueless "savage''). This was confirmed when Oprah broke in, saying, " . . .You
think that posing nude on the Internet, having sex with your husband and posting those pictures says
that you have a lack of values? Is that what you're saying?" Though formulated in a serious and
non-accusatory tone, Oprah could not even finish her inquiry before fervent applause broke out
across the audience. Another woman questioned what further appalling behavior might follow in
years to come, given the current level of "dep ravity'' of the guests: ''If you had to spice up your life
in five years of marriage, what in the world are you gonna be doin' in ten years?"
Interestingly enough, though, while seeing these "deviants" as fundamentally lacking in
values, the general tenor of the crowd seemed to be tolerant of their rights as individuals to practice
what they were doing, so long as they understood their lack of values and did not subject the rest of
the culture to their influence. The interest of the individual and an ethical life, apparently, are
radically separate for them. These examples, again, belie "moral" preoccupations and a radical
individualism that continue to hinder real ethical progress and the production of joyful lives.
A substantial contrast to these pictures, I think, may be found in the lives of various
"exotic" cultures that we in the West have a history of marginalizing with colonizing rhetoric like
"savage" and "uncivilized."

Even without romanticizing or idealizing communities such as the

Brazilian Canela tribe, it seems clear that such cultural challenges-if we will permit them to
challenge us rather than presuming some sort of cultural or ethical superiority--offer valuable lessons
for our materialist driven culture despite (or perhaps even because of) their comparable material
poverty. In The Canela: Bonding through Kinship, "Ritual, and Sex (as well as a related Discovery Channel
documentary entitled Intimate Tmths

of the Canela Tribe), anthropologist William Crocker describes a

Canela society that evinces much more fulfilling and joyful lives than those exemplified in the
illustrations above. The Intimate Tmths documentary reports that the strength of Canela society
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derives in part from their multiple-partner sex rituals and their encouragement of extramarital
liaisons. The point of stating this so forthrightly is not for shock value, but to highlight the apparent
connection between excessive forms of individualism, materialism, and unfulfilled lives.
The Canela serve well for making these connections in light of changes that are beginning to
occur within the tribe. Just two decades earlier (in the 1970s: two decades prior to the production of
the documentary), the Canela practiced traditional customs that included the expectation that young
males would learn to suppress jealousies for the good of the group. One young man, Pedro (a
shaman, for whom some social detachment was to be anticipated), resisted this central social
convention and expressed his jealousy on various occasions by attempting to keep his wife, Yomtam,
against her wishes, from participating in ritual sex with other men and by physically punishing her.
His behavior inflamed Yomtam's brothers, and the ceremonial chief, Raimundo was called in to
mend ("mending" or "making good" is "the Canela way'') the rift that was created. Though Pedro's
jealousy remained, he represented the exception rather than the rule in those days (ie., 1970s). Most
successfully suppressed their jealousies. Women spoke of the joy of being with the men, describing
them as "so beautiful," "so many." The festivals provided opportunities for indulging in various
sexual activities and celebrating a spirit of giving and openness. Perhaps an attractive woman might
even be "generous to an ugly man" during the festivals out of compassion for him. Despite these
practices, the Canela maintain strong nuclear families, with the husband (or husbands) and mother
both contributing to the duties of parenting along with the assistance of the extended family.
Marriage provides stability, yet both the husband and wife are expected to have private affairs, with
the women having as much choice in the matter as men.
The changes that _began to take place, however, came (from th_e point of view of the tribal
chief) after the influence of the whites. By the 1990s, Pedro's jealousies had become the norm for a
new gene�tion. In the words of the chief, the law is to "let one's wife go and play," but some are
trying to "take over the ways of the white people." A typical young man, Carampei, recalled a time
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during the early years of his marriage when spousal possessiveness was much less conspicuous.
Now, "even if I talk to a girl, my wife will notice and say, 'What are you talking to her about? "'
Interestingly, this transformation accompanied the arrival of a rudimentary cash economy, the rise of
individualism, and the corresponding decline of traditional sharing: "The concern for possessions
has also led_ to jealousy." Given the dwindling opportunities for sexual play and the dissolution of
traditional customs, Carampei commented, ''We become just like the white people." Much of the
tribe's joy appeared to be sapped with the onset of strong individualism and material and sexual
possessiveness.
This example, I thin� helps to show a significant way in which the materialist-oriented
mindset of many contemporary Western persons overlaps with, reinforces, and is strengthened by
outmoded moralities. The Canela, in contrast to the modem West, had once exhibited a low degree
of individualism and a correspondingly low level of possessiveness with regard to interpersonal
(including sexual) relations and material belongings.

Powerful family bonds, strong social

attachments, adventurous and varied sexual relations, and constantly nurtured friendships have been
recurrent cultural motifs-all of which are conspicuously waning in our own society of "voluntarily
associating individuals." The Canela are (or were), in the real sense of the term, a community in which
everyone serves a social function that is deemed important and contributes meaningfully to their way
of life. This society, of course, is not without problems, but there is much we can learn from their
way of life. And happiness without excess and wastefulness and the advantages of fighting excessive
forms of individualism, possessiveness, and materialism are prominent lessons we have failed to
learn from societies who have not shared in our abundance.
Self-Criticism

Nontheistic ethics, lacking coercive ethical arguments24, has the task of convinong
individuals that personal well-being and happiness are largely connected with establishing and
24 By coercive ethical arguments, I mean the kind that Kant might need to answer the objection: ''Tell me why I ,ho11iti, qua
individual, live in light of the principle 'What if everyone did as I am about to do?"' On the face of it, an individNal might think
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nurturing close friendships, maintaining strong family bonds, and fostering salubrious sexual
relations. But happy lives, we are (or should be) learning, do not have to be detrimentally costly
e.g., gained at the expense of others or the environment (though there are surely limits to this good
news; my outlook is not naively optimistic. There are tragic choices in life, and gains often entails
losses elsewhere.25)
that it is in her best interest to let everyone else live this way, while she cheats the system, taking advantage of those who live
according to the norm. Thus, a coercive ethical argument would have to show that it is indeed in her best interest to act
accordingly, perhaps because a god will subject her to eternal torment if she fails to do so. But this is not the only
consideration that might show it is in her best interest to live an ethical life, which is what I am attempting to demonstrate.
25 Incidentally, this is part of the reason why I am more reluctant than Jeffrey Stout to declare truth-status to certain cases of
moral agreement. What I think we can attain, while not constitutive of moral truth, involves more or less favorable (or
unfavorable) courses of action (collective or individual) which might serve the interest of all, most, or few people (or no
one) in light of the most adequate view of the world we have managed to acquire in our given historical context. I compare
moral discourse to navigating a ship on an open sea amidst other ships with similar (but not identical) and (in circumscribed
ways) adaptable compasses. Everyone has or implies a conception of the good life, resulting in both overlapping agreement
on and conflict over good ends to collectively and individually pursue (and feasible and desirable means to those ends). But
to suggest that where overlap exists is indicative of moral truth is misleading for suggesting that where there is conflict there
might often be a truth of the matter that is just not yet understood. (A large degree of moral and political univocality may
be more symptomatic of oppression than willful agreement.) Scientific conflict might eventually be settled if one theory
eventually shows its superior explanatory capacity in light of its better predictive success--a criterion explicitly or implicitly
accepted by both parties-in the long run. But even when there is shared adjudicatory criteria in a moral disagreement, there
might be no truth of the matter at which to arrive. Consider two people arguing in Cancla·society about whether the culture
ought to go on valorizing varied sexual relations. If Pedro possesses a greater biological predisposition toward sexual
jealousy and is relatively wculy desirous of sexual promiscuity in relation to Carampei (given that they have been subjected
to a similar cultural influence, we might reasonably conclude that their difference is at least significantly biological), then
Pedro will have much more of an interest in changing the status quo, while Carampei finds himself better able and more
happy to live with the continued cultural valorization of sexual variety and the institutional arrangements that support it. In
this case, the difference of selves precludes the possibility of agreement on the most desirable course of action even where
significant moral criteria are shared. Of course, selves are not completely different. The interests of selves often overlap.
Moral argument can look like more like rational discourse and less like emotive assertion where shared criteria of judgment
exist-for example, the thin agreement that we ought to collectively pursue the reduction of unnecessary suffering. Yet
even where such agreement exists, many will disagree over what constitutes for dijfmnt individNals greater or lesser causes of
suffering. Abortion rights advocates and anti-abortionists might agree on many background assumptions, yet disagree over
whether the loss of the JX)tential interests of the fetus constitutes a form of suffering greater than those of the mother whose
actual interests are at stake (among others who would suffer from the resulting expansion of overpopulation problems).
Stout says that "[d]isagreement over an issue like abortion might. . . be compared with disagreement among cosmologists
over the origin of the universe . . . neither one seems impossible in principle to resolve by rational mean!' (42, emphasis added).
I think the comparison in terms of rational argumentation simply does not stand up to scrutiny. If competing interests exist
around the issue of abortion, there is no truth at which we might arrive. Disparate voices in science might produce unity as
competing ideas strive to show superior explanatory success, but there is no reason to think that disparate voices in ethics
will produce unity because there are multiple (differing) selves whose (to some extent different, to some extent overlapping)
interests are involved. Disparate voices in ethics often do not produce ethical truths, but expanded or widened sensibilities.
In science, multivocality is desirable to the extent that it lead! lo a better unified understanding of the world around us. But
multivocality in ethical discourse is intrinsical!J desirable, not just a means to an end. In many cases, we do not seek ethical
agreement, but for everyone's (sometimes greatly differing) interests to be heard. Where the sometimes differing interests
of women have been silenced, we should consciously seek their voice. (Saying that it is good to expand our horizons on
matters of human possibility through deliberate interpersonal, intergroup, and intercultural dialogue sounds like an assertion
of a moral "truth," but this is where I would hesitate to use the notion of truth and lean on the observation that we are
partially constituted biologically in ways that incline us toward concerns beyond ourselves, whether or not we self
consciously choose to nurture those inclinations individually and collectively. This is the point at which my moral
"reasoning" comes to an end, and I just take a stake because I think it is wise to take this course of action and that we ought
to attempt to reproduce such outward concerns.) So I do not think that most moral dilemmas are "like cases where
scientists get inconclusive data back from the laboratory" (Stout 46). What new data might settle issues where competing
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So, on one hand, it does remain the task of even an explicitly nontheistic ethics to convince
large numbers of thoughtless, unreflective persons that the pursuit of an ethical life is actually
conducive to self-flourishing. Yet, again, I think this is partly symptomatic of the fact that even
many generally non-religious persons in our culture continue to assume (often not consciously) that
ethics and religion are inseparable (1.e., some form of the Dostoyevskian maxim that ethics ends with
the death of God) and the concomitant notion that self-interest and an ethical life are largely
antagonistic. For such people, adultery continues to be ''bad" (don't ask why), so if you want to do
it, you ought to try like hell to get away with it without your spouse finding out. This way of life-as
uncritical and passive as the typical religious devotee's unquestioning spirit--challenges none of the
ways such social expectations come to be "normative" in the first place (even without representing

interests are at stake-where different selves have different and competing interests? There is no equivalent of a World (but
only differing selves) for moral language to attempt to represent. There is no comparable reality except to the extent that
differing selves have overlapping interests. Whereas many scientific disagreements cannot be resolved due to inadequate
information (though there is a truth ·of the matter), many ethical disputes cannot be settled: someone's interests will
ultimatdy gain at the expense of someone else's loss. No amount of data, for instance, can settle the issue of whether one
individual's death in a rescue mission is worth the freedom of ten prisoners of war. Nonethdess, progress in ethics can still
occur, even in cases in which there is no truth of the matter at which we might hope to arrive. If, to continue using the
same enmple, anti-abortionists really are not convinced that the merdy potential interests of a fetus (and the problems that
would come with satisfying those potential interests) outweigh the actual interests of a potential mother, but rather that
there exists a god who intends to bring suffering to participants in political systems that permit abortion, then disabusing
them of this belief--presuming that they are in fact wrong-might lead to wider agreement on a conception of the good.
So what we can get at is a better understanding of the world--say, one that recognizes that humans are not the only animals
that are sensitive to severe pain and suffering-that diminates former rationalizations for previously accepted behaviors.
Cultures which have considered the practice of buying, sdling, and owning people as property as legitimate often justified it
on the basis of patently false components of their worldview. No god, for instance, ever drowned a depraved earth in
floodwaters and then cursed one of three surviving sons of Noah, Ham, along with his Canaanite lineage, by declaring them
slaves to his more righteous brothers. But some have certainly thought so and have used such a narrative to justify the
servitude of whole races of people. To bdieve this was and is not mm!J mistaken, as there might be strong desires making
people want to think so (in particular, so they could tolerate slavery or explain their distrust of people who do not look like
their own ethnic group). Ethos affects worldview, and worldview affects ethos. In summary, if nihilism simply means that
we cannot speak of moral truths, then it seems to me both philosophically accurate and pragmatically inconsequential. If
our pursuit of conceptions of the good were somehow dependent on a realm of Moral Truths, then it would be significant.
But this admission does not mean that we have "nothing to say to the scoundrels and fanatics" (Stout 14). Their
conceptions of the good might be based on conceptions of reality and humanity that are just plainly wrong. Stout insists,
"Instead of asking, 'Why not be a moral nihilist or skeptic, given the facts of moral diversity?' I intend to ask, 'Why feel one
m11st be?,,, (15). Instead of asking either, I suggest no one can be so in practice, so why be concerned - with the ontological
status of moral propositions in the first place? Though conceptions of "the good" might look as distorted as Hitler's, no
one lives without one. Of course, we want leverage against tyrants like Hitler and citizens like Ted Bundy, but I see no
reason why we need moral truths to lock away or execute Ted Bundy; we just need an overlapping interest in keeping people
like them out of our society. I do not think there is a rationally coercive philosophical argument to give Bill Gates to
convince him that it is "rational" or "morally true" that he ought to feed starving children rather than purchase a S25
million yacht, but we can increase our knowledge about whose conception of the good life is more adequate to the reality of
human nature and what makes human wdl-bcing flourish; and we can attempt to embed values in cultural symbols,
narratives, and other forms that ridicule and dissuade the pursuit of such exorbitance at the expense of others; and so on.
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the norm) nor the accuracy of the antagonistic depiction of self-interest waging war against social
expectations on the stage of one's life (somewhat like id versus superego on the stage of the ego).
One goal, then, might be to continue replacing the cultural symbols that embody and
reinforce a distracting and sometimes even counterproductive focus on "moral" issues. Many uses
of religious narratives continue to sustain the notion that ethics is something detached from us,
requiring something of us that we are . naturally inclined to resist (as the sometimes-employed
theological notion of "sinful nature" or "flesh" suggests).

''The current orthodoxy about self

interest and ethics paints a picture of ethics as so�ething external to us, even as hostile to our own
interests. We picture ourselves as constantly tom between the drive to advance our self-interest, and
the fear of being caught doing something that others will condemn, and for which we will be
punished" (Singer 1 8).

Letting the Boat Sink: Disabusing a Perplexed Culture
One response these circumstances might be something like what Sheila Davaney has in
mind: a radical reconstruction of the notion of theology (and a corresponding ethics) in which the
past is never valorized just for being past, and preferences are never privileged in the ahistorical
manner that Bruce Lincoln criticizes (as stable, fixed, and dangerousfy unquestionable precisely for being
"divine commandments" or "primordial truths"). One of my contentions with this position, though,
is that this move appears to be such a considerable reconstruction that, despite its eme'l,ence.from and

interaction with and response to a theological past, it might be more descriptively accurate to say that the
theological tradition out of which she works--as a recognizably distinctive tradition-is being
unstitched and refashioned not just in new ways, but with such radical novelty that it now appears to
blend entirely into its contemporaneous secular traditions. To the extent that this is true, current use
of the recognizable resources of a theological past needlessly prolongs the life of a tradition that
others continue to work out of in less valuable--and even destructive-ways. In short, it might
produce less suffering in the long run to sink the boat than to patch its substantial holes and radically
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reinterpret its significance in light of our best current knowledge. Perhaps we need to contribute to
the construction of an inchoate secular tradition with creative stories that lack the baggage which
much theological discourse (to the dismay of the smartest theologians) seems to clr_ag along with it in
our culture. It is not that narratives of Jesus have no potential as metaphorical resources for ethical
rhetoric; they do. But for many people Jesus's significance far exceeds this. For them, this sign
continues to be deeply entrenched in a web of problematic beliefs and practices that leads them to
exhibit the same counterproductive "moral" preoccupations of the past and drives a wedge between
the self and the ethical life (as the self allegedly needs incentives and warnings to be interested in the
welfare of others).
In short, there are conceivable replacementI for the myth of happiness in exorbitant and ever
increasing wealth: alternatives for adventurous, pleasurable lives in which we pursue fulfillment, in
part, through self-conscious concern for others. Yet religious narratives continue to be IVide!y 1md to
joreitail many of these possibilities by reinforcing a preoccupation with antiquated moral concerns
and otherworldly emphases. Moreover, once religious perspectives shed this problematic focus on
otherworldly concerns, it becomes difficult to see what they retain which offers a distinctively
"religious" outlook. Terry Eagleton wonders ''whether it is possible to speak of 'literary theory'
without perpetuating the illusion that literature exists as a distinct, bounded object of knowledge"
(1 78). I wonder if it is possible to speak of theology without perpetuating the illusion that there is
some distinctive theological object of study-namely, God and God's ahistorical revelations-and
without sustaining all of the problems that proceed from this classical formulation.
Bruce Lincoln has similar worries about making ethical propositions from a "religious"
standpoint. Of religion's distinctive kind of participation in ethi�al discourse, Lincoln writes:
Of particular interest, I think, is the way religion connects to the other domains of culture: specifically, the
capacity of religious discourse to articulate ethical and aesthetic positions in a uniquely stabilizing fashion.
What religion does-and this, I submit, is its defining charaderiJtfr-is to invest specific human pnfmncrs with
transcendent status i!J misrepnsenting them as revealed truths, primordial traditions, divine commandments, and so
forth. In this way, it insulates them against most forms of debate and critique, assisting their transmission
from one generation to another as part of a sacred canon. (Lincoln 416, emphasis added)
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It is not that the defining theme of theological discourse is necessarily the uncritical acceptance of
authoritatively presented human preferences, but once this transcendent, authoritative, purportedly
ahistorical element is removed, and religious discourse is presented as involving transparently human
and historically contingent claims and preferences, it is not clear that they offer anything distinctive.
It is in this sense that Hauerwas's paradigmatic saintly lives (e.g., Dorothy Day) are potentialfy (though
not necessarify) problematic for giving breath to ideological sources of suffering.26 There is no a priori
argument for this; it is a matter for ongoing reflection whether or not reinforcing narratives that
sustain ethical preferences under the guise of faithfulness to "God's" ahistorical truths or
faithfulness to the arbitrarily valorized preferences of the past will become sources of suffering. But
they might (and certainly often have). If essential "Christian" practice uncompromisingly involves
"not killing one's babies" and "lifelong monogamous fidelity," then to the extent that these practices
become sources of suffering in people's lives (by producing further overpopulation problems, by
bringing a number of children into the world that will face neglect or abuse, by reinforcing values
that ought to be questioned in light of their persistent failures, etc.) these Christian practices require
revision or complete abandonment.

Whether this sort of process effaces the distinctiveness of

Christian practice to the point of leaving the tradition no recognizable resources for challenging a
wider culture simply does not matter.
Of course, Davaney, McFague, and others, like Gustafson, resist essentializing Christian
practices in this way. But what is the result of their tough-minded theological honesty? Stout
contests:
Academic theology seems to have lost its voice, its ability to command attention as a distinctive contributor to
public discourse in our culture. Can theology speak persuasively to an educated public without sacrificing its own
integrity as a recognizable mode of utterance? . . . To gain a hearing in our culture, theology has often assumed a

26 If humans steadfastly practiced a principle of exemplary pacifism, with no collective judgments to coercively enforce
certain socially beneficial expectations, for example, what would likely happen to the human species? 11ichael Ruse explains
that "the whole point about having morality as an adaptation is that it has to be a shared adaptation. If only I am moral and
you are not, then you will win, and I and my bloodline will soon be eliminated. Morality . . .is a social phenomenon, and
unless we all [or a substantial enough number of us] have it, it fails" (126). Peter Singer relates a similar point as a kind of
demonstration of the inadequacy and ultimate destr11ctiveness of a consistently applied "tum the other cheek" principle.
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voice not its own and found itself merely repeating the bromides of secular intellectuals in transparently figurative
speech" (163, emphasis added).

"It may be that academic theologians have increasingly given the impression of saying nothing
atheists don't already know" (Stout 1 64).
Davaney counters this criticism, saying, ''What would count as 'distinctively theological' is
not always clear, but it appears it would be akin to more classical forms of theological argument and
expression" (Davaney 137).

Elsewhere, she objects, ''While apparently philosophers can change

their self-understanding, theologians [according to Rorty] remain prisoners of their longings for
ahistorical meaning and truth" (Davaney 1 25).

It is ce�y true that theology can radically

reconstruct itself. Theologians need not follow the lead of reactionaries who continue to exercise
more classical modes of theological argument and expression, who remain distinctive on/y at the

expense of arbitrarily raising human preferences to a nonnative status and thus presenting an
authoritarian ethic. The resurgence of religion in America over the last few decades has been marked
by just such a tendency to not "be nourished by serious thought" (Stout 1 64), leaning uncritically on
the purported revelations of God. More thoughtful theologians, of course, "find the intellectual
vacuity and dogmatism of that piety every bit as troubling as other intellectuals do" (Stout 164). Yet
once this problem is remedied, it is not clear what is distinctive at all besides the admittedly
figurative-and in a sense misleading-traditional language. Davaney, for good reasons, appears to
buy tenability and relevance, but only at the expense of theological distinctiveness.

Secular

intellectuals no longer "need to be told, by theologians, that Genesis is mythical, that nobody knows
much about the historical Jesus, that it's morally imperative to side with the oppressed, or that birth
control is morally permissible" (Stout 1 64).
Stout makes a similar conclusion regarding Gustafson's position in the end: ''We can see
why he concludes that his theology had better do without the doctrine of eternal life, the ascription
of intentions and intellect to God, and so on. What remains entirely unclear is how the scruples that
would lead to these conclusions would allow Gustafson to retain what little theological content he
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has at the end" (183). It is not simply that Gustafson fails to show this;· rather, "[t]he question is
whether he can make such things plain without violating the critical scruples that set him in motion
away from orthodoxy" to begin with (Stout 184).
None of this suggests that the Christian theological tradition has any continuity to lose. But
there is at least the possibility, it seems, of reconstructing a tradition to the extent that it becomes
more descriptively accurate to say that the tradition has dissolved into the secular idiom rather than having
evolved into something theologically novel. We cannot ignore our past it must be critically engaged.
But we can leave specific traditions behind or allow them to die. Just as recognizable traditions are
born via "the constructive intermingling of varied influences, historical and contemporary'' (Davaney
1 1 0), they can be unstitched or dissolve in a similar fashion. At some point, we �ust conclude that so
much reconstructive work has been done that the theologians work becomes an argument against
the Christian tradition, not a reformulation of it: ''By my lights, for better or worse, [Gustafson] has
already moved beyond the point at which reformulation tips the balance from a presumption in
favor of the Christian tradition to a presumption against it'' (Stout 185). So, in brief, "if God is dead,
asks [1.fary] Midgley, 'why dress up in his clothes?"' (Stout 1 81).
Perhaps theology offers distinctive resources for creatively depicting the mystery that
pervades life and remains within our worldview despite, or even in light of, our best scientific
insights and speculations. Using the symbol of God "to give expression to what is ultimate in life in
the face of the mystery of existence" (Davaney 1 57) is a legitimate application of a traditional
symbol; there is no rule against construing God in this way. But there are other ·ways to depict this
mystery of existence and other ways of challenging the pervasive mindset in our culture of materialist
self-interest in less misleading ways (i.e., without the baggage the term God carries with it) and in
ways that do not sustain outmoded uses of God-language. If we are to successfully replace the
vision that is producing such dull lives and propelling us swiftly toward self-destruction, we should
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do so in a way that does not unintentionally fund the moralizing preoccupations that continue to
impede the very ethical progress we seek.
Conclusion

1bis paper has traversed a peculiar range of material, from Stanley Hauerwas to Peter Singer,
and from Oprah to the Canela tribe of Brazil. 1bis bizarre amalgam of considerations, however,
hopefully ties together into some sort of coherent narrative.

I began by arguing that Stanley

Hauerwas's manner of sustaining a substantial theological program encounters the problem of
making witness unintelligible on its own principles. The source of this difficulty has appeared to
proceed from Hauerwas's implicit assumption that the Christian tradition can only be properly
understood from an insider's perspective and has some sort of ahistorical unity of practice and belief
that can be legitimately preserved theologically on the basis of criteria unique to this form of life.
Put succinctly, I think Hauerwas mistakes theologically desirable background assumptions for
hi.rtoricai/y appropriate background assumptions. Postmodern, historicist insights into the contingency
of all human knowledge claims do not legitimize the move to starting with "primordial" or classical
or central convictions, expect where those beginning points are defensible in the present historical
context.

I have, in particular, argued that his suggestions overlook the necessary historical

connection between recognizable traditions and their original and ongoing development out of a
multiplicity of resources and ignores the critical influence of agents who perpetually impact the shape
traditions take in a given historical moment. The experiences and knowledge claims of human selves
are neither singularly formed by one tradition, nor are those very traditions immune from the
formative influence of the ongoing reflections and experiences of multitraditioned human selves.
These admiss�ons, I maintain, require-lest we become guilty of the anti-intellectual move of
insulating our claims from revision in light of rival views of the world-that we constantly revise our
web of beliefs and our informing traditions in light of the broadest range of human understanding
possible in our specific historical setting. The historical contingency of all our claims does not entail
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the more radical conclusion that all knowledge claims have an equalfy uncertain status. In summary, I
think that Hauerwas takes advantage of historicist insights to guard theological claims from the
realities of the historical milieu in which we find ourselves. To borrow the language of McCutcheon
again, Hauerwas takes advantage of postmodern relativity to smuggle back in unquestioned
assumptions that are not legitimately beyond question in the present. Postmodernism does not
forestall useful critique and constant reflection; rather, it magnifies the need for such self-reflexivity.
Of course, not all linguistic developments involve explicit or even implicit explanations of
the world, but to the extent they do, they are assessable on the criterion of predictive success. Thus,
we do not belie the subject of theology simply by bringing theological convictions into coherence
with the broadest range of human knowledge available to us. (In fact, this principle of "submitting
all to God" is intrinsically problematic.) In this sense, my position overlaps much more with the
points made by Sheila Davaney (and similar arguments forwarded by James Gustafson) and the
contemporary theology to which she contributes. My only contention with this position, which
reduces God to metaphor, is that our present cultural situation, in which God-language continues to
be used for highly destructive purposes, perhaps calls for the more pressing responsibility to
disabuse a wider culture of problematic, classical theological convictions that fund wrongheaded _
moral preoccupations by more direct attacks on these ways of viewing the world than by a
reconstruction of the very language they use. Reconstruing our culture's troubling notion(s) of God
may be one way of achieving the same ends I am after, but in light of liberal theology's failure
despite its marked improvements on classical theological convictions-to supplant problematic
theological beliefs among the vast majority, I remain convinced that a sustained attack on the
language itself may more effectively propel us in the ethical direction we _wish to go.
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